A critical review of sovereign guarantees and it’s adequacy as a risk mitigation instrument in a limited recourse context : Pakistan’s energy sector case study. by Khan, Ahmed Abdullah
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/101223/
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
 
4 
A Critical Review of Sovereign Guarantees and it’s Adequacy as a Risk 
Mitigation Instrument in a Limited Recourse Context 
 
 Pakistan’s Energy Sector Case Study  
 
By 
Ahmed Abdullah Khan 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
School of Law 
University of Warwick 
October 2017 
  
 
5 
Table of Contents 
A Philosophical Scope of Sovereign Guarantees and Their Adequacy as a 
Risk Mitigation Instrument in a Limited Recourse Context ............. 1	  
Table of Contents ................................................................................................. 5	  
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... 8	  
Declaration .......................................................................................................... 10	  
Abstract.. ............................................................................................................. 11	  
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................ 13	  
Table of Figures .................................................................................................. 16	  
Table of Cases ..................................................................................................... 17	  
Dedication ........................................................................................................... 20	  
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................. 21	  
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 21	  
1.1	   Pakistan’s Chronic Energy Crisis: Fruitless Effort ................................ 21	  
1.2	   Research Methodology .......................................................................... 28	  
1.2.1	   Books, articles, cases and other academic literature .............................. 29	  
1.2.2	   Academic Workshop .............................................................................. 30	  
1.2.3	   Fieldwork analysis and interviews ......................................................... 31	  
1.3	   Investment Security, Certainty and Promotion ...................................... 32	  
1.4	   The Emergence and Risk of Circular Debt: A Threat to Investment? ... 39	  
1.5	   SOEs and the Existential Paradox for the Sovereign Guarantee 
Framework ............................................................................................. 53	  
1.6	   Redundancy Measure: Political Risk Insurance ..................................... 58	  
1.7	   Conclusion ............................................................................................. 61	  
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................. 66	  
Project Finance as a Risk Mitigation Instrument—A Primer ....................... 66	  
2.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 66	  
2.1.1	   Historical Outline ................................................................................... 67	  
2.1.2	   Understanding Project Finance and Corporate Finance Transactions ... 74	  
2.2	   Main Parties in a Project Finance Transaction ....................................... 77	  
2.2.1	   Sponsors ................................................................................................. 79	  
2.2.2	   Project’s Sub-Contractors ...................................................................... 82	  
2.2.3	   Off-Taking Body and Government of Host State .................................. 84	  
 
6 
2.3	   Project Finance and Application: Gulpur Power Project ....................... 86	  
2.4	   Conclusion ............................................................................................. 89	  
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................. 92	  
Guarantee or Indemnity—An Old Chestnut Revisited .................................. 92	  
3.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 92	  
3.1.1	   Historical Significance ........................................................................... 94	  
3.2	   Definition of Suretyship ......................................................................... 96	  
3.2.1	   Principles underlying a guarantee ........................................................ 100	  
3.2.2	   Underlying features of an Indemnity ................................................... 106	  
3.3	   Co-Existence of Indemnity and Guarantee—The InG Agreements .... 111	  
3.3.1	   Guarantee or Indemnity? An Old Chestnut .......................................... 116	  
3.3.2	   Release of a Guarantor? ....................................................................... 118	  
3.4	   Conclusion ........................................................................................... 122	  
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................... 127	  
Sovereign Guarantees: Post Gunboat Diplomacy to Trade Diplomacy ...... 127	  
4.1	   Introduction .......................................................................................... 127	  
4.2	   Shifting Sands: Sovereign within Sovereignty? .................................. 131	  
4.2.1	   Sovereign Guarantees and Infrastructure Development ...................... 142	  
4.3	   Are Sovereign Guarantees Absolute or Obsolete? The Case for a Faulty 
Structure ............................................................................................... 147	  
4.3.1	   Sometimes A Cigar Is Just A Cigar ..................................................... 152	  
4.3.1.a	   Separation of the State from SOE: Myth and Delusions revisited under 
Article 4 ............................................................................................... 154	  
4.3.1.b	   Hc Svnt Dracones: Article 5 and Exercise of Government Authority. 179	  
4.3.2	   The Expectation Gap ............................................................................ 185	  
4.3.3	   Legislative Limitations, Imbalance and Restrictions ........................... 187	  
4.4	   Conclusion ........................................................................................... 192	  
 
7 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................... 200	  
Redundancy Measure: Political Risk Insurance ........................................... 200	  
5.1	   Introduction .......................................................................................... 200	  
5.2	   Navigating Political Risk ..................................................................... 205	  
5.2.1	   What is Political Risk? ......................................................................... 205	  
5.2.1.a	   Expropriation ....................................................................................... 207	  
5.2.1.b	   Transfer restrictions ............................................................................. 211	  
5.2.1.c	   Contract repudiation ............................................................................. 213	  
5.2.2	   Political Risk in Pakistan ..................................................................... 219	  
5.3	   Political Risk Insurance ....................................................................... 224	  
5.3.1	   Are Insurance and Guarantee instruments two sides to a coin? ........... 227	  
5.3.2	   MIGA’s PRI: A Reassuring model? .................................................... 231	  
5.3.3	   Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) ........................... 235	  
5.3.4	   Are Risk Insurance and Sovereign Guarantee Instruments different?. 249	  
5.4	   Conclusion ........................................................................................... 255	  
Chapter 6 ........................................................................................................... 259	  
Conclusion: Investment Security Reappraisal .............................................. 259	  
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 272 
  
 
8 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Dalvinder Singh for his support 
and guidance throughout this process. I am indebted to him for his commitment 
and resolve. Undertaking a PhD has been an enlightening experience and this 
thesis is every bit a reflection of Professor Singh’s commitment, as it is mine.  
Undertaking a PhD has been a great learning experience. I have come across 
various concepts, theoretical frameworks, and academic literature that I would 
not otherwise have explored. I was 17 when I met young scholars at the 
University of Cambridge. I was moved by their research, and their commitment 
to preserve knowledge by creating more. My decision to pursue a PhD was rather 
fortuitous, however an insightful learning experience. 
This thesis would not have been possible without the help of the academic and 
administrative staff at the law school. They have been most supportive of my 
endeavors. I would especially like to thank Professor Stephen Connelly and Dr 
Raza Saeed for their relentless help on issues that have invariably contributed 
towards my thesis. 
I would like to thank the Economic Social Research Council (ESRC) for 
providing the funding and ancillary support to undertake this PhD thesis. I am 
grateful to ESRC’s DTC team for their belief in my ideas albeit raw at the time 
of my application. ESRC’s continued support recently helped me organise a 
workshop in London reflecting on the dynamics of political risk insurance in 
electricity projects. This workshop has led me to explore new ideas and bring a 
 
9 
practitioner’s perspective to this study. I am also grateful to Dr Raphael Heffron 
(Jean Monnet Professor in Energy and Natural Resources Law and Policy, Queen 
Mary University of London) for his relentless support. We have co-authored a 
paper in collaboration with lawyers from King & Spalding LLP in the Oxford 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business. He has encouraged me to undertake 
new endeavors, and this workshop would not have been possible without him. 
This thesis is not the end. The ideas that I have reviewed and reflected upon are 
all very broad, modestly, a thesis within their own right. I hope to expand on 
these ideas and continue to contribute within this area.   
 
10 
Declaration 
I, Ahmed Abdullah Khan, hereby declare that this thesis is my original work, 
which to the best of my knowledge, information and belief does not infringe 
rights of any third parties. I also confirm that the chapters of this thesis have not 
been submitted either in part or in full before any other University for the award 
of any Degree or Diploma. 
  
 
11 
Abstract 
This study provides a holistic outline of the investment security measures 
provided by host states, especially in developing countries normative to a limited 
recourse context. In order to provide a thorough, discursive analysis, this thesis 
refers to Pakistan’s energy sector as a case study example. Rising electricity 
shortfall and continued rise of circular debt have inhibited Pakistan’s continued 
efforts to address electricity challenges. These pose serious questions insofar as 
sovereign guarantee measures provided by the state. Moreover, in view of the 
acute shortage of capital for infrastructure development in developing 
economies, especially in the energy sector, there is an omnipresent question 
around the adequacy of these security measures. This thesis canvasses the use of 
sovereign guarantee measures normative to Pakistan’s energy sector, adopting a 
three-tier approach. First, this thesis attempts to discuss the highly leveraged 
nature and structure of project finance transactions. These measures are 
explained as an area of immense importance, especially from an energy sector 
standpoint. This form of finance is especially important for infrastructure 
projects in volatile, risky jurisdictions. The second tier focuses on risk-mitigation 
strategies adopted by host states especially in an unregulated or poor investment 
regime. It examines sovereign guarantees offered by host states, with a specific 
focus on legal structures under a suretyship arrangement from a Common law 
perspective. Whilst undertaking a thorough, discursive analysis this thesis 
reviews the existing frameworks of the organisations engaged within Pakistan’s 
energy cycle to determine the adequacy of any guarantees.  In an interesting 
twist, this study adopts the structural and functional tests laid out in various cases 
to determine the adequacy of sovereign guarantee frameworks. Last, this thesis 
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reviews third-party risk-mitigation instruments with a specific focus on MIGA’s 
risk insurance as a measure of either an additional or replacement form of 
security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms  
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
 
CPPAG  Central Power Purchasing Agency Guarantee Limited 
 
CPEC   China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
 
DISCO  Distribution Companies 
 
Draft Articles Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 
 
Debt Limitation Act Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 
 
EPC   Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
 
EIU   Economic Intelligence Unit 
 
EVP   Executive Vice President 
 
ESRP   Energy Sector Restructuring Program  
 
EBRD   European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 
FC   Financial Close 
 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Financial Assistance  United Kingdom Infrastructure (Financial Assistance Act 
Act 2012) 
 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
 
GOP   Government of Pakistan 
 
GBP   Great Britain Pound 
 
Group   The World Bank Group 
 
GB   Gilgit Baltistan 
 
HUBCO  Hub Power Company Limited 
 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
 
ICSID   International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 
IPP   Independent Power Producer/Provider 
 
 
14 
IA   Implementation Agreement  
 
ILC   International Law Commission 
 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
 
IFC   International Finance Corporation 
 
LDC   Less Developed Country 
 
LOI   Letter of Intent 
 
LOS   Letter of Support 
 
MIGA   Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
 
MIGA Convention Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 
 
MAC   Material Adverse Change 
 
NEPRA  National Electric Power Regulatory Authority 
 
NTDC   National Transmission and Distribution Company 
 
NNPC   Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
 
NAFTA  North America Free Trade Agreement 
 
OGDCL  Oil and Gas Development Company Limited 
 
PPIB   Private Power Infrastructure Board 
 
PPA   Power Purchase Agreement 
 
PPP   Public-Private Partnership 
 
PRI   Political Risk Insurance 
 
PSO   Pakistan State Oil 
 
SACE   Servizi Assicurativi Del Commercio 
 
SPV   Special Purpose Vehicle 
 
SOE   State Owned Entity 
 
SWF   Sovereign Wealth Fund 
 
T&D   Transmission and Distribution  
 
15 
 
Twh   Tera Watt Hours 
 
Oxfam   Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
 
O&M   Operation and Maintenance 
 
OPIC   Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
 
USAID  United Stated Agency for International Development 
 
US   United States of America 
 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
 
WRI   World Resource Institute  
 
WAPDA  Water and Power Development Authority  
  
 
16 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Key Players in Pakistan’s Energy Sector .......................................... 44	  
Figure 1.2: Payment Cycle in Pakistan’s Energy Sector ...................................... 46	  
Figure 1.3: Price Differential Comparison ........................................................... 48	  
Figure 1.4: Cost of Generation v Consumer Tariff .............................................. 49	  
Figure 1.5: Circular Debt Figures (US$ Bn) ........................................................ 50	  
Figure 2.1: Infrastructure Finance Model ............................................................ 72	  
Figure 2.2: Typical Project Finance ..................................................................... 78	  
Figure 2.3: MIRA Power Project Finance Structure ............................................ 88	  
Figure 3.1: Pre-Default ....................................................................................... 104	  
Figure 3.2: Post-Default ..................................................................................... 104	  
Figure 3.3: The Indemnity Pendulum of Responsibility .................................... 110	  
Figure 4.1: Illustration of SOE and State ........................................................... 170	  
Figure 5.1: Selected Country Risk Profile ......................................................... 206	  
Figure 5.2: Transfer and Regulatory Risk in Asia and Latin America .............. 213	  
Figure 5.3: Rate of Return on Equity vs. GDP Growth ..................................... 215	  
Figure 5.4: Change in FDI since 2011 (GBP£bn) .............................................. 216	  
Figure 5.5: FDI by Region ................................................................................. 217	  
Figure 5.6: FDI Inflow by Region ...................................................................... 218	  
Figure 5.7: Pakistan's FDI Inflow 2006-2010 .................................................... 222	  
Figure 5.8: Pakistan's FDI Inflow 2011-2014 .................................................... 222	  
Figure 5.9: Interest in PRI  ................................................................................. 244	  
Figure 5.10: Illustration of how MIGA operates ............................................... 248	  
 
  
 
17 
Table of Cases 
Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Unex Corp Ltd [1994] 38 Con L R 63 
 
Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV, MSC Belgium N V [2008] EWHC 
1265 (Comm) 
 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Judgement ICJ 
Reports 2007 
 
Argo Caribbean Group Ltd v Lewis [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 454 
 
Barclays Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306 (Comm) 
 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 
1970, 3 
 
Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ticaret Ve Sanayi A S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ARB/03/29 
 
Birkdale District Electric Supply Co Ltd v Southport Corporation (1926) AC 355 
 
BNP Paribas SA and Others v Yukos Oil Co [2005] EWHC 1321 (Ch) 
 
Bristol Airport Plc v Poudrill and Others [1990] 2 WLR 1362 
 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo v Gold Coast Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1806 
 
CiBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 
 
Commercial Cable Co v Newfoundland (1916) 2 A C 610 
 
Commissioner of Crown Lands v Page [1960] 2 Q B 274 
 
Concord Trust v Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc [2005] UKHL 27 
 
Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Ltd v Chalk (1975) AC 520, 533 
 
Dahanayaka v De Silva and Others [1978] 1 SLR 41, 10 September 1979 
 
Dane v Mortgage Insurance Corp Ltd [1894] 1 Q B 54 at 60 
 
Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No ARB/09/02 
 
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7 
 
18 
Flamingo Duty Free Shop Private Limited v The Republic of Poland, 
UNCITRAL 12 August 2016 
 
General Produce Co v United Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255, 258 
 
Goulston Discount Co Ltd v Clark [1967] 2 Q B 493 
 
Harbour Assurance v Kansa (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455 
 
Harburg India Rubber Comb Company v Martin [1902] 1 KB 778 
 
Harley Davidson Inc v Minstar Inc 41 F 3d 341 (7th Cir 1994) 
 
Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara Attenborough Associated Ltd [1997] AC 70 
 
HUBCO Power Company Ltd v Pakistan WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841) 
 
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos [1980] 2 All ER 29 
 
IIG Capital v Van Der Merwe [2008] EWCA Civ 542 
 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia, Award dated 3 March 2010, ICSID Case 
Nos ARB/05.18 and ARB/07/15 
 
IPCO (Nigeria) Limited v Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (2017) 
UKSC 16 
 
Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No ARB/04/13 
 
Knighthead Master Fund LP and Others v Bank of New York Mellon and 
Another [2014] EWHC 3662 (Ch) 
 
Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine, ARB No 080/2005 
 
Marubeni Hong Kong v Government of Mongolia [2005] EWCA Civ 395 
 
Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch & Others v Government of Balochistan & Others 
(PLD 2013 Supreme Court 641) 
 
Moschi v Lep Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 
 
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No ARB/99/6 
 
New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455 
 
Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11 
 
 
19 
Northshore Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc and Others [2011] EWCA Civ 
230 
 
OGRA through its Secretary v M/S Midway II, CNG Station and Others (Civil 
Petition No 455/2013) 
 
Pan Am Corp v Delta Air Lines Inc, 175 B R 438, 514 (S D N Y 1994) 
 
Pitts and Others v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 
 
Polak v Everett [1876] 1 QBD 669 
 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) UKSC 34 
 
Prudential Insurance Co v IRC (1904) 2 K B 658 
 
Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] A C 379 
 
Rederiaktiebolaget Amphirite v The King [1921] 3 K B 500 
 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Chandra and Another [2011] EWCA Civ 192 
 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 A C 773 
 
S D Myers Inc (US) v Canada, First Partial Award, paras 117, 123, 127, 40 I L M 
1408 (2001) (NAFTA Ch11 Arb Inb 2000) 
<www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_sdmyers.htm> 
 
Sofaer v Anglo Irish Asset Finance Plc (2011) EWHC 1480 (Ch) 
 
Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17 
 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529 
 
Twycross v Dreyfus, 5 Ch D 605, 616 
 
Trafalgar House Construction (Regions) Ltd v General Surety & Guarantee Co 
Ltd [1996] A C 199 
 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v Government of Pakistan, Directorate of 
Agricultural Supplies [1975] 1 W L R 1485, 1491 
 
Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch) 
 
Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 
 
Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 C L 
R 41 
 
Zuhal K [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 151 
 
20 
Dedication 
I dedicate this thesis to my father… He is the real hero, and inspiration behind 
this thesis. If I become half the man he is, I will consider myself successful! I am 
also grateful to my family for their continued support and trust.  
 
 
 
  
 
21 
Chapter 1  
 Introduction 
1.1 Pakistan’s Chronic Energy Crisis: Fruitless Effort 
The inception of this study dates back to my work seeking investment for a 
50MW power project in Pakistan. This experience led to familiarity with the 
notions of project finance, sovereign guarantees, risk management in 
infrastructure development finance, and measures to mitigate risk. A corporate 
entity was incorporated, and through this commercial enterprise several private 
equity firms were approached to explore investment opportunities in Pakistan’s 
energy sector. After several successful meetings with government officials to 
discuss price tariffs, and with EPC contractors and private equity firms to discuss 
financial close arrangements, the mosaic was being completed. The second round 
of meetings were succeeded by a third, in order to facilitate a final round of 
meetings to commence work. Unbeknownst to me then, this was only the 
beginning of an endless chain of meetings between government officials and 
various representatives from the EPC contractors. This experience raised several 
pertinent questions, for example, how does the government aim to pay the 
project company in view of rising circular debt? The accumulation of circular 
debt renders any security offered under a sovereign guarantee inadequate; why 
offer it in the first place? And last, what concessions and measures will the 
government adopt to address the state-owned entity issue? It was the lack of 
answers for these questions that inhibited, and later thwarted efforts to secure 
finance for an electricity project that could have contributed towards economic 
growth in Pakistan.  
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The outcome of this experience laid the foundation for undertaking this research 
project. The broader theme for this thesis rests upon illuminating various facets 
of sovereign guarantees and the implications of breach of contractual 
commitments by off-taking bodies in infrastructure development. It also 
illustrates how little investors and government officials know about ‘sovereign 
guarantees’, especially in project finance context. Failure to facilitate and 
establish an electricity power project was an end to one endeavour, but the 
beginning of another. In essence, this study is a journey to try and understand the 
sovereign guarantee framework as a means to not only assist investors to 
determine the adequacy of such guarantees, but also to provide government 
officials an outline of how they can improve their investment regime by 
understanding what a sovereign guarantee entails.   
As we look around us; we see roads that our cars drive on, we see transmission 
lines through which electricity is transferred from the generation facilities to our 
households, water storage facilities, and a thick network of roads, amongst many 
other examples. Infrastructure in one form or another surrounds us. Infrastructure 
facilities play a key role in promoting and sustaining rapid economic growth, and 
attracting more investment in other sectors to stimulate growth. Infrastructure, 
designed properly, can also make growth more inclusive by sharing its benefits 
with poorer groups and communities, especially by connecting distant lands, 
remote areas and landlocked countries to major trade routes or business centres.1 
Moreover, it also creates a systemic effect wherein one infrastructure project 
                                                
1 See Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, ‘Estimating demand for infrastructure, 2010-2020’, in Biswa 
Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian Community, 
(ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
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leads the way for another infrastructure project, for example investment in an 
electricity generation plant will attract investment for distribution centres.  
Project finance has been used in sectors where large investment capital is 
required, investment vehicles have long-lived assets, and a longer period is 
required in order to amortise investment costs. A close correlation exists between 
the projected cash flows of the project and the required rates of return for the 
lenders and sponsors alike.2 Whereas there is growing acceptance and 
recognition to improve infrastructure facilities and invest within the 
infrastructure alleviation in order to foster growth, it is argued that public coffers 
are cash strapped. There is a big gap in the ability of both developing and 
developed countries to finance all of their infrastructure needs.3 In particular, 
infrastructure funds for developing countries like India, Pakistan, Nigeria and 
other Sub-Saharan Africa countries are scarce, and subject to competition. In 
order to meet these growing demands for infrastructure, and involve the private 
sector to share the risk of operations within these imperative infrastructure 
                                                
2 Antonio Estache and John Strong, ‘The Rise the Fall, and…the Emerging Recovery of Project 
Finance in Transport’, (July 2000) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2385 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=630757> Accessed 03 May 2017. Estache and Strong submit ‘project 
finance has typically been used in those sectors that require large capital expenditures, that have 
long-lived assets and, that require long periods to amortize investment costs and generate 
required rates of returns for both creditors and equity holders. Historically, project finance has 
been used to describe financings in which the lenders look to the cash flows of an investment 
project for repayment, without recourse to either equity sponsors or the public sector to make up 
any shortfall.    
3 Kwok-Chii Fung, Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Francis Ng, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in 
Financing Regional Infrastructure’, in Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, ‘Estimating demand for 
infrastructure, 2010-2020’, in Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag, 
Infrastructure for Asian Community, (ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
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development projects, project finance is increasingly used to facilitate high-risk 
infrastructure development.4  
From the outset, the international infrastructure regime is very competitive. As 
global economy growth expands, industrial production levels are soaring. As 
outlined by Bhattacharyay, in order to keep pace with the demands of rapid 
urbanisation and economic growth (currently at 4%), developing economies will 
need to increase spending from the current US$800bn-$900bn to about US$1.8 
trillion-US$2.3 trillion per year by 2020, or from about 3% to 6-8% of GDP in 
infrastructure development.5 These figures correspond with ADB’s report 
regarding infrastructure development in Asia’s context.6 Growing demands and 
rapid expansion have created a chronic infrastructure deficit especially in the 
energy sectors of countries with emerging and developing market economies.7 
Lack of long-term planning and inadequate regulatory measures have culminated 
in a whole gamut of issues for the infrastructure industry in these jurisdictions. 
Inderst notes that good infrastructure is key to economic growth as well as social 
                                                
4 It is also interesting to note that borrowers prefer project finance loans if the corporate 
governance system in a country is weak, economic health is poor, and political risk and bank 
influence is high. See Christa Hainz and Stefanie Kleimeier, ‘Project Finance as a Risk-
Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending’, (December 2006). Governance and the 
Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), SFB/TR 15, Discussion Paper No. 183 < 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=567112> Accessed 21 April 2017; also see Edward R Yescombe, 
Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). Yescombe argues that ‘a high ratio of 
debt is the essence of project finance. Within prudent limits, therefore, sponsors wish to limit the 
amount of equity they invest in a project, to improve their own return, and thus to raise the 
maximum level of debt’; also see International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment (IEA, 
2017).  
5 See Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, ‘Estimating demand for infrastructure 2010-2020’, in Biswa 
Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag (ed.), Infrastructure for Asian 
Connectivity, (ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar, 2012) pp 19-79.  
6  Asian Development Bank, Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs (Philippines, ADB, 2017) < 
https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs> Accessed on 14 August 2017. 
7 India is a good example of industrial growth at a staggering pace. With a total of 300 million 
people still without access to electricity, it is believed that India’s rapid economic growth and 
industrial expansion is further straining the existing energy deficit that exists. For an insight into 
India’s energy sector and their current reliance and shift from traditional energy mix, please see 
Richard Martin, ‘India’s Energy Crisis’ MIT Technology Review (7 October 2015) 
<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542091/indias-energy-crisis> Accessed 10 January 2017. 
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and ecological development8. Public expenditure in both developed and 
developing countries is stretched to its limits; the growing population, expanding 
middle classes, rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, and depletion of resources 
are creating huge and visible pressures on existing infrastructure framework. As 
a result, infrastructure investment demand has grown immensely in developing 
countries.9 Consequently, there has been an increasing reliance on the private 
sector or on public-private partnership model to promote infrastructure 
development.10  
Pakistan’s chronic energy crisis is no hidden fact. Not only is this crisis deeply 
rooted in the electricity production deficit, which in 2015 stood at 5000MW11, it 
also relates to governance issues that are experienced through widespread 
inefficiencies, including transmission and distribution (hereinafter referred to as 
“T&D”) losses of more than twenty percent.12 Pakistan has thus been embroiled 
in an issue that threatens its economic presence in the global markets. As this 
study later discusses, the impact of the energy crisis on the textile industry, and 
agriculture is immense. Pakistan’s installed electricity capacity stands at 
                                                
8 For a contrasting perspective on the impact of infrastructure investment on the environment, see 
Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, environment impoverishment, and the crisis 
of development (Island Press, 2013).   
9 See Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian 
Community, (ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
10 See Hugh G McCrory Jr, ‘Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries’, (April 1995) 
American Society of International Law Vol.89, pp 19-36. McCrory argues ‘by the end of the 
1980s, many emerging nations had rejected models of development that stressed state ownership 
of industry and had embraced a new model of development based upon support for the private 
sector’.  
11 See Musadik Malik, ‘Pakistan’s energy crisis: Challenges, Principles, and Strategies’, in 
Michael Kugelman (ed), Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is there any way out? 
(Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2015). On average Pakistan experiences a 
shortfall of 4000MW of electricity.  
12 Michael Kugelman (ed), Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is there any way out? 
(Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2015). 
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21,000MW.13 However, this figure does not reflect Pakistan’s electricity need; it 
indicates the total generation capacity. Pakistan is no different to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, or any other developing country for that matter. Developing countries 
emphasise on power generation whilst completely overlooking investment for 
power distribution networks. Consequently, electricity generation is centred on 
the existing consumers, and is supplied to an existing demographic without wide 
circulation. In the Sub-Saharan Africa, there are over 620 million people who 
lack access to electricity. That is over two-thirds of the region’s population. A 
report published14 by Oxfam outlines that even dramatically expanding such 
supply would leave many in energy poverty. The report relies on the 
International Energy Agency’s (hereinafter referred to as “IEA”) forecasting and 
submits that on-grid generation in Sub-Saharan Africa will increase 350% by 
2040, from 440 to 1541 Tera watt hours (TWh). Despite this increase, 530 
million people will still be without electricity. 
The predominant reliance on imported fossil fuels and lack of energy mix is not 
providing any consolation for the current investment regime. As Khalid Mansoor 
highlights, 44% of Pakistan’s energy supply is imported. With an estimated 
US$15bn spent on oil imports, it is hard to imagine how an already constrained 
                                                
13 This is an estimated figure. As per various sources it is argued that Pakistan’s peak demand 
during 2014 along was 20,800MW. This figure is expected to rise to nearly 32,000 MW by 2019. 
Also see John R. Hammond, ‘The role of the US Private sector in Meeting Pakistan’s Energy 
requirements’, in Robert M Hathaway, Bhumika Muchhala, Michael Kugelman, Fuelling the 
Future: Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 21st century (Woodrow Wilson International 
Centre for Scholars, March 2007). Hammond argues that Pakistan will require 143,310MW by 
2030.  
14 Ryan Hogarth and Llmi Granoff, ‘Speaking truth to power: Why energy distribution, more than 
generation, is Africa’s poverty reduction challenge’ (OPM/Oxfam, Working Paper 418, May 
2015). 
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economy can sustain such high expenditure.15 Moreover, the oil import bill is 
subject to fluctuation depending upon the market conditions, for example dollar 
exchange rate, and International oil prices.16 To put this into perspective, 
Pakistan produces only 19.9% of the oil it consumes. This means that a major 
proportion of this fuel is imported, often paying heavy premiums due to 
fluctuating oil prices in the global markets. This economic constraint directly 
affects the liquidity position of distribution companies in Pakistan.  
Rapid growth through industrialisation and urbanisation has placed considerable 
pressures on the existing infrastructure facilities in Pakistan. This also correlates 
with the general expansion and growth in Asia. The region’s rapid growth by 
providing services to the developed economies through cheap labour, lack of 
adequate regulatory framework to protect employees, and their drive to attract 
foreign capital has meant that Asia has been predominantly a scapegoat for large, 
multinational corporations based in the United States, United Kingdom and 
Europe to produce high-quality products at cheaper, competitive prices.17 Growth 
at an unanticipated pace and lack of availability of capital have inhibited these 
states to manage the allocation of resources and provision of services, further 
constraining the existing framework. Whereas, India, China, and even 
Bangladesh have kept up-to-date with investment reform and adequate 
                                                
15 Khalid Mansoor, ‘How coal can help address Pakistan’s energy crisis’ In Michael Kugelman 
(ed), Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is there any way out? (Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, 2015). 
16 See Robert M Hathway, Bhumika Muchhala, Michael Kugelman, Fuelling the Future: Meeting 
Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 21st century (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 
March 2007).  
17 See Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai, and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian 
Community (joint publication of the Asian Development Bank Institute and Asian Development 
Bank with Edward Elgar, 2012).  
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regulation18, Pakistan’s political and policy challenges have led to a decline in 
investment and increasing energy deficit.19 Scarcity of public funds has meant 
that there has been no major undertaking insofar as investment in the energy 
sector in the last decade.20  
1.2  Research Methodology 
The notion of ‘sovereign guarantees’ is predicated upon the understanding that 
an organ of the state will guarantee the performance of an off-taking body to the 
project company. This statement is fraught with various implications for the 
entire project finance transaction. However, despite the growing use of sovereign 
guarantees in emerging, developing economies, they have not attracted a major 
academic undertaking that deal exclusively with the use of guarantees in 
investment regimes. As a result, this study focuses on the use of guarantees 
issued by sovereign states to investors in order to attract investment, and provide 
a robust mechanism for security. This thesis relies upon various primary and 
secondary sources to carry out a discursive analysis. However, it is often difficult 
to label or categorise a thesis, especially one involving a hybrid of research 
                                                
18 For a detailed discussion on India’s energy sector reform please see Sheoli Pargal and 
Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, More Power to India: The Challenge of Electricity Distribution (The 
World Bank Group, 2014) 
<file://wimple/User53/l/lapnai/Desktop/PhD%20folder/India%20Energy%20Sector%20Report/
More%20Power%20to%20India,%20pargal%20and%20Banerjee.pdf> Accessed on 23 March 
2017. The report lauds efforts undertaken by India to improve distribution networks and enhance 
efficiency. However, there is still room for improvement as the energy sector is inhibited by 
approximately US$77bn circular debt (as of 2011) which amounts to 5% of India’s GDP.  
19 Pakistan’s lack of an up-to-date policy framework is primarily due to the state’s constant 
‘firefighting’ strategy, rather than undertaking any meaningful policy. As a result, any incumbent 
government continues to address old policies that have either been challenged or dissolved, 
instead of implementing new policies.  
20 For a detailed discussion on the timing of infrastructure development please see Fan Zhai, 
‘Benefits of Infrastructure: An empirical study’ in Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai 
and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian Community, (ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012). 
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methods.21 The scope of this thesis encompasses qualitative research of a 
doctrinal nature, reviewing the underlying features of a guarantee transaction 
from a ‘black letter law’ perspective. Moreover, this project is predicated on 
using Pakistan as a case study model to discuss and highlight the logical 
connections or disjunctions between the uses of sovereign guarantees as a mode 
of investment security. This conjunction of doctrinal research and comparative 
study is highly relevant for the purposes of this project. Whereas, doctrinal 
research has been defined as ‘a detailed and highly technical commentary upon, 
and systematic exposition of, the context of legal doctrine’22, the law of 
guarantees is extensively a black letter law subject. It is argued that this study 
uses the doctrinal and black letter law approach to provide a context to the 
sovereign guarantee framework that is widely used by various developing 
countries. This section outlines the research methodology to help readers 
understand the sources that have been used to carry out and support the primary 
hypothesis; are sovereign guarantee instruments an adequate form of security?  
1.2.1 Books, articles, cases and other academic literature 
Despite their wide use, sovereign guarantees have not attracted a major academic 
undertaking. In order to understand the intricacies and the underlying features of 
a sovereign guarantee, this study has separated the two terminologies ‘sovereign’ 
and a ‘guarantee’ and tries to determine their significance in isolation. Whereas 
academic text and case law on guarantees is predominately from a private sphere 
of law, the underlying features within a guarantee transaction from a public, 
                                                
21 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertation: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson, 2007) 31.  
22 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertation: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson, 2007) 49. 
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meta-form are the same. Consequently, academic text from common law 
countries has been referred to, in order to understand the characteristics of a 
guarantee transaction. Primarily, there are three broad research questions that 
have been addressed as part of this academic undertaking: 
1. Why is there a need for security measures in highly leveraged 
financial transactions? 
2. What is being offered by the state under a sovereign guarantee 
framework, and what are the underlying features of this 
framework? 
3. In the event that the sovereign guarantee framework proves 
inadequate, what measures can be adopted to strengthen the 
existing security framework?  
Relying on various cases, academic literature on guarantees from private law 
sphere aligns the above-mentioned questions to the principal purpose of this 
project, which is to identify ambiguities in sovereign guarantee framework. 
Additionally, there is a vacuum in the determination whether an entity forms an 
integral part of the state’s organic structure. This study seeks recourse to the 
Draft Articles, and judgements pronounced by ICSID tribunal on Articles 4 and 5 
to review the contention.    
1.2.2 Academic Workshop 
Academic engagement is a vital portion of any robust academic undertaking. 
Through funding from the Economic Social Research Council (ESRC), a 
workshop was organised at the Centre for Commercial Legal Studies (London) 
as part of this project, in order to discuss ideas, exchange views, and to engage 
with both practitioners and academics. The event focused on deliberating various 
contours that have been discussed in this study. The primary underlying issue 
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that was reviewed at the workshop was the role of political risk insurance. In 
light of the discussion undertaken throughout this study, it was pertinent to 
incorporate the views of the people at MIGA, policy advisors and practitioners. 
This workshop provided a great platform to engage with these practitioners and 
policy advisors in order to field ideas from this study as a method to influence 
policymaking, and to seek their advice.  Since the workshop has been mentioned 
throughout this study as a source, it is worthy of being discussed separately as a 
‘method’. This workshop afforded a useful sphere to get an insight into the 
minds of government officials who negotiate these sovereign guarantee 
agreements with private investors, and decipher their views to understand what is 
really being offered under a sovereign guarantee framework. Organising a 
workshop was also a great opportunity to discuss some of the arguments 
presented in this thesis to gauge the opinion of practitioners and other eminent 
academics.  
1.2.3 Fieldwork analysis and interviews 
In the absence of a theoretical framework to support my contentions, it was vital 
that various facets of this project were discussed with members of government, 
key policymakers, and civil servants in the organisations that have been 
extensively discussed, especially in Chapter 4. The primary aim and objective for 
undertaking fieldwork focused on gathering and reviewing information from 
confidential agreements signed with PPIB and private investors. Whereas no 
commercially sensitive information has been used for the purposes of this 
project, various contingent liability terms, guarantee provisions, and general 
responsibilities of the parties have been perused and are subject to 
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confidentiality. Since the major focus of this study is predicated on Pakistan and 
its energy sector, this study endeavours to use the relevant information derived 
through interviews and fieldwork to establish the underlying relationship of 
sovereign guarantees with investment flow. As outlined in the study, Whitman’s 
contention regarding state guarantees inviting ‘political interference’ and such 
assurances being construed as a form of ‘favouritism’ are some of the norms that 
required extensive understanding of how such transactions are undertaken.23 
Moreover, as explored in Chapter 2, the premise of risk is not entirely mitigated 
through careful structuring of a transaction by insulting one party from another’s 
contractual risk. This is an interesting contention especially in view of breach of 
contractual provisions by SOEs.  
As part of the fieldwork undertaken for this project, investor-government 
meetings were witnessed in order to understand the underlying framework. An 
understanding developed by undertaking fieldwork and attending government-
investor meetings strengthens the contentions that such measures are necessary 
to attract investment, especially in a developing-country context. Moreover, 
another contention that facilities the proposal concerning the establishment of a 
revenue management plan is predicated upon the understanding that 
underdeveloped countries will have to follow ways and methods of development 
importantly different from those followed by the Western countries.24 
1.3 Investment Security, Certainty and Promotion 
                                                
23 Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press, 1965) 123. 
24 Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University 
Press, 1962) 102.  
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A theme that is constant throughout this study is predicated on the understanding 
that highly leveraged project finance transactions cannot mitigate risk through 
project finance alone. As a result, least-developed countries (hereinafter referred 
to as “LDCs”) and even some developed economies adopt guarantees as a form 
of risk mitigating measure. Unlike a private party or a corporate entity, a 
sovereign cannot be bankrupt or liquidated.25 In the event that an off-taker 
defaults on payment to the project company, the state, as the sovereign, will 
indemnify the project company against breach of contractual undertaking. As a 
result, sovereign guarantees have been used in infrastructure development sector 
to increase capital inflow, and to provide a robust form of security to investment 
vehicles, sponsors and lenders. 
However, as discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the concept of security and secure 
investment options is often elusive. Security culminates into certainty, and 
consequently leads to promotion. The three notions may seem obscurely 
connected, however they have a very strong correlation. Certainty and security in 
an investment regime promotes the infrastructure development capacity of a 
jurisdiction. Consequently, infrastructure development leads to growth.26  
Countries, especially volatile jurisdictions are prone to policy change due to 
economic conditions or regime change. This study discusses Riqo Diq as an 
example to illustrate this issue. Cases like Riqo Diq are a classic example of how 
regime change can lead to unfavourable results for investors. Such cases also 
                                                
25 For a detailed discussion on sovereign debt restructuring, see Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Legal 
Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (1st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009).  
26See Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, The Role of Institutions in Growth and 
Development (World Bank, Working Paper 10, 2008). 
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illustrate that the revocation of an agreement is not primarily targeting the 
investor per se, but trying to secure an otherwise undervalued deal. Sovereign 
guarantee agreements are a measure to provide security against such instances, 
especially in developing countries. Another aspect of sovereign guarantees is 
predicated upon the future revenue stream aspect of project finance. This is 
discussed later in detail.  
It is fascinating to see how despite higher returns, favourable policies, and even 
concessions on tax and import duties, investors are increasingly content to wield 
more robust security measures for their project companies. This signifies the 
investor’s interest in trying to protect their investment returns, and consequently 
lenders associating a lower risk premium. Therefore, within the ambit of 
investment and infrastructure development there is an increasing demand for 
sovereign guarantees from host states, as a measure of security to provide 
certainty within a highly-leveraged transaction. As outlined in Chapter 2, project 
finance transactions are predicated on high debt to equity ratios, especially in 
transactions involving the energy sector, wherein there are agreements signed 
between the off-taker and the project company. Project finance is viewed as an 
informal method to mitigate risk. Equity investment by sponsors is often 
associated with the lower risk that sponsors undertake. However, there is an 
increasing debate amongst practitioners and academics concerning the risk 
mitigation characteristic of project finance. Even though the sponsor’s equity 
investment may form a smaller part of the larger proportion of the total financing 
secured for the project company, there is a lack of adequate due diligence 
measures to inspect the investment regime, and the practicalities of carrying out 
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an extensive study to understand the dynamics of the host country are almost 
impossible. Even if extensive studies were carried out, this would not only 
involve time, it would directly increase the total cost of capital. While the due 
diligence measures may be ipso facto correct, the dynamics of liquidity or fiscal 
inadequacy might mean that there can be a radical shift due to previous 
administration’s poor policies or inadequate risk management.    
This study aims to discuss the underlying notion and legal principles within a 
sovereign guarantee framework. Whereas there are several methods to mitigate 
risk and create an environment where investors are comfortable to invest, 
sovereign guarantees are a more formal method of risk mitigation. Academic 
discourse on bank guarantees, sureties in both private and international law, is 
illustrative of the variety of material available on the subject.27 We have often 
come across the term guarantee used in an abstract manner, usually symbolic of 
an assurance towards a product, discharge of debt or even under land law.28 As 
financial contractual relationships grow complex, we have come across the term 
in various contexts29, often involving private parties and large financial 
                                                
27 For main academic texts on guarantees please see James O’Donovan and John Phillips, The 
Modern Contract of Guarantee (1st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010); Geraldine Andrews and 
Richard Millett, Law of Guarantee (6th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011); David Marks and 
Gabriel Moss, Rowlatt on Principal and Surety (6th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011); for a 
detailed discussion security in commercial transactions please see Hugh Beale, Michael Bridge, 
Louise Gullifer and Eva Lomnicka, The Law of Personal Property Security (1st Edition, Oxford, 
2007). 
28 The registration of title or creating a charge is effectively a system wherein the State 
authoritatively establishes title by declaring, under a guarantee of indemnity, that it is vested in a 
named person or persons, subject to specified encumbrances and qualifications. See Ben 
McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins, Sarah Nield, Land Law: Text cases, and materials (3rd edition, 
Oxford, 2015); Also see Law Commission, Land Registration of the Twenty-First Century: A 
conveyancing Revolution (Law Com No. 271, 2001). 
29 See Royal Bank of Scotland v Chandra and Another [2011] EWCA Civ 192; Northshore 
Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc and Others [2011] EWCA Civ 230; Landlord-tenant 
perspective see Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara Attenborough Associated Ltd [1997] AC 70; banking 
business between a lender an ordinary borrower wherein the borrower provides a guarantee to the 
financial institution assuring them that the loan will be paid back. See Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge (No.2) [2002] 2 A C 773; Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1993] Q B 109; also see CiBC 
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institutions. However, guarantees from an infrastructure investment perspective 
are generally scarce, and even in instances where academic literature discusses 
guarantees from an international, sovereign perspective30, it lacks a thorough, 
discursive analysis.31 As discussed in Chapter 2, the principal rationale for using 
project finance as a method to provide financing for an infrastructure project 
relates to the management of risk. Highly leveraged project financings are 
predicated upon distribution of risk where a particular party is best able to 
manage it. Consequently, the risk of currency exchange or regulatory risk rests 
with the host state. Construction and other commercial risks are borne by the 
project company. There is an increasing competition for securing investment by 
LDCs and other developing countries. Subedi argues that investment contracts 
especially those relating to infrastructure projects, often provide for higher levels 
of protection to investors than typical commercial contracts, by insulating them 
from future changes in domestic law of the host state.32 
Sovereign guarantees are one weapon in an arsenal used by host states to 
mitigate sponsor’s risk. As a consequence of issuing these sovereign guarantees, 
                                                                                                                               
Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200; simply within a structure where party A undertakes to 
guarantee the obligation of party B to party C. 
30 It is interesting to see the rationale adopted by the Court in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphirite v The 
King [1921] 3 K B 500. The scope of the case remains uncertain. The facts do demonstrate how 
an assurance can be mistaken for a guarantee. Rowlatt J submitted ‘it is not competent for the 
Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the 
needs of the community when the question arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom of 
action in matters which concern the welfare of the State’. This principle was not endorsed in 
Commissioner of Crown Lands v Page [1960] 2 Q B 274 and in Robertson v Minister of Pension 
[1949] 1 K B 227. 
31 Sovereign guarantees have been mentioned briefly in the following texts: Surya P Subedi, 
International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2nd Edition, Hart Publishing, 
2012); Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002); William M 
Stelwagon, ‘Financing Private Energy Projects in the third world’, 37 Cath Law 45 1996-1997; 
Philip R Wood, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees and Legal Opinions (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2007); Ibrahim F Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticisation of Investment 
Disputes: The roles of ICSID and MIGA’, 1 ICSID Rev: Foreign Investment L J 1. 
32 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Second 
Edition, Hart Publishing, 2012) 
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not only do lenders feel comfortable lending to volatile jurisdictions, but such 
concessions are also reflected in the interest rates associated with the lending 
amount; lower risk involves lower premium and vice versa. Sovereign guarantees 
play a critical role in attracting and retaining investment especially in LDCs. 
Sovereign guarantees have so far not attracted any major academic undertaking 
within the literature that exists on foreign investment law.33 The dearth of 
academic text on the subject undermines the role of sovereign guarantees as a 
pivotal plank in a bid for attracting foreign investment.34 Since a major part of 
lending to developing countries has taken the form of publicly guaranteed debt or 
private debt finance, it is imperative that an academic discourse reviews the 
underlying framework of sovereign guarantees.35 Foreign investment for 
infrastructure development in fragile, developing and underdeveloped economies 
like Pakistan, Nigeria and even India are contingent upon sovereign guarantees. 
Whereas sovereign guarantees can be adopted to mitigate various forms of risk, 
this study reviews the sovereign guarantee structure used by the government of 
the host state in order to guarantee the performance of the off-taking body. The 
                                                
33 See Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Second 
Edition, Hart Publishing, 2012); Philip R. Wood, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees and 
Legal Opinions (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007); a good academic text dedicated to 
government guarantees in foreign investment context is Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors (1st Edition, Columbia University Press, 1962). 
34 See Jonathan Eaton, ‘Public debt guarantees and private capital flight’, The World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol 1, No 3 (May 1987), pp.377-395. Eaton expresses his understanding of 
sovereign guarantees and explains why they are necessary: first, that lenders may not be able to 
observe the parameters of particular loan projects directly and therefore rely on the local 
government to determine whether or not these are at financially sound levels. Requiring a loan 
guarantee makes accurate reporting of the relevant data incentive-compatible for the government. 
Secondly, that lenders may not have a direct method to enforce repayment. Even if funds are 
invested domestically, lenders must rely on the local government to pursue bankruptcy 
proceedings against a borrower who does not repay. For a contrasting picture regarding 
government guarantees see Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in 
Foreign Investment (Princeton University Press, 1965). Marina argues ‘businesses are generally 
extremely reluctant to seek a government guaranty for fear of thus inviting political interference, 
and governments are equally loath to grant them because such action might be construed 
favouritism or, at the very least, involve them undesirably in judging the merits of a given 
enterprise’.  
35 Jonathan Eaton, ‘Public debt guarantees and private capital flight’, The World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol 1, No 3 (May 1987), pp 377-395. 
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highly leveraged nature of the project transaction requires contractual packages 
from project sponsors confirming that the project company output, namely 
electricity, will be purchased at a proposed rate (x) for a period of (y) years.36 In 
addition to a proposed letter of intent (hereinafter referred to as “LOI”), the 
lenders require a guarantee from the state in the form of a letter of support 
(hereinafter referred to as “LOS”) confirming that the off-taker will buy this 
electricity as an agreed output; failure to do so will result in an indemnification 
by the host state. This indemnification is an additional form of security to the 
contractual warranties and indemnities contained in a power purchase agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as “PPA”).37   
However, as we extensively review this form of secure undertaking, there is an 
increasing narrative rebutting this presumption of an absolute undertaking under 
a sovereign guarantee framework. The increasing liquidity issues, or commonly 
known as ‘circular debt’, challenge the foundations of these security measures on 
the predication that the off-taking body does not have the economic means to 
satisfy project debts. As a consequence, there is a need to either strengthen the 
current framework or seek recourse to alternative, more robust measures.38  
                                                
36 In many emerging markets, power purchase contracts for solar PV and wind are often set for 
20-25 years as a way to reduce risks of revenues falling short of that required to recover the 
investment. This has been crucial for attracting private developers and raising debt finance in 
such markets. Please see International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment (IEA, 2017).  
37 It is however to be noted that even when no guarantee was provided, lenders have had 
governments accountable for the debts of private borrowers in default. Diaz Alejandro, ‘Good-
bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash’, Journal of Development Economics 19 (1985), 
1-24 wherein an account of the bankruptcy of some Chilean Banks provides an example: even 
though the Chilean government explicitly did not guarantee foreign loans to these banks, 
creditors demanded and received payment from the government when private banks became 
insolvent. Also see M Breheny and J Beaven, ‘Australian federal and state government 
guarantees—a legal overview’, (1986) 4 J I B L 231. 
38 Sham Oirere, ‘Dismay at proposal to scrap Kenyan guarantee’, WindPower Monthly (Kenya, 
01 May 2011); See Keith D Larson, ‘New Incentives for Independent Power Projects in Nigeria’, 
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The primary contention affecting any satisfactory results being derived from 
sovereign guarantee framework is predicated on the liquidity problems that 
originate within Pakistan’s energy sector due to lack of or poor regulatory 
frameworks. These liquidity problems impede the off-taking entities from 
making timely payments to project companies. Consequently, the circular debt 
inhibits the state’s ability to honour sovereign guarantees. The next section 
discusses the circular debt issue, and provides an outline of the presumption of 
why sovereign guarantee frameworks are inadequate, and why there is a need to 
understand their underlying features to improve them.   
1.4 The Emergence and Risk of Circular Debt: A Threat to Investment? 
Previous sections illustrate one point: risk. The risk of non-payment, risk of in-
direct expropriation, and risk of non-service of debt obligations have immense 
repercussions for the project company. The entire project is predicated on risk. 
However, the notion of risk is often ill defined and aspirational. The prognosis of 
an investment is predicated on risk. Historically in an investment context, risk 
has been defined as the threshold of an individual or an entity that reflects their 
ability to undertake or participate in a certain transaction wherein the returns are 
proportional to the risk undertaken. Risk determines the success of a transaction. 
In every business transaction, there is a certain degree of risk. A private vendor 
selling coffee opposite a large coffee shop knows that during busy hours the 
large coffee outlet will be unable to serve coffee to its anxious, impatient 
customers. He spots an opportunity. He believes in taking risk. A substantial 
                                                                                                                               
05.01.2011. Lexology <www.lexology.com/library> Accessed 15 June 2015. Larson submits that 
in order to make sovereign guarantees more robust (i) a government backed letter of credit 
facility provided, (ii) capitalising a bulk trader with the proceeds of a government bond issue, (iii) 
through an LC facility backed by a partial risk guarantee issued by the World Bank. 
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risk! An independent clothes store next to a large retail outlet is taking a risk of 
not attracting enough customers. A bespoke tailoring company opening a store 
next to a large suiting outlet risks not attracting clients, and more importantly, an 
investor seeking to invest in a host state where political demographics are 
volatile is taking a risk. In essence, all transactions around us, no matter how 
small, are predicated on risk. As an SACE report outlines, the concept of risk is 
not easily quantifiable and the numerous steps compound the difficulty involved 
in its measurement.39 The ability to summarise risk with a single denominator is 
unrealistic. However, while risks can be mapped out, they can hardly be 
quantified.40 
Whereas the underlying features of a guarantee are common amongst most 
jurisdictions, this study will primarily review Pakistan’s energy sector as a case 
study example. There are various challenges that inhibit Pakistan’s ability to 
attract investment finance for developing a thriving electricity sector and foster 
growth. The biggest challenge facing Pakistan is the non-honouring of 
contractual commitments. An increase in fiscal and budgetary constraints has 
caused developing countries to reconsider investment options.41 Developing 
countries are now increasingly seeking recourse to private sector led 
infrastructure development. However, with high T&D losses, the contractual 
                                                
39 See Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country risk from theory to practice’, SACE (May 
2012) <www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> Ascari outlines that 
the difficulty in the measurement of risk is compounded by the steps involved i) the identification 
of the source of risk ii) the extrapolation of the risk-event unfolding process, iii) the estimate of 
the impact on a specific transaction/economic agent, iv) the means/actions undertaken to mitigate 
the impact before and after the event has occurred.  
40 See Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country risk from theory to practice’, SACE (May 
2012) <www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> 
41 Pakistan for example faces an increasing budget deficit. Pakistan’s budget deficit has increased 
to around 2.4% of the GDP during the first half of the fiscal year. See Mehtab Haider, ‘Budget 
deficit swells to 2.4pc of GDP in first half of 2016-17’ The News (Islamabad, 27 January 2017) 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/182083-Budget-deficit-swells-to-24pc-of-GDP-in-first-half-
of-2016-17> Accessed 27 January 2017. 
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commitments under which the private sector engages in infrastructure 
development can prove cumbersome for the off-taking bodies to honour their 
contractual agreements, and consequently for the state to provide any real 
security measure under the sovereign guarantee framework.42 As outlined earlier, 
the competitive nature of investment regime provides very little space for error. 
Ostensibly, no one can argue that Argentina, and more recently Greece, defaulted 
on purpose. The implications of a host state’s default under a PPA, or even 
expropriation, can have long-lasting adverse implications. Whereas all risk will 
not have the same implications for all host countries, in the context of Pakistan’s 
energy sector it is argued that the prevailing economic stress, political crisis and 
an on-going war with extremist elements are the biggest deterrents for any 
investor.43 Economic and political uncertainty is an investor’s worst enemy. In 
addition to the political turmoil that has mired the country since its inception in 
1947, the circular debt crisis has caused uproar in the energy sector. Investors 
have been sceptical concerning the investment regime because of delayed or 
ceased payments under the agreed tariff structures. Since project companies are 
primarily raising finance under newly incorporated special purpose vehicles 
(hereinafter referred to as “SPV”), the entire project financing is predicated on 
the future revenue stream of the project company. Delayed or no payment can 
cause disruption to the project company’s debt servicing agreements, and have 
long-term repercussions for the host country. Consequently, circular debt is a 
                                                
42 Akthar Ali, ‘Alleviating the Energy Crisis: An Action Plan for the Gas and Electricity Sectors’ 
in Michael Kugelman (ed.), Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is there any way out? 
(Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2015). The report submits that 
Pakistan’s T&D losses amount to approximately 23%. Even though these figures are lower than 
India (30%), they are still higher compared to other countries like Japan (4%), China (6%), South 
Africa (6%). 
43 See Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector Investment 
(Supplementary Document 13, 2014) <www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-
001-sd-04.pdf>. Accessed 01 April 2017. 
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severe inhibition for Pakistan in view of the increasing marketing of investment 
opportunities.  
Circular debt, as outlined by a report commissioned by USAID, is the amount of 
cash shortfall within the Central Power Purchasing Agency (hereinafter referred 
to as “CPPA”) that it cannot pay to power supply companies. This shortfall is 
due to two important factors. First, the difference between the actual costs of 
providing electricity in relation to revenues realised by the power distribution 
companies (hereinafter referred to as “DISCOs”) from sales to customers plus 
subsidies and, secondly insufficient payments by the DISCOs to CPPA out of 
realised revenue as they give priority to their own cash flow needs.44 In simple 
words, circular debt is one entity facing problems in its cash inflows, which 
results in that entity holding back payments to its suppliers and creditors. Thus, 
problems in cash flows of one entity transfer to other segments of the payment 
chain.45 What this means is that cash flow problems of one entity cascade down 
to the other segments of the payment chain in such a manner that it affects both 
suppliers and creditors.  
Circular debt in the energy sector has impaired investment prospects and created 
a differential between what the investors expect, and what protection they are 
really offered. In fact, the title to this thesis makes reference to the inadequacy of 
sovereign guarantees primarily because of the increasing threat that liquidity 
issues pose to investment regimes throughout developing countries. In light of 
                                                
44 Planning Commission of Pakistan and USAID, The Causes and Impacts of Power Sector 
Circular Debt in Pakistan (March 2013) <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KPHC.pdf> 
Accessed 22 March 2015. 
45 See Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of circular debt in Pakistan and its resolution’, 
(2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15:SE, pp 61-74. 
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the circular debt problem, it is clear that the provision of a sovereign guarantee 
mitigates the risk that arises as a result of the occurrence of an event; they are not 
a guarantee that an event will not occur. It can also be argued that given its 
current form, circular debt can amount to an indirect expropriation measure, 
since it inhibits the project’s ability to produce the desired results. Even though 
an investor is not being deprived or parted from the ownership of the project 
company, their ability to continue production and generation of the project 
company’s core product is hampered due to the off-taking body’s non-payment 
or delay in payment. Figure1.1 provides an overview of all the parties involved 
in Pakistan’s energy sector, and helps to illustrate the dynamics of Pakistan’s 
circular debt. 
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Figure 1.1: Key Players in Pakistan’s Energy Sector46 
Figure 1.1, key players in Pakistan’s energy sector, provides an outline of the 
major parties involved. Moldova’s energy sector post restructure can be 
compared with Pakistan, India and Nigeria. It is submitted that the underlying 
problem concerning liquidity issue relates to malfeasance, mismanagement and 
sometimes corruption, especially in the ‘generation and distribution’ section of 
the illustration. Improper regulatory frameworks and lack of adequate regulation 
insofar as the generation and distribution segment of the figure is a major 
contributor to the circular debt crisis. Not only are the main entities (ie DISCOs, 
                                                
46 Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of circular debt in Pakistan and its resolution’, 
(2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15:SE, pp 61-74. 
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NTDC, CPPAG) ill-regulated, their cross-sectional relationship lacks any 
meaningful policy. For example, even though the distribution companies have 
mainly been restructured to form corporate entities, they are not operating 
independently from the state’s influence. Their board is appointed by the 
Ministry of Water and Power through instructions from the Prime Minister. 
However, this lack of corporate governance is one of the issues in a mosaic of 
problems. Political influence is not only perpetrated in corporate governance 
matters but as a result of compromised management. This leads to inefficient 
application of laws preventing electricity theft, which are predominantly 
redundant because of political ramifications. Whereas there is an element of 
corruption prevalent within the issue concerning prevention and enforcement of 
electricity theft, political parties realise that enforcement and prosecution under 
the Electricity Theft Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Theft Act”) can create 
consumer dissatisfaction from political circles, and a shift in voter preference.    
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Figure 1.2: Payment Cycle in Pakistan’s Energy Sector47 
In comparison to Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2 illustrates the payment chain in 
Pakistan’s energy sector. It also provides evidence to suggest the inception of the 
term ‘circular debt’. The high T&D losses, especially in developing countries 
like India and Pakistan, are primarily because of consumers not paying their 
dues, or tampering with electricity meters in order to receive direct, free 
electricity from the grid. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, if consumers are not paying 
their electricity dues, the distribution companies are unable to pay the generation 
companies, thus creating a systemic liquidity crisis within the energy chain. As 
outlined earlier, no state intentionally defaults on their payments. However, 
despite several multilateral reports and studies identifying the fundamental issue 
with the energy sector’s regulatory framework and no redressal of the 
                                                
47 Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of circular debt in Pakistan and its resolution’, 
(2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15:SE, pp 61-74. 
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discrepancies, it can be concluded that the government, especially in Pakistan, is 
not intent on improving the situation.  
Subsidies are another cumbersome factor, inhibiting the state’s ability to make 
timely payments, and directly contributing to the accumulation of circular debt. 
In Pakistan, the state’s inability to transfer the real cost of generation to the 
consumer has proved fatal for energy sector. In an existing constrained fiscal 
space, it is argued that subsidies are highly regressive.48 As a result, end 
consumer tariffs are inadequate to recover the rising costs of power generation49, 
and the government is unable to fully compensate CPPA against resulting 
losses.50 Figure 1.3 illustrates the power tariff for consumers from November 
2006 to January 2010.51 This figure provides an illustration of how, the energy 
regulator NEPRA’s recommendations are being ignored by demonstrating a price 
differential between what NEPRA recommends, and what is actually approved 
by the Ministry of Water and Power. It is submitted that an increasing burden on 
the economy will cause adverse impact on the long-term success of the 
infrastructure investment in the energy sector. Also, after drawing comparisons 
                                                
48 See International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: First review under the extended arrangement 
under the extended fund facility, request for waiver of nonobservance of a performance criterion 
and modification of performance criteria (IMF Country Report No 14/1, January 2014)  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1401.pdf> Accessed 08 March 2014. The 
report highlights the importance of either reducing subsidy or eliminating any subsidy 
arrangements altogether. The report appreciates the political ramifications of such policy shift. 
The report has also highlighted that due to political uncertainty Pakistan has been unable to shift 
its subsidy burden from the state exchequer to the consumer.  
49 Whereas Pakistan’s policy has shifted over the years from diesel-powered IPPs to LNG 
powered energy projects, it is argued that when the diesel-powered energy projects were 
introduced there was an increasing number of objections from political circles to stop any 
investments in the IPP sector based on oil-based power generation. In respect of the declining 
price for oil products, it can be argued that had the administration continued to use the oil-based 
IPPs, the situation regarding energy production and generation would have been different.  
50 Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of Circular Debt in Pakistan and its resolution’, 
(2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15: SE pp 61-74. 
51 Source: Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of Circular Debt in Pakistan and its 
resolution’, (2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15: SE pp 61-74. 
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between Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4, it is clear that the increasing price differential 
in the average power purchase price (Rs/Kw) and the price which consumers 
actually pay demonstrates the increasing economic burden of subsidies.52 
Without a complete overhaul in the energy sector, it seems unlikely that 
sovereign guarantees will have any meaningful impact in providing a robust form 
of security to the investors, or help attract new investment in Pakistan in order to 
sustain a long-term investment regime.53  
 
Figure 1.3: Price Differential Comparison 
Moreover, the table below outlines the consumer tariff vis-à-vis the cost of 
power generation, reflecting on the point made earlier concerning the non-
transfer policy of the cost of generation onto the consumer.54  
                                                
52 See OGRA through its Secretary v M/S Midway II, CNG Station and others (Civil Petition No. 
455/2013). The Chief Justice noted that ‘one of the reasons for reduced power generation was 
increase in the cost of generation whereas no tariff increase allowed between FY2003 to FY 
2007, despite a steep increase in generation cost due to a surge in oil prices’.  
53 See International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: First review under the extended arrangement 
under the extended fund facility, request for waiver of non-observance of a performance criterion 
and modification of performance criteria (IMF Country Report No. 14/1, January 2014) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1401.pdf> Accessed 28 June 2016. 
54 The author is aware that these figures are outdated. However, their use is for illustrative 
purposes only. 
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Figure 1.4: Cost of Generation v Consumer Tariff 
As illustrated in Figure 1.5, the circular debt issues occurring in Pakistan’s 
energy sector have constantly been accruing despite payments to the DISCOs 
and consequently, to the IPPs.55 
                                                
55 Gathered from various sources: Planning Commission of Pakistan and USAID, The Causes 
and Impacts of Power Sector Circular Debt in Pakistan (March 2013) 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KPHC.pdf> Accessed 14 October 2015; Wajeeha Riaz, 
‘Circular Debt: From where it all started’, Prime Institute 21 May, 2014  
<http://www.primeinstitute.org/blog/circular-debt-from-where-it-all-started> Accessed 06 
December 2015; Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector Investment 
(Supplementary Document 13, 2014) <www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-
001-sd-04.pdf> Accessed  17 January 2017. 
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Figure 1.5: Circular Debt Figures (US$ Bn) 
The accumulation of circular debt is not only predicated on the state’s inability to 
meet or honour their contractual obligations, it also rests on poor policy making. 
The 1994 Energy Policy (hereinafter referred to as “1994 Policy”) adopted the 
‘take or pay’ provision in the energy agreements. Take-or-pay, send-or-pay, and 
ship-or-pay are commonly used provisions within the energy sector. This 
provision provides the buyer an option to both off-take electricity and pay, or in 
case they are unable to off-take electricity, to pay the project company 
regardless. These provisions are considered to form part of the fabric of energy 
industry risk allocation.56 The inclusion of take-or-pay provisions in PPAs 
entered with IPPs during the operation of the 1994 Policy has directly inhibited 
the off-taking bodies’ ability to pay. The off-taking body would pay the IPPs 
regardless of whether electricity has been purchased or not, if the IPP were ready 
                                                
56 Ben Holland, ‘Enforceability of take-or-pay provisions in English law contracts-resolved’, 
(2016) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2016.1164554> Accessed  24 April 2017. 
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to supply such. However, the circular debt figures outlined in Figure 1.5 arose 
during 2006-07, when oil prices were all time high in the international market.57 
The government at the time endeavoured to approach the circular debt figures by 
injecting more cash, despite severe fiscal and economic stress on its own coffers. 
This standalone approach has since then been repeated once the incumbent 
government came to power after the 2013 general elections. Despite repeated 
instructions from the IMF as discussed earlier, Pakistan is yet to undertake an 
overhaul in their regulatory regime in order to curb the increasing discrepancy, 
rising circular debt, and the acute energy shortage.58 From 2006 to 2012 there 
was a steep increase in the circular debt figures. The circular debt reached an all-
time high during 2012 crossing the US$8 billion mark. Unlike the rural 
population, the urban cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi faced the wrath 
of sweltering heat and electricity outages in excess of eight hours each day. In 
some parts of these major cities, it was even worse. According to articles 
published in various leading newspapers, some parts of Islamabad, Lahore were 
experiencing power outages of more than 16 hours on a daily basis.59  
In the past, government guarantees were called by the IPPs due to non-
performance by the power purchasers. This call of guarantees was not honoured, 
and consequently a group of IPPs took the case to the Supreme Court for 
                                                
57 Please note that during the year 2014-2016 oil has subsequently decreased from approximately 
US$160 per barrel to as low as US$32 per barrel.  
58 Also interesting to note is the observation recorded by the ADB regarding the weak governance 
structure and an overhaul in the regulatory measures prevailing at the time. ADB has submitted 
that the government’s interest and role in the appointment of the Board of Directors of the 
DISCOs, and political and bureaucratic factors continue to limit the Board’s independence and 
technical and management competency. At the corporate level, Board authority and efficiency in 
monitoring and enforcing the performance of DISCO management has been insufficient to 
improve performance. Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector 
Investment (Supplementary Document 13, 2014) 
<www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-001-sd-04.pdf>. 
59 AFP, ‘For Pakistan, every day is a blackout with no end in sight’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 08 
August 2012) <https://www.dawn.com/news/740705> Accessed 11 November 2014. 
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adjudication. The case was settled out of court.60 Not only is circular debt 
creating uncertainty for payment of dues by the off-taking bodies, it also presents 
an overhanging risk, often deterring investment, and leading to an irreparable 
risk factor that causes higher premiums, and more stringent terms in the loan 
documentation.61 When the incumbent government took office, special measures 
were undertaken to facilitate the Ministry of Finance to sanction funds in excess 
of US$4 billion to be paid to the IPPs. In 2013, payments were made and the 
circular debt (for the time being) was taken off the balance sheets. However, 
after several months the circular debt started to accumulate again and reached an 
amount in excess of US$1.6 billion. A pivotal role in the rise of circular debt is 
the price hike in the international oil market, and the devaluation of the Pakistani 
rupee against the dollar. It is submitted that from 2005 to 2011, the cost of 
furnace oil increased in real terms from US$236 to US$639 per tonne. In that 
period, the Pakistani rupee depreciated at an alarming rate wherein the cost per 
tonne went up from PKR21, 087 to over PKR70, 930. This meant that the cost of 
power generation had an astonishing increase of 236% in a period of six years.62  
In view of the increasing circular debt, lack of adequate regulatory frameworks 
and a complete overhaul in the energy sector, it is questionable whether a 
sovereign guarantee offers any real protection to the investor. Chapter 3 
discusses guarantees from a private sphere of the law. A sovereign guarantee is 
quintessentially a contract. A state’s inability to make timely payments in the 
                                                
60 Details of these cases are subject to confidentiality.  
61 Also see Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector Investment 
(Supplementary Document 13, 2014) <www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-
001-sd-04.pdf> Accessed 23 March 2017. 
62 Planning Commission of Pakistan and USAID, The Causes and Impacts of Power Sector 
Circular Debt in Pakistan (March 2013) <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KPHC.pdf> 
Accessed 06 September 2015. 
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absence of a well-regulated energy sector creates not only challenges for the 
investor, but also further constrains the already existing limited fiscal space.  
One of the primary issues that emerges in this section indicates a stronger role 
being played by state-owned entities (hereinafter referred to as “SOEs”) as a 
means to facilitate investment projects in a de-regulated industry. It is argued that 
SOEs play a pivotal role in enforcing PPAs, and ensuring that sovereign 
guarantees are honoured. As a result, SOEs both generally and from Pakistan’s 
standpoint need to be discussed in order to carry out a discursive analysis. 
1.5 SOEs and the Existential Paradox for the Sovereign Guarantee 
Framework 
Corporate governance and regulation have been briefly referred to in the 
previous sections, and will be mentioned throughout the course of this thesis. 
The primary argument consistent throughout this project is predicated on the 
same foundations upon which these organisations in Pakistan’s energy sector are 
structured. However, corporate governance and regulation will require a 
separate, serious undertaking. To understand the sovereign guarantee structure, it 
is pertinent to discuss those SOEs operating, in order to provide the basic 
frameworks upon which these contractual relationships are predicated. 
Chapter 4 provides an interesting account of how these sovereign guarantee 
structures may be inadequate by referring to the basic principles of guarantees 
under common law. In pursuit of achieving the desired discourse, this study 
discusses SOEs and their role in the sovereign guarantee framework, and 
illustrates the absence of effective regulation in abstract, in order to provide a 
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discourse on the legal inadequacies in sovereign guarantee frameworks. There is 
no strict legal framework in international law that discusses the organic structure 
of the state in the aftermath of the state’s heavy involvement through their SOEs. 
Consequently, this study refers to Article 4 and Article 5 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (hereinafter referred to as “Draft Articles”) to 
discuss the notion of these SOEs being organs of the state. Any discussion to 
such account under relevant Company law rules will require a displacement of 
the long-standing principles of separate legal personality. However, this study 
reviews the sovereign guarantee framework from a guarantee law perspective, 
and makes recourse to Draft Articles in an effort to determine the adequacy of 
these guarantees in light of the decision in cases such as Vossloh63 and Thomas 
Lakeman.64  
SOEs play a pivotal role in infrastructure development.65 SOEs were formally 
introduced in the capital markets due to the private sector’s demand for 
deregulating various facets of the infrastructure industry and to mitigate 
sovereign risk. They were primarily aimed at providing one-window, specialised 
and efficient66 bodies to facilitate investment options for the private sector. As a 
result, these institutions or corporatised bodies were created in order to reap the 
benefits of corporate machinery in the international capital markets. SOEs and 
                                                
63 Vossloh Aktiengesellschaft v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2443. 
64 Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17. 
65 See World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014). The 
report submits that ‘…It is observed that despite the trend towards privatisation over the past 20 
years, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are still significant economic players. Globally, SOEs 
account for 20 percent of investment, 5 percent of employment, and up to 40 percent of output in 
some countries. They continue to deliver critical services in important economic sectors such as 
utilities, finance and the energy sector’. 
66 See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment (2nd Edition, 
Oxford, 2012). Also see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Public Sector Modernisation: Changing Organisational Structures (OECD Policy Brief, 2004).  
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their problematic nature in wake of breach of sovereign guarantees has been 
extensively discussed in Chapter 4 as part of this project’s analysis to provide a 
critical review of the security offered under a sovereign guarantee. However, in 
the absence of adequate regulatory frameworks, increasing influence exercised 
by the government, and SOE’s inability to exercise decision-making independent 
of the government, there is an increasing view that Pakistan’s SOEs status as 
‘independent’ is problematic. The SOEs discussed in Chapter 4 are not insulated 
from the state, nor operate under a clear concession agreement. A good 
illustration of the position of SOE in managing the affairs of the state is 
submitted by Jessel MR, who submits that ‘if the financial activities were that of 
a government department, and assuming that the bank is right on international 
law, there would be no legal debts at all but only obligations of honour’.67 This 
means that without SOEs engaged in international finance transactions, there 
would be uncertainty surrounding the corporate structure that is adopted by a 
government department.68 However, with a variety of public policy goals in 
mind, the state’s position insofar as arguing whether a SOE is in fact a ‘separate 
legal entity’ is subjective upon the nature of the case, and the cause of action 
arising therein.  
In the 1990s, SOEs were seen as new method of Public-Private Partnerships 
(hereinafter referred to as “PPPs”) wherein the state’s primary purpose was to 
provide basic physical infrastructure by collaborating, and in essence, shifting 
                                                
67 See Jessel M R in Twycross v Dreyfus, 5 Ch D 605, 616.  
68 A stark reflection of this submission can be seen in various cases. An old but popular case of 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529 illustrates this ‘cherry 
picking’ nature of government, wherein they would claim that an institution is carrying out 
governmental functions in one instance and be a commercial enterprise in another.  
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risk to the private sector.69 SOEs have also been used to reduce fiscal burden, 
fiscal risk, enhance transparency and accountability for the use of scarce public 
funds. Moreover, as governments face continued budget constraints, better-
governed SOEs70 are more easily able to raise finance for infrastructure and other 
critical services through the capital markets.71 Public bodies were also 
corporatised in a bid to later privatise them, in order to raise capital and attract 
foreign investment in various basic facilities’ projects globally. Moldova 
provides a good illustration of this submission. In the 1990s, Moldova’s energy 
sector suffered from approximately 25% T&D losses. Circular debt accumulated, 
along with large commercial losses, primarily due to illegal connections and 
tampering of electricity meters, and electricity theft. Corporatisation, industry 
restructuring and privatisation led to a series of reforms within the energy sector 
to address these chronic issues. Whilst the principal reasoning underlying SOE 
reform is often viewed as a precursor to privatisation, Pakistan’s energy sector 
has not implemented the requisite reforms as per the recommendations under the 
Energy Sector Restructuring Program (hereinafter referred to as “ESRP”)72 in 
1998. The ESRP recommended a complete overhaul in Pakistan’s energy sector 
including inter alia, privatisation of distribution companies and setting an 
independent regulator. Whereas a detailed regulatory reform is beyond the 
purview of this study, it is submitted that in order to continue using the current 
                                                
69 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Public-Private Partnerships, Government 
Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington, IMF 2006). 
70 In India, 41 centrally owned SOEs account for 20% of the market capitalisation of the Mumbai 
Stock Exchange.  
71 For a detailed discussion on SOEs, please see World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of 
State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit (Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ World Bank, 2014).  
72 See Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program (Performance 
Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-energy-restructuring-program-
0> Accessed 22 April 2017. 
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sovereign guarantee structure, Pakistan needs to implement a complete 
transformation of its regulatory frameworks.73  
SOEs play a pivotal role in facilitating the issuance of a sovereign guarantee. 
There are two methods through which SOEs can become involved in the process 
of sovereign guarantees. First, in a bid to balance a mosaic of stakeholder 
interests including multilateral agencies, states re-register previously publicly 
owned bodies as companies under the relevant Company Law rules. As a result, 
corporatisation transforms a previously publicly owned enterprise into a 
corporate entity managed by an appointed board and a managing director. This 
quasi-sovereign juristic fabric gives the impression that the entity is independent. 
This method is primarily used for off taking distribution companies. Second, 
sovereign guarantee structure involves a body that facilitates and issues a 
sovereign guarantee to the SPV. This form of entity is normally a statutory body, 
formed under the directions from the parliament, government or through 
legislative means to formulate, execute and contribute towards the inception of 
policies. Both these forms of entities are commonly used throughout the world in 
infrastructure sector in order to facilitate investment, and form the underlying 
feature of a sovereign guarantee. 
Since the focus of this study is primarily reviewing the sovereign guarantee 
structure in Pakistan, Chapter 4 reviews the role of PPIB, NTDC and CPPAG. 
Sovereign guarantees have been discussed extensively throughout this study. 
                                                
73 From the data reviewed by the World Bank Group, the report submits that privatisation 
improved firm performance in competitive sectors and, when accompanied by proper policy and 
regulatory frameworks, in financial and infrastructure sector. See World Bank Group, Corporate 
Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit (Washington, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014).  
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However, in the event that this study proposes that the sovereign guarantee 
framework is inadequate, what recourse can investors seek in order to strengthen 
their existing security package?  
1.6 Redundancy Measure: Political Risk Insurance 
Consistent with the theme throughout this study, this introductory chapter 
introduces the state’s need to provide robust security measures in order to attract 
infrastructure investment funds. Contractual security measures such as sovereign 
guarantees form part of the fabric that provides a robust measure to mitigate risk. 
This thesis repeatedly makes reference to the highly-leveraged nature of project 
financings, especially in transactions involving a PPA. However, in light of the 
liquidity crisis discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, especially from 
Pakistan’s standpoint, investors are increasingly seeking recourse to alternative 
contractual security measures. These additional or alternative security measures 
are increasingly being used in order to mitigate risk in infrastructure 
development. London’s sewerage system upgrade project incorporates the 
payment at the start of construction method. Various other jurisdictions adopt an 
escrow account model as a means to mitigate risk. As discussed throughout 
Chapter 5, developing countries are increasingly competing against each other in 
order to secure infrastructure investment funds. Developing countries have 
adopted various measures to promote capital inflow inter alia publicising 
relevant investment opportunities, providing necessary infrastructure to support 
private investors, and to provide support in the form of equity investment and 
guarantees. However, wherein certain risks can be mitigated through non-
conventional methods or ignored, liquidity issues in Pakistan’s energy sector are 
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increasingly deterring investors from exploring new investment opportunities 
despite higher returns.  
Moreover, in the absence of a robust framework to protect investment, and 
ensure timely debt servicing, it is not only the state that is driven by market-
centric policies to provide protection. Investors too are seeking alternative ways 
to provide certainty and security in challenging, risky jurisdictions. Investors are 
persuaded by higher returns: however, they are content to transfer the risk of the 
project to other parties. Some of these parties have been discussed in Chapter 2. 
As a result, investors are seeking methods to mitigate risk. As outlined in 
Chapter 5, it is likely that sovereign guarantees or other favourable measures will 
be considered problematic by investors for two reasons; first, investors may feel 
that there is no real protection being offered under a sovereign guarantee or other 
non-conventional forms of security. Second, they may find that favourable 
treatment or concessions offered by the incumbent government may attract 
political criticism due to policy or regime change. As a result, this study refers to 
political risk insurance as a model to provide a substitute for sovereign guarantee 
framework, or as a measure of additional security. Since the focus of this study is 
to review Pakistan’s energy sector, this study refers to the inclusion of risk 
insurance model offered by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (hereinafter referred to as “MIGA”) to either replace sovereign 
guarantee framework, or use as an additional form of security.   
Chapter 5 discusses the notion of ‘political risk’ as not only the occurrence of 
some political event that will change the prospects of profitability of a project, 
but also as a material adverse change which either disrupts the operation of a 
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project or extinguishes its ability to provide the agreed services. Whereas the 
chapter provides an extensive outline of the risk endured by private investors, the 
main focus of the chapter relates to the use of risk insurance as an alternative 
means of promoting investment.  
As extensively discussed above, the primary issue concerning the inadequacy of 
sovereign guarantees is the non-payment or delay in payment by the off-taking 
bodies. Consequently, the rise in circular debt figures relate to off-taking bodies’ 
inability to honour contractual obligations. With inadequate fiscal space to 
entertain requests by investors to fulfil payment obligations, it is argued that the 
most relevant weapon in MIGA’s arsenal of risk insurance instruments is to deal 
with contract repudiation. As illustrated in an earlier section, circular debt 
inhibits the ability of an off-taker to provide timely or no payment under the 
PPA. However, the chapter also reflects on some of the criticisms that may be 
involved in using a risk insurance model. Discussion of moral hazard has been 
undertaken because there is an increasing belief that the use of risk insurance 
model perpetuates irrational behavior by investors. Moreover, whereas risk 
insurance model can provide an adequate form of security primarily because 
multilateral bodies like the World Bank immediately indemnify the investor in 
cases where there has been a breach on an agreement, the host states are required 
to indemnify the insurer. As a result, there may be an incentive for an investor to 
use a risk insurance model, however from a host state’s standpoint this will 
primarily entail a further constraint and possibly affect other projects since 
multilateral institutions can influence the reimbursement of finance in other 
projects.  
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1.7 Conclusion 
Often the advantages associated with infrastructure development are intangible, 
at least immediately. Lack of supply of a commodity like electricity can create 
awareness of the benefits associated with generation of electricity amongst 
consumers. Consumers are generally very well aware of the benefits that are 
associated with development due to wide access to digital and print media. 
However, displacement of local population, smoke generated from coal-based 
power plants destroying crops, or more generally the idea of foreigners working 
in their area can lead to opposition for such projects. Infrastructure projects do 
not bring or associate themselves with immediate reform or results. China’s 
US$4 billion recent investment in Kenya’s railway sector will not only connect 
Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda, it will also provide cheaper goods alternative to the 
poorest segments within Kenya.74 However, in order to achieve this development 
goal there will be land acquisition problems, terrain problems, and general 
dissent amongst the locals. Economic goods such as railway, electricity, and 
other infrastructure projects take several years before any real benefit can be 
derived from them. For example, some of the larger hydro-power dams take 
three to six years before they generate electricity. Whereas off-grid electricity 
generation takes less time to setup than a conventional power plant, it is targeted 
more towards smaller communities or individual consumers. Unlike the benefits 
of infrastructure, the risks inhibiting the progress of a project are often tangible. 
Its effects can severely disrupt the operation of a project.  
                                                
74 David Pilling and Emily Feng, ‘Kenya’s $4bn railway gains traction from Chinese policy 
ambition’ The Financial Times (London, 4 April 2017) < https://www.ft.com/content/d0fd50ee-
1549-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c> Accessed 04 April 2017. 
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This study aims to provide a discursive analysis of the risk-mitigating measures 
that are used in highly leveraged finance transactions in order to understand the 
underlying features of a guarantee framework. Moreover, in the event that 
sovereign guarantees due to procedural issues prove to be inadequate, this study 
seeks an alternative measure to provide certainty in Pakistan’s electricity 
investment regime. This study has been divided into six chapters. Whereas an 
outline has been provided in the previous sections of this introductory chapter, it 
is submitted that a brief detail of all the chapters is as follows.  
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to project finance transactions. This chapter 
aims to provide the reader with an introduction to project finance, and assist in 
the terminologies used in the subsequent chapters. The high-risk nature of 
electricity generation in developing countries has led to an increase in project 
finance being used as a method to mitigate risk. This chapter provides an in-
depth analysis of the principles underlying highly leveraged transactions within 
the electricity sector in general. A case study from Pakistan’s energy sector has 
been included in the chapter as an example of project finance structure.  
With an overview of the underlying financial transaction that predicates various 
energy projects, Chapter 3 begins to provide a historical account of the law of 
suretyship, the umbrella term that encompasses guarantees and indemnities. This 
chapter illustrates some of the fundamental principles of both guarantee and 
indemnity provisions within a project finance transaction. This chapter provides 
the bedrock of the subsequent chapter, Chapter 4. As the study progresses, 
sovereign guarantees are introduced as the most important facet within risk 
mitigation in Pakistan’s electricity sector. Chapter 4 provides an outline of the 
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main parties to a sovereign guarantee transaction, and ascertains the adequacy of 
the relationship that exists between the SOEs and the government. The chapter 
refers to the possibility of these institutions being mere ‘rubber stamp’ 
organisations. Consequently, the chapter demonstrates how the sovereign 
‘guarantee’ structure may be problematic from a procedural perspective by 
reviewing the current framework through the lens of the Draft Articles. This 
chapter provides a coherent indication that in the absence of a well-insulated 
SOE, there is a possibility that there is no meaningful security package being 
offered under the current sovereign guarantee framework from Pakistan’s 
standpoint. In the event that there is no real protection being offered under the 
current sovereign guarantee framework, what recourse do investors have?  
Chapter 5 illuminates instances wherein the state has failed to provide any robust 
form of contractual security to the project company or the lenders; what recourse 
do sponsors have as a means of protecting their investment? One of the primary 
reasons for using MIGA’s political risk insurance product is because of their 
unique product offering ‘non-honouring of sovereign contractual obligations’. In 
light of the discussion undertaken at the start of this chapter, it is submitted that 
in the presence of liquidity issues, it would be beneficial to scrap sovereign 
guarantee framework altogether and adopt the PRI model in order to mitigate 
risk.   
The challenges discussed throughout this study are an illustration of the 
widespread issues prevalent within other developing countries. The lack of 
policy frameworks, marketing infrastructure investment opportunities without 
ancillary infrastructure facilities in place, and mismanagement of resources are 
 
64 
common instances in Asian and African countries. An example is where 
marketing investment opportunities fail due to the lack of distribution centers or 
infrastructure to off-take electricity from the project company. This has been a 
major challenge to countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan and even India. 
Whereas India is economically more stable than the other three listed countries, it 
is argued that without proper due diligence exercised on the part of the host state, 
investment opportunities should not be marketed at all. There have been reported 
instances where governments sign off-take or PPAs without realising that they do 
not have the infrastructure capacity to off-take such electricity. 
As outlined in a recent report by the ADB, the increasing demand for 
infrastructure has led to a substantial increase in the cost associated with 
maintaining infrastructure development.75 As a result, this study can be 
replicated to determine the adequacy of sovereign guarantee frameworks in other 
regimes and jurisdictions. In conclusion, it is submitted that the primary aim of 
this project is to provide an extensive analysis of guarantees offered in 
investment regimes. However, it also aims to achieve a larger purpose, much 
larger than the provision and availability of electricity. The lack of electricity in 
countries like Pakistan has directly affected the lives of millions. Hundreds of 
people die every day in countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, Namibia, and Ethiopia 
because of the lack of electricity that inhibits the functionality of basic health 
facilities. This study is an effort to provide an extensive discourse to help 
governments and investors better understand the security packages they are being 
                                                
75 Michael Peel and Tom Mitchell, ‘Asia’s $26tn infrastructure gap threatens growth, ADB 
warns’ The Financial Times (Beijing, 28th February 2017) < 
https://www.ft.com/content/79d9e36e-fd0b-11e6-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4> Accessed 28 February 
2017.  
 
65 
offered, and to seek more robust measures in case there is uncertainty 
surrounding such measures.  
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Chapter 2  
Project Finance as a Risk Mitigation Instrument—A Primer 
2.1 Introduction 
The underlying concept of project finance requires an understanding and 
explanation of all the relevant parties involved within a project finance 
transaction. This thesis refers to the highly-leveraged nature of project finance 
transactions, off-taking bodies, EPC contractors, and more importantly the host 
state. In order to assist and provide a valuable discussion on the area surrounding 
sovereign guarantee, it is important to understand how energy projects are 
structured. In addition to understanding the role of various parties involved in a 
project finance transaction, an attempt has been made to succinctly present an 
outline of how project finance is a tool to mitigate risk. 
Furthermore, a brief outline of the differences between corporate finance and 
project finance transactions is reviewed. For the purposes of clarity, inherent 
differences are explicitly outlined to allow differentiation between an off- and 
on-balance sheet financing structure. This discussion highlights the nature of risk 
that is endured through project finance transactions, and illustrates how non-
payment of dues/tariff, principally due to liquidity issues, can be problematic for 
the project company in particular and the host state’s investment regime in 
general.   
In order to provide a context for the discussion undertaken hereunder, Gulpur 
Power Project is illustrated as a typical project finance transaction. From a 
project finance standpoint, this transaction provides a good outline of the 
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relationship that exists between the parties, contractual frameworks, and a 
general understanding of how lenders can potentially mitigate their risk by 
contracting directly with the engineering, procurement and construction 
contractors (hereinafter referred to as “EPC”), and the operation and maintenance 
(hereinafter referred to as “O&M”) contractors.  
In view of this discussion, this chapter provides a bedrock for understanding the 
concepts that will be under discussion in the following chapters, and provides a 
basic framework for anyone trying to understand how risk of default canvasses 
for a project company from a financial perspective normative to sovereign 
guarantees.  
2.1.1 Historical Outline 
From a historical standpoint, it can be argued that infrastructure development has 
been predominately undertaken through private sources of finance. It was not 
until the end of the nineteenth century that public finance for large infrastructure 
projects76 began to dominate private finance, and this trend continued throughout 
most of the twentieth century.77 Whereas there are still remnants of public role 
within infrastructure development through sovereign wealth funds and other 
public sector entities, it is argued that the role of public finance has become 
limited. A report published by the World Resource Institute (hereinafter referred 
to as “WRI”) makes a similar observation. WRI note that public divestment in 
                                                
76 See Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, ‘Estimating demand for infrastructure, 2010-2020’, in Biswa 
Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian Community, 
(ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). The author highlights the key role of 
infrastructure development in promoting and sustaining growth, and as a result the uplift of 
poorer groups and communities.  
77 See Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michel A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38. 
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the service sectors is necessary because governments can no longer afford to 
support loss-making enterprises due to budgetary and fiscal constraints.78  
The early 1980s witnessed an increase in private sector financing of large 
infrastructure investments. Private investment in infrastructure development has 
now predominately taken the form of project finance.79 Yescombe notes that: 
Private finance for public Infrastructure is not a new concept: 
The English road system was renewed in the 18th and early 
19th centuries using private sector funding based on toll 
revenues; the railway, water, gas, electricity, and telephone 
industries were developed around the world in the 19th century 
mainly with private-sector investment. During the first half of 
the 20th century, however, the state took over such activities in 
many countries, and only over the last 20 years has this process 
been reversing.80  
The International Energy Agency’s (hereinafter referred to as “IEA”) 2017 report 
highlights that more than 90% of energy investment is financed from the balance 
sheet of investors, suggesting the importance of sustainable industry earnings, 
which are based on energy markets and policies. However, the report submits 
                                                
78 Navroz K Dubash and Sudhir Chella Rajan, The Politics of Power Sector Reform in India (The 
World Resources Institute, 2 April 2001). 
<http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/powerpolitics_india.pdf> Accessed 21 April 2017. 
79 See Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michael A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38. The growing 
popularity of project finance is primarily predicated on the fact that it reduces the need for 
government borrowing, shifts part of the risks presented by the project to the private sector, and 
aims to achieve more effective management of the project.  
80 Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002).   
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that project finance is a popular method for financing electricity projects in 
volatile economies.81 The growing popularity of project finance is primarily 
predicated on a complex web of contractual structures82 between various parties 
involved in a typical project finance transaction.83 As Nevitt and Fabozzi submit: 
[T]he key to a successful project financing is structuring the 
financing of the project with as little recourse as possible to the 
sponsor while at the same time providing sufficient credit 
support through guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor 
(government), or third party, so that lenders will be satisfied 
with the credit risk.84  
These contractual structures are designed to allocate risk within a transaction to 
parties who can best appraise and manage those risks.85 Despite an 
                                                
81 International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment (IEA, 2017).  
82 The presence of various contractual structures reduces risk as various methods of sub-
contracting leads to transfer of risk within a project, from one party to another. See Francesco 
Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk Shifting through non-financial contracts: 
Effects on loan spreads and capital structure of project finance deals’, (October 2010) Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320. 
83 In 2014, 12% of project finance transactions were financed through equity, 9% by bonds, and 
79% by loans. See Georg Inderst, Infrastructure Investment, Private Finance and Institutional 
Investors: Asia from a Global Perspective (ADBI Working Paper 555, January 2016). 
<http.ssrn.com/abstract=2721577> Accessed 23 March 2016; also see Biswa Nath 
Bhattacharyay, ‘Estimating Demand for Infrastructure 2010-2020’, in Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, 
Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag, Infrastructure for Asian Community, (ADBI/ADB and 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
84 Peter K Nevitt and Frank Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, EuroMoney, 2004). Nevitt 
and Fabozzi also submit that in project financing, the project, its assets, its contracts, its inherent 
economics and its cash flows are segregated from its promoters or sponsors, in order to permit a 
credit appraisal and loan to the project, independent of the sponsors. While in the final analysis, 
lending to a project requires strong credit support from some source, frequently this support can 
be accomplished in an indirect or contingent manner which may have little or no impact upon the 
sponsor’s debt capacity when compared to a direct borrowing. In some circumstances the credit 
of third parties unrelated to the sponsor can be used to support the credit standing of the project.  
85 Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michel A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investments’ (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38. Another 
interesting contention in view of the submission made above is that risk should be borne by 
parties who are best able to manage them. Brealey, Cooper and Habib have argued that ‘the 
statement that capital is cheaper for governments than to the private investors is misleading. 
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overwhelming volume of academic text available on project finance, there is no 
strict definition of the term available.86 Ostensibly, project finance can be defined 
to mean a project being financed. The word ‘project finance’ is a nebulous term 
with no precise meaning. It can be used in a variety of different instances, each 
with its own set of specifications to be taken into account. Project finance can be 
used to define the availability of funds raised through active participation of 
several parties. These funds are raised based upon direct or indirect credit 
support provided by the sponsor.87 The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (Basel II) provides an apt definition of the term. This study refers to 
the Basel Committee’s definition primarily because of its reference to the lender 
being paid solely or exclusively out of the money generated by the contract for 
the facility’s output.88 This definition captures the real issue concerning non-
                                                                                                                               
Governments do not have to provide a return to shareholders, however this does not imply that 
the total cost of capital is lower to governments than it is to the private sector. The lower interest 
rate simply reflects the guarantee provided by the taxpayers to lenders; also see Cynthia A 
Williams, ‘Regulating the Impacts of International Project Financing: The Equator Principles’, 
(April 2013) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol 
107, pp 303-308. 
86 Some of the eminent texts available on project are as follows; these have been referred to 
throughout this study for the purposes of explaining the contours of project finance: Richard A 
Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michel A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund infrastructure 
investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38; Peter K Nevitt and Frank 
Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, EuroMoney, 2004); Edward R Yescombe, Principles of 
Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002); Benjamin C Esty, ‘Returns on Project Financed 
Investment: Evolution and Managerial Implications’ (2002) 15 Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance; Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, 
‘Risk Shifting through non-financial contracts: Effects on loan spreads and capital structure of 
project finance deals’, (October 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7; 
Stefanie Kleimeier and William L Megginson, ‘An empirical analysis of limited recourse project 
finance’ (July 2001) University of Oklahoma, Michel F Price College of Business Working Paper 
Series <http//ssrn.com/abstract=283969>  Accessed 21 September 2016. 
87 Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney, 2004). The 
necessity of an equity investment by the sponsor in the project entity is a function of the 
collateral and the nature of credit support.  
88 Ellis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd Edition, Oxford, 
2013). An interesting submission by Ferran and Chan Ho reviews the significance of limited 
liability corporate structures and discusses the pre-eminent position this structure enjoys, due to 
limited financial risks and the ability to raise large amounts of finance; also see Barclays 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306 (Comm) as per Gloster J wherein she 
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payment of dues or liquidity issues within the energy cycle. As highlighted by 
the Committee, a project’s reliance on the future revenue stream provides the 
debt-servicing component of the project. In the absence of certainty to that 
account, no project finance transaction is sustainable. The Committee defines 
project finance thus: 
Project finance may take the form of financing of the 
construction of a new capital installation, or refinancing of an 
existing installation, with or without improvements. In such 
transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or almost 
exclusively out of the money generated by the contracts for the 
facility’s output, such as the electricity sold by a power plant. 
The borrower is usually an SPE (Special Purpose Entity) that is 
not permitted to perform any function other than developing, 
owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that 
repayment depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on 
the collateral value of the project’s assets. 
                                                                                                                               
noted that the corporate form is a structure that facilitates the raising of necessary capital for 
business and that, for this reason, only in exceptional circumstances does the law allow the 
creditor for business and that, for this reason, only in exceptional circumstances does the law 
allow the creditor of a company to pierce the veil of incorporation. 
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Figure 2.1: Infrastructure Finance Model89 
Sovereign guarantees and risk insurance instruments are two of the many facets 
of risk mitigation that are being used by developing countries to attract 
investment. Similarly, project finance is a financial tool or a body of various 
contractual frameworks aiming to regulate the project company in view of the 
project’s limitation insofar as generating revenue. From a risk management 
standpoint, project finance is a risk mitigation instrument. The leverage that such 
financial arrangements provide to sponsors creates an opportunity for delegating 
various forms of duties in order to distribute risk.90 Infrastructure investment 
through project finance, under its existing framework, is predicated on a highly 
leveraged financial arrangement.91 However, the entire risk and cost of the 
                                                
89 See Georg Inderst, ‘Infrastructure Investment, Private Finance and Institutional Investors: Asia 
from a Global Perspective’ (January 2016) ADBI Working Paper 555 
<http.ssrn.com/abstract=2721577> Accessed 23 March 2016. 
90 See Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk Shifting through non-
financial contracts: Effects on Loans spreads and capital structure of project finance deals’, 
(October 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320. The authors 
argue that ‘because project finance makes extensive use of contracts, some people refer to it as 
contractual finance’. Also see Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michel Habib, ‘Using 
Project Finance to Fund Infrastructure Investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 9, 25-38. 
91 Evidence suggests the idea that even if project finance infrastructure assets are highly 
leveraged, thinly capitalised special purpose vehicles with low financial flexibility, project 
finance debt contracts are still structured to be resilient to a wide range of potentially severe risks, 
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infrastructure development is not solely borne by the private parties. 
Infrastructure development is highly dependent on economic success, and 
consequently fiscal restraints, as governments increasingly endure fiscal 
tightening.92 Whereas seemingly fiscal restraints may not have direct 
implications for the success of a project, they will affect the project’s operations. 
An example from an energy project perspective are IPPs. An IPP is established 
to produce an agreed amount of electricity. These project companies are 
privately owned, often through support from the government of the host state. 
These IPPs can be owned by foreign entities or local businesses.93  However, role 
of an IPP is limited to the production of the electricity. It will not be the role of a 
special purpose vehicle (hereinafter referred to as “SPV”) as an IPP to transfer a 
product from the project to its final destination, the consumer. Transmission lines 
and other ancillary facilities will be the responsibility of the state.94 These 
include providing adequate transport facilities, in order to provide furnace oil or 
coal to the project company. There has been an increase in the role of the private 
                                                                                                                               
minimising in this way any post default loan economic loan. See Emanuele Rossi and Rok 
Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015)  
92 Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in Europe 
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). The authors, whilst discussing the role of the government, 
highlighted that the European Market, which has been historically known as the largest 
infrastructure project finance market in terms of the number and volume of transactions, has been 
affected to a high extent due to the government fiscal tightening and cautious and progressively 
regulated credit markets; also interesting to note is the submission put forward by Jamie Logie, 
‘Restructuring natural resources projects in the emerging markets: features and challenges Part 
2’, (2016) 2 CRI 73. Logie argues that ‘maintaining a good relationship with host governments is 
crucial for project sponsors operating in emerging markets’.  
93 Historically foreign entities have struggled to successfully operate under the IPP structures. A 
recent decision by ICSID against Pakistan establishes this. See Hasnaat Malik, ‘International 
litigation: Pakistan slapped with $700m fine in RPP case’ The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 20 
September 2017) <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1511129/international-litigation-pakistan-
slapped-700m-fine-rpp-case/> Accessed 20 September 2017. 
94 Despite an increasing demand for infrastructure investment, the transmission lines have 
generally been ignored. Recently, however the Government of Pakistan has agreed to attract 
investment in transmission facilities under the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor agreement; 
also see World Bank, Making Politics Work for Development: Harnessing Transparency and 
Citizen Engagement (Policy Research Report, 2016). 
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sector in facilitating and investing in such infrastructure facilities.95 However in 
countries that have recently opened doors for foreign investment, or newly 
marketed opportunities for infrastructure development, the private sector is often 
reluctant, and demands such facilities to be provided by the state.  
2.1.2 Understanding Project Finance and Corporate Finance Transactions 
In order to understand the limited recourse nature of project finance, and 
distinguish between off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet finance, it is 
important to highlight the differential nature of corporate finance and project 
finance. In view of the project’s reliance on future cash flows, this section 
highlights why there is a need to mitigate political risk within the ambit of 
project finance, and why it forms an important facet, especially in energy sector 
transactions.  
A project finance transaction involves an independent, legally and economically 
self-contained legal entity96 whose only business is the project that is being 
financed.97 Within a project finance transaction, the purpose is to develop a 
                                                
95 There has been an increase in the liberalisation of markets, recording a shift from vertical 
integration into an un-liberalised market. As discussed in International Energy Agency’s report, 
spending on electricity networks and storage continued its steady rise of the past five years, 
reaching an all-time high of US$227bn in 2016, with 30% of the expansion driven by China’s 
spending in the distribution system. Another 15% went to India and Southeast Asia, where the 
grid is expanding briskly to accommodate growing demand. See International Energy Agency, 
World Energy Investment (IEA, 2017).  
96 Also interesting to note the submission made by Yescombe. Yescombe argues that ‘project 
finance is provided through a ‘ring-fenced’ project, one which is legally and economically self-
contained through a special purpose legal entity’. See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project 
Finance (Academic Press, 2002).  
97 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); also see Christa Hainz and Stefanie Kleimeier, ‘Project 
Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending’, (December 2006). 
Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), SFB/TR 15, Discussion Paper No 
183 < https://ssrn.com/abstract=567112> Accessed 21 April 2017. Hainz and Stefanie submit 
‘project finance is defined as the creation of a legally independent project company that is 
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capital-intensive infrastructure project wherein the repayment will be entirely 
subject to internally generated cash flows.98 Prima facie, it is for this reason that 
project finance has been an encouraged modus operandi for power producers.99 
Hainz and Kleimeier make an interesting observation in this regard. They argue 
that project finance is more commonly used where ‘bank influence is stronger 
and political risk and the economic health and corporate governance systems are 
weaker’100. It would be appropriate to submit that project finance is a tool of 
financial engineering wherein finance is raised primarily on the project’s 
construction, operating and revenue risk, and their allocation between investors, 
lenders and other parties through contractual and other arrangements.101 As a 
consequence, project finance is a measure of ensuring an equitable distribution of 
risk. As outlined in the next section, each party within a project finance 
transaction bears a certain amount of risk proportionate to its contribution within 
the project in return for an agreed compensation.102  
                                                                                                                               
financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms, and which has non-or limited recourse 
debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset’. 
98 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). Rossi and Stepic argue that ‘project finance as a method of 
raising of funds on a limited recourse basis, with a purpose of developing a capital intensive 
infrastructure project, where the sponsor is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) entity, and repayment 
by the borrower will be entirely dependable on internally generated cash flows produced by the 
project and not necessarily depending on the soundness and credit worthiness of the sponsors’. 
99 See Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper and Michel A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38. Brealey, 
Cooper and Habib submit ‘Project finance encouraged the formation of stand-alone power 
producers able to borrow large sums on the basis of the long-term power purchase agreements 
they had entered into with electric utilities’.  
100 See Christa Hainz and Stefanie Kleimeier, ‘Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in 
International Syndicated Lending’, (December 2006). Governance and the Efficacy of Economic 
Systems (GESY), SFB/TR 15, Discussion Paper No 183 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=567112> 
Accessed 21 April 2017. 
101 Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002).  
102 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). It is 
interesting to note that ‘the main security in a project finance transaction for lenders is the project 
company’s contracts, licenses, or ownership of rights to natural resources; the project company’s 
physical assets are likely to be worth much less than the debt if they are sold off after a default on 
their financing’. 
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 In comparison, corporate finance structures are predicated entirely on the 
balance sheet strength of an existing corporation.103 Corporate finance differs 
from the intricacies of project finance; the extent to which risk is hedged or 
mitigated in a project finance transaction insulates the final beneficiary from the 
project company.104 A project company is more commonly known as the SPV.105 
Lenders have been wary of this within the current scenario for any project 
finance transaction amidst a seamless web106 of various off-shore corporations in 
between the SPV and the main beneficiary of the project company.107  
This complex web of contractual documentation also means that with the 
mitigation of risk, Estache and Strong argue that project finance is more 
expensive than a typical corporate finance transaction.108 Within a typical project 
finance transaction there will be several companies behind the sponsors, in what 
can be termed ‘a strategic outlay of companies’, in order to isolate and insulate 
                                                
103 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). Rossi and Stepic argue that ‘yields for debt infrastructure 
investments are much higher than those on governmental bonds and similarly rated corporate 
bonds under comparatively law default rates and high recovery rates.  
104 See Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper and Michel A Habib, ‘Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 25-38. Brealey, 
Cooper and Habib stress that one of the key comparative advantages of project finance is that it 
allows the allocation of specific project risks (ie completion and operating risks, revenue and 
price risk and the risk of political interference).  
105 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). Yescombe 
argues that project companies or SPVs are often formed at a later stage of a project development 
process (unless project permits have to be issued earlier, or it has to sign project contracts), 
because it normally has no function to perform until the project finance is in place. From 
experience, it is submitted that sponsors tend to register the SPV/SPE/SPC beforehand, in order 
to secure finances, negotiate with the off-taker and various other contractors. However, this 
position varies on a case to case basis.  
106 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). Yescombe 
argues that project finance, unlike other methods of finance, is a seamless web.  
107 See Stefanie Kleimeier and William L Megginson, ‘An empirical analysis of limited recourse 
project finance’, (July 2001). University of Oklahoma, Michel F Price College of Business 
Working Paper Series. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=283969> Accessed 22 May 2016. Kleimeier and 
Megginson argue that ‘the observed level of loan fees and the number of participating bank do 
provide indirect evidence that project finance lending may well be considered relatively more 
risky than other types of lending’.  
108 Antonio Estache and John Strong, ‘The Rise the Fall, and…the Emerging Recovery of Project 
Finance in Transport’, (July 2000) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2385 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=630757> Accessed 5 May 2016. 
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the final project company from the actual sponsors of the SPV.109 Another 
interesting reason why sponsors may be discouraged from raising finance on-
balance sheet is primarily because of costs associated with incorporating a new 
subsidiary. Certain jurisdictions have relaxed rules and regulations for a newly 
incorporated company, in comparison to the registration of a subsidiary.110 As a 
result, companies are encouraged to register new corporations in order to 
facilitate investment. However, the mere registration of a new entity does not 
preclude the sponsors from lender scrutiny. It is argued that banks and other 
financiers would most certainly carry out extensive due diligence of the sponsors 
and the companies they own before lending money.  
In view of the wider discussion undertaken throughout this thesis, this chapter 
reflects upon the differential nature of a project finance transaction in 
comparison to a corporate finance transaction. More importantly, it provides an 
outline of why lenders and sponsors seek risk mitigation in project finance 
transactions. In view of the discussion undertaken in this section, the next section 
elaborates on the ‘strategic outlay’ of parties within a project finance transaction.  
2.2 Main Parties in a Project Finance Transaction 
This section is an introduction to all the main parties involved within a project 
finance transaction. Whereas the concepts underlying this section are 
                                                
109 This insulation of project company from the main beneficiary sponsor is for two reasons: tax 
purposes and a friendly jurisdiction with a more stable legal regime.  
110 From Pakistan’s standpoint, it is argued that a foreign company requires a permission letter 
under the Companies Ordinance 1984 from the Board of Investment. This permission letter 
stipulates a time period for its validity. After the time period has elapsed, the investors require 
further permission in order to continue. Moreover, some other countries require local members or 
partnerships in order to provide access to the local market and advantages of the legal regime. 
However, it is argued that 51% ownership in these cases can be cumbersome and risky.  
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rudimentary, they have been included to assist readers in understanding the 
nature of entities and their roles in the context of discussion undertaken in 
subsequent chapters. Figure 2.2 provides a structure used in project finance 
transactions.  
 
Figure 2.2: Typical Project Finance111 
The main parties involved in a typical project finance transaction are the 
sponsors, EPC contractors, off-take agencies, and the government of the host 
state. Correlation between a government of the host state and the off-take agency 
                                                
111 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance 
(Academic Press, 2002). 
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has been discussed extensively in Chapter 4.112 Involvement of various parties in 
a project finance transaction is prima facie geared towards combining and 
amalgamating various kinds of guarantees and undertakings from various 
interested parties, so that the financial burden and risk of any one party will not 
be onerous, but the combined guarantees and undertakings of all the parties will 
be bankable credit.113  
2.2.1 Sponsors 
Project finance transactions are highly leveraged, because this enables lower 
initial equity contribution, thereby making the project investment a less risky 
proposition for the shareholders.114 Equity investment in a project finance 
transaction represents the risk capital.115  
The sponsors, more commonly known as ‘shareholders’, are the ‘active equity 
investors in a project’, meaning ‘their role is one of promotion, development and 
management of the project’.116 Within the tranche of a sponsor there can be one 
or several sponsors contributing equity towards the project.117 Yescombe notes 
                                                
112 Chapter 4 has focused on Pakistan’s off-take agency and the government institutions dealing 
with the transaction. However, research indicates that Kazakhstan faces a similar issue. See 
GRATA, ‘Financing Renewable Energy Projects in Kazakhstan: Key Legal Challenges’ Gratanet 
(March 2016) <www.gratanet.com> Accessed 03 May 2016. The report published by Grata 
argues that ‘in practice, current mechanism of guaranteed off-take does not provide sufficient 
comfort for the lenders and investors, because the FSC is apparently, not credit worthy enough as 
a single off-taker to make the renewable energy projects bankable in Kazakhstan’.  
113 Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney, 2004).   
114 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).  
115 Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney, 2004).   
116 Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). 
117 It is interesting to note that a sponsor developing a project who brings in another sponsor to 
commit the required balance of the equity shortly before financial close has expectations to be 
compensated for undertaking the higher risk towards the earlier stages of the project. As a result, 
the new sponsor can be required to pay a premium for its shares, or credit the original sponsor 
with a notionally high rate of interest on cash already spent on the project, which is taken into 
account when calculating each sponsor’s share of development costs, and allocating shares based 
 
80 
that project finance is often used where there are several sponsors.118 Sponsor’s 
equity contribution varies, and is structured according to the tax and accounting 
standards advisable by the sponsor’s advisors. Ordinarily, it is thought that a 
sponsor’s equity forms part of the project company through ordinary shares. 
Whereas this may be true for many corporate finance transactions, within the 
sphere of project finance, sponsors’ advisors often recommend for the sponsors 
to provide part of this equity in the form of subordinated debt. The rationale 
surrounding this advice is predicated on the notion that interest on shareholder’s 
subordinated debt may be tax-deductible, unlike dividends on ordinary shares.119  
The SPV lies at the centre of all contractual and financial relationships in a 
project finance transaction; these relationships have been outlined in Figure 2.2, 
above.120 The SPV is ordinarily incorporated only with one objective: to 
undertake and carry out the business of the project.121 A typical project finance 
transaction will involve a 75:25 debt to equity ratio, respectively.  
                                                                                                                               
on this. Moreover, in various projects, a sponsor joining the project at a later stage, after the 
development and construction stages, may be recipient of a lower Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
due to the lower risk that they bear.  
118 Project finance is often used where the equity investment in the project company is split 
between several sponsors. The project company may not always be directly owned by sponsors; 
for tax reasons the sponsors often use an intermediary holding company in a favourable third-
country tax jurisdiction. See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic 
Press, 2002).  
119 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002), pp 262-263. 
Yescombe also argues that another reason for shareholder equity being provided as a 
combination of share capital and shareholder subordinated loans is that it leaves lenders in 
exactly the same risk position, provided the investors’ rights are completely subordinated in 
payment and ability to accelerate, etc to those of the lenders.  
120 See Rajeev J Sawant, ‘The economics of large-scale infrastructure FDI: The case of project 
finance’, (August 2010), Journal of International Business Studies, Vol 41, No 6, pp 1036-1055. 
Sawant argues ‘separate incorporation is therefore necessary and important to allow the sponsors 
to set up a capital structure of high-debt, syndicated lending that is rigid and tied to a single-
purpose capital asset’.  
121 See Stefanie Kleimeier and William L Megginson, ‘An empirical analysis of limited recourse 
finance’, (July 2001). University of Oklahoma, Michel F Price College of Business Working 
Paper Series. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=283969> Accessed 03 May 2016. Kleimeier and 
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There is no hard and fast rule concerning the debt to equity ratios within a project 
finance transaction. These figures vary according to the by-product or the agreed 
output of the project company. Yescombe has discussed this notion extensively, 
arguing that from a lender’s perspective leverage (equity: debt) should be122: 
1. 10:90 for an infrastructure project with a project agreement 
with no usage risk (public hospital, prison). 
2. 15:85 for a power or process plant project with an off-take 
contract. 
3. 20:80 for an infrastructure project with usage risk (toll road or 
mass transit project). 
4. 30:70 for a natural resources project. 
5. 50:50 for a merchant power plant project with no off-take 
contract or price hedging. 
In view of the highly-leveraged nature of a project finance transaction, sponsors 
are driven towards mitigation of risk. Moreover, due to the high debt nature of 
these transactions, lenders are motivated to provide better interest rates or credit 
facilities to projects that are in a good position to mitigate their risks. As a result, 
sponsors seek various legal and non-legal measures as a means to mitigate or 
diminish risk altogether.123 Sponsors are a central part of the SPV. Since the 
entire premise within a project finance transaction is structured on the future 
                                                                                                                               
Megginson argue that ‘In project finance the general understanding is first, that creditors share 
much of the venture’s business risk and, second, that funding is obtained strictly for the project 
itself without an expectation that the corporate or government sponsor will co-insure the project’s 
debt at least not fully’.  
122 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). 
123 See Emanuele Rossi and Rok Stepic, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). Rossi and Stepic argue that a high leverage enables lower 
initial equity contribution, thereby making the project investment a less risky proposition for the 
shareholders. An interesting misconception that exists amongst some prospective project 
financiers is that there is no or little requirement for equity investment by the owners or sponsors 
of the project. See Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, 
Euromoney, 2004).   
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revenue generation of a project, sponsors are likelier to seek sovereign guarantee 
measures from the host state. 
2.2.2 Project’s Sub-Contractors 
In many ways, project finance is the process of cascading risk of one party to 
another, in return for an agreed consideration. Project construction / output risks 
are one of the major risks faced by a project company. For example, project 
construction risk involves the commencement of project works according to an 
agreed timeline, in addition to a specific use of technology to ensure maximum 
output. It also involves the technology that is being used in order to ensure 
maximum project output.124 As a result, project companies are increasingly sub-
contracting the project construction (and even operations) to other contractors as 
a method of mitigating their own risk and liability. 
Amongst this seamless web of contractual documentation involved within a 
typical project finance transaction, EPC and operation and maintenance 
(hereinafter referred to as “O&M”) contracts are fundamental for the smooth 
operation of a project finance transaction, especially within the energy sector.  
The trickledown effect of risk is passed on from sponsors through the EPC 
contracts to the EPC contractor. This category of contractors, or in many cases, 
sub-contractors is primarily in place in order to shift liability of non-completion 
                                                
124 Contemporary literature on project finance refers to technology as a separate facet. In light of 
the increasing use of take-or-pay contracts, especially in the energy sector, it is argued that 
technology is very important. IPPs, especially in developing countries, tend to focus on 
generation capacity at 30-40% capacity. This can be improved by using better technology 
methods. However, with the provision of take-or-pay agreements, and absence of equipment 
warranty clauses, the likelihood of default increases. As a result, project companies tend to sub-
contract construction to other contractors, for example, EPC contractors. 
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of project risk from the sponsor to the EPC contractor. It is also a mechanism 
used by sponsors to promote their project, convincing lenders by highlighting 
key strengths and previous successful projects undertaken by the contractors. As 
a result, any risk of non-completion of project is shifted to the contractor.125 As 
discussed in the earlier section, sponsors arrange for the financial closing with 
the lenders and as a result, after the financial close (hereinafter referred to as 
“FC”) is achieved, construction works are commenced. In the absence of an EPC 
contract or an EPC contractor, the sponsors will be directly liable for debt service 
and the non-completion of a project. Please refer to Figure 2.3. Thus, the 
additional financial liability that sponsor(s) incur may become very significant in 
the absence of an EPC contract.126  
Whereas the financial viability of the EPC contractors is of prime importance to 
the sponsors and resultantly, to the lenders, it is submitted that O&M contractors 
have a vital role to play too. The entire future-earning portfolio of the SPV is 
predicated upon the capacity at which the project company operates. In an energy 
sector SPV, the required tariff per Kwh will have to be satisfied in order to 
generate enough cash flow to service its debt. In the event that the SPV is unable 
to service its debt or meet the required threshold of electricity as agreed under 
the PPA, the lenders can invoke a Material Adverse Change or more commonly 
known as the ‘MAC’ clause in the loan agreements.127 In the event that a MAC 
                                                
125 See Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk shifting through non-
financial contracts: effects on loan spreads and capital structure of project finance deals’, 
(October 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320.  
126 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002), pp 155.  
127 Please see the following academic literature for a detailed discussion on MAC clauses: Frank 
Julien and Jean-Marc Lamontagne-Defriez, ‘Material Adverse Change and Syndicated Bank 
Financing: Part 1’ (2004) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 172; Frank Julien 
and Jean-Marc Lamontagne-Defriez, ‘Material Adverse Change and Syndicated Bank Financing: 
Part 2’ (2004) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 193; Rian Matthews, ‘Are 
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clause is invoked, all funding facilities are suspended or permanently revoked. 
As a result, an O&M contract with an experienced operator provides the greatest 
comfort to lenders (and to the sponsors), ensuring there is an experienced 
operator for the project, and another entity to whom the risk of operation can be 
shifted.128  
2.2.3 Off-Taking Body and Government of Host State 
The host state government and off-takers have been intentionally included under 
one section. Whereas the two prongs originate from the same pivot, it is argued 
that the dual role played consequently has a direct correlation to the outcome of 
the success of a project. In recent years, due to the restructuring of public owned 
entities—and their subsequent privatisation in a bid to improve performance and 
promote free market economy—there has been an increase in quasi-government, 
parastatal, state-owned companies.129 The widespread view within the industry 
outlines that a private party is in a far superior position to perform better, 
financially and economically, than the affairs of any such institution left at the 
behest of a public entity.130  
                                                                                                                               
courts undermining the flexibility of MAC clauses in finance documents?’ (2015) JIBFL 485; 
Also see Pan Am Corp v Delta Air Lines Inc, 175 B R 438, 514 (S D N Y 1994); BNP Paribas 
SA and others v Yukos Oil Co [2005] EWHC 1321 (Ch).  
128 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). Yescombe 
argues that lenders have a strong preference for O&M contractors to be investors in the project, 
because an O&M contractor who has an equity investment stands to lose more than just the 
penalties for poor performance. There has also been a precedent in the past where one or more 
sponsors operate to provide the services under an O&M contract.  
129 See Cally Jordan, ‘How international finance really works’, (2013) 7(5) LFMR, 256-264. An 
interesting read on the global financial crisis because of the failure of formal, state-led regulation, 
and also a breakdown of lex mercatoria of finance.  
130 This argument is predicated on several factors. However, there is increasing academic 
literature that provides criticism for this contention. The conflicting roles of government as 
owner, provider and rule maker in the affairs of the SOEs have led to corruption and poor 
performance. Public bodies, due to lack of transparency and independence, are prone to 
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The off-taker or off-taking bodies play a pivotal role within the project finance 
framework. Moreover, in view of the assumption that the host state is in a better 
position to mitigate and manage risk, the SOEs play a pivotal role in assisting the 
host state to ensure timely payments. As outlined earlier, the entire project 
finance structure is predicated on future payments. The incorporation of the SPV 
is predicated upon the off-taker agreeing to off-take project’s produced output. In 
addition to signing a commitment letter, the off-taker contractually provides a 
number of undertakings to the project company and the lenders, which may 
include credit support agreements131 in respect of the procurer’s payment 
obligations.132  
Through various interviews and engagement with audience at a workshop 
organised in London, it has become apparent that there are common 
misconceptions surrounding off-taking bodies and role of the host state.133 Some 
believe that the state’s role is limited until the project commences its operation. 
However, ‘comfort letters’, letters of support—more commonly known as 
                                                                                                                               
corruption and therefore ought to be privatised. A contrasting argument relates to the fact that 
changes in such circumstances are driven by vested interests to allow powerful multinational 
corporations to buy off the state’s resources at bargain prices, and that they would ultimately 
pave the way for them to gain control over public programs and policies. See Navroz K Dubash 
and Sudhir Chella Rajan, The Politics of the Power Sector in India (The World Resources 
Institute, 2 April 2001) <http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/powerpolitics_india.pdf> 
Accessed 17 April 2017. 
131 A credit support agreement should not be confused with a Government Support Agreement 
(GSA). GSA, like a sovereign guarantee, is a comfort letter from the government outlining their 
responsibilities in any event that the state owned entity defaults; also see Francesco Corielli, 
Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk shifting through non-financial contracts: effects on 
loan spreads and capital structure of project finance deals’, (October 2010) Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320 Corielli, Gatti and Steffanoni studied capital 
structure negotiation and cost of debt financing between sponsors and lenders using a sample of 
more than 1000 project finance loans worth around US$195 billion closed between 1998 and 
2003. They concluded that lenders rely on a network of non-financial contracts as a mechanism 
to control agency cost and project risk.  
132 Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). 
133 Information was gathered as part of the workshop agenda from speaker’s presentations and by 
later interviewing some of the speakers, most notably Mr Rafael Molina and Ms Shamali De 
Silva.  
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sovereign guarantees—along with other contractual bundles, for example EPC 
and O&M contracts, are provided to the lenders in order to seek and confirm debt 
financing on the syndicated loan or the bond market.134 This aspect has been 
highlighted in Chapter 4 wherein it is argued that sovereign guarantees are a 
mere ‘comfort tool’135 in order for lenders to feel secure whilst lending to risky 
jurisdictions, and having recourse to the state in case there is a breach on 
repayments.136 These contractual bundles, especially the PPA, are an indication 
to the lender of a project’s future cost and more importantly, revenues.137 
2.3 Project Finance and Application: Gulpur Power Project 
This section is an illustration of how all the parties discussed in the previous 
section are structured within a project finance transaction. In view of this 
chapter’s focus on project finance, this section will aid in understanding the 
relationship that exists between the parties in conjunction with the discussion on 
sovereign guarantees in the following chapters. One of the key strengths of a 
                                                
134 Also see Hugh G McCrory, Jr, ‘Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries’, (April 1995) 
American Society of International Law, Vol 89, pp 19-36. McCrory argues that the extent of host 
country government support for infrastructure project continues to be a difficult issue. 
Governments would like the power sector to take more of the risk. As reforms in the pricing of 
electricity take effect in the coming years, the need for government guarantees regarding power 
purchaser obligations are likely to be re-examined. 
135 There have been reported instances where a sponsor has to issue comfort letters to the 
lender(s). See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002). 
Yescombe submits that ‘if a commercial risk involved in the project is not adequately mitigated 
by other means, the sponsors may have to step in to fill this gap. “Comfort letters” are sometimes 
offered to lenders as a risk mitigation in place of formal guarantees; for example, a sponsor may 
state that it owns the shares in the Project Company, that it presently intends to maintain this 
ownership and keep the Project Company in a sound financial condition, and that it provides 
management support’. Moreover, there have also been instances wherein the sponsors have had 
to issue comfort letters to lenders in order to confirm that there will be no change in management 
(ie sponsors), or a certain EPC or O&M contractor will be engaged with the SPV for a certain 
length of time.  
136 See Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney 2004).  
Nevitt and Fabozzi argue that guarantees enable promoters to shift the financial risk of a project 
to one or more third parties. While guarantees are essential to project financing, guarantees can 
give lenders a false sense of security.  
137 See Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk shifting through non-
financial contracts: effects on loan spreads and capital structure of project finance deals’, 
(October 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320. 
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project finance transaction is the lender’s focus on future revenue generated by 
the project company. However, lenders’ consideration does not disregard the 
existing entities of the sponsors. It is quite the contrary; lenders are inclined to 
subdue their risk by reviewing a sponsor’s existing business or businesses. 
Primarily, it is for this reason that some sponsors seek professional O&M or even 
EPC contractors in order to facilitate their application for financing from the 
lenders, as discussed in the earlier section. There is also an indication from some 
case study examples wherein the sponsor’s use their existing companies as O&M 
and EPC contractors. Nevitt and Fabozzi have also addressed this misconception.  
They highlight that certain borrowers misinterpret the conception of ‘self 
supporting’ project. They understand that their borrowing is a completely self-
supporting project without guarantees or undertakings from financially 
responsible parties.138  Typically, it is argued that a lender would not be 
promiscuous when lending within a project finance transaction, knowing that 
there are higher returns with a higher risk involved.139 
In order to better understand the parties involved, this section illuminates the role 
of various parties by applying these to a recent power project undertaken in 
Pakistan. Gulpur Hydro Power Project (hereinafter referred to as “Gulpur 
Hydro”) is situated in the Kotli district of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan. Gulpur Hydro 
is a 102MW power project registered under the name Mira Power Limited. Mira 
                                                
138 See Peter K Nevitt and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition Euromoney Book, 
2004). They argue ‘there is a popular misconception that project financing means off-balance 
sheet financing to the point that the project is completely-self-supporting without guarantees or 
undertakings by financially responsible parties. This leads to misunderstandings by prospective 
borrowers who are under the impression that certain kinds of projects may be financed as stand-
alone self-supporting project financings and, therefore, proceed on the assumption that similar 
projects in which they are interested can be financed without recourse to the sponsor’. 
139 Interesting observation made by Nevitt and Fabozzi: they submit that ‘lenders, on the other 
hand, are not in the venture capital business. They are not equity risk takers’. See Peter K Nevitt 
and Frank J Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney Book, 2004).  
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Power is a newly incorporated SPV. The figure below illustrates the involvement 
of various parties to this transaction. Primarily, MIRA’s sponsors include Korea 
South-East Power Co. (KOSEP), Daelim, and a minority stake of Lotte. The 
project has several lenders, including the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
(Korea Exim Bank) and FMO Entrepreneurial Development Bank. Figure 2.3 
provides a detailed illustration of Gulpur Hydro project.140  
 
Figure 2.3: MIRA Power Project Finance Structure 
                                                
140 Work on this project has commenced recently. There is no literature available on the project, 
however for brief details please see: Asian Development Bank, ‘Pakistan: Gulpur Hydropower 
Project. Non sovereign project, 47929-001’ <https://www.adb.org/projects/47929-
001/main#project-overview> Accessed 23 March 2017; also see Dawn, ‘PM Nawaz inaugurates 
102MW Gulpur hydropower project in AJK’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 15 October 2015) 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1213248> Accessed 15 March 2017. 
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There are two elements of this illustration that need to be highlighted. First, EPC 
and O&M contractors have direct contracts with the lenders, and second, the 
lenders have direct agreements with the Government of Pakistan. As discussed in 
section 2.2.2, Project’s Sub-Contractors, it is argued that EPC and O&M 
contractors play a vital role within the administration and construction of the 
project. In order to mitigate their risk further, lenders have contracted directly 
with the contractors, in a bid to monitor their performance and as a result, the 
performance of the project.141 The second prong to this figure is the lender 
contracting with the government of the host state. This can be sub-divided into 
two factions. One corresponds to the general assurance that the host state is 
deemed to provide to the lender(s). These can be comfort letters or other 
assurance letters concerning the smooth sailing of the project. The second faction 
relates to more onerous legal obligations. These relate to the indemnity and 
guarantee factions that we have extensively discussed in the Chapter 3.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an introduction to the underlying features of a highly-
leveraged transaction. The entire premise of this study is predicated on the 
understanding that project finance transactions are highly leveraged. As a result 
of their highly-leveraged nature, they warrant increased or improved forms of 
risk mitigation measures in order to protect investment. In view of increasing 
                                                
141 This submission also relates to the argument forwarded by Corielli, Gatti and Steffanoni 
concerning risk. They have submitted that ‘lenders rely on the network of non-financial contracts 
as a mechanism to control agency cost and project risk’. See Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, 
Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk shifting through non-financial contracts: effects on loan spreads and 
capital structure of project finance deals’, (October 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Vol 42, No 7, pp 1295-1320. Essentially, a whole gamut of non-financial contracts is entered into 
with various sub-contractors directly by the sponsors and the lenders, in order to shift liability 
and to mitigate risk. 
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challenges and threats to projects, especially as a consequence of liquidity crises 
in developing country investment regimes, parties require more robust measures 
of security in order to mitigate risk. This chapter introduces project finance as a 
measure of securing finance through a limited recourse provision, with an 
intention to facilitate a newly incorporated project company to exclusively 
produce a product. Consequently, this chapter emphasises that the risk borne by 
the lenders and the sponsors is imminently higher in comparison to a typical 
corporate finance transaction.  
In order to understand the nature of risk, this chapter outlines all the main parties 
involved within a project finance transaction. With a view to understanding the 
complex nature of sovereign guarantees, all the relevant parties and their roles 
are discussed, in a bid to explain the relationship that exists between these parties 
in the larger context of sovereign guarantees. The provision of a guarantee from 
a financial perspective cannot be explained without outlining the role of all the 
parties involved. This chapter accomplishes this task. 
One of the contentions forwarded within this chapter is a discussion on the 
limited recourse nature of project finance transactions. Through a strategic outlay 
and structuring, the final beneficiary is isolated from the project company. 
Moreover, this chapter also highlights the use of other sub-contractors in a bid to 
mitigate the risk and exposure of the project sponsors. This chapter introduces 
project finance as a method of risk mitigation. However, the presence of all these 
parties within a project finance transaction caters for commercial risk, but not 
political risk. In view of the liquidity issues prevalent within Pakistan’s 
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investment regime, it is submitted that project finance structures can be used to 
better understand risk—however they cannot mitigate them completely.  
Project finance is an extensive study; a vast field that requires a more serious, 
independent undertaking of its own. In view of the complex nature of these 
project finance transactions, this chapter is an illustration of the parties that 
formulate a typical project finance transaction, and provides a canvas illustration 
to understand why sovereign guarantees are issued, especially in a project 
finance framework.  
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Chapter 3  
Guarantee or Indemnity—An Old Chestnut Revisited 
3.1 Introduction 
It is understood that all complex financial arrangements require some form of 
security. These security measures can take the form of collateral, creation of a 
security interest or generally, structuring the transaction in a manner wherein the 
parties are cascading their risk from one party to another through contractual 
measures. However, in view of a project’s heavy reliance on future cash flows 
and its highly-leveraged financial nature, such measures of risk mitigation may 
prove to be inadequate. Consequently, investors seek more reassuring measures 
to secure their investment, especially in a project finance context.  
As a result, this chapter plays a central role in the prognosis of this entire thesis, 
in relation to the notion of security and its adequacy. It attempts to review a more 
robust measure of security: one involving a third-party guaranteeing the 
performance of another party. In a bid to explain the adequacy of a sovereign 
guarantee instrument, it is important to undertake a discourse, and explain the 
rationale of sovereign guarantee instruments by highlighting the underlying 
features of suretyship.  
There are three primary contentions addressed in this chapter. First, in order to 
align the purpose of this study and create a background, a historical context for 
the use of suretyship instruments has been provided before dwelling further into 
the intricate nature of various forms of suretyship. Despite being an abstraction, 
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this section will provide an outline of how suretyship instruments play an 
eminent role in promoting free flow of capital in a private and a public sphere.  
Second, reference is made to cases from common law jurisdictions, in an attempt 
to explain the two sub-categories of suretyship. The two main features of 
suretyship instruments, guarantee and indemnity, have been extensively 
discussed in this section in a bid to outline their general definitions. Whilst this 
section may seem abstract, it strongly rebuts the presumption that sovereign 
guarantee instruments are no longer pivotal planks within an investment regime. 
Moreover, in view of the discussion to be undertaken in Chapter 4, this section 
provides a background to the law surrounding the concept of suretyship. As a 
general overview, this section attempts to discuss how the courts interpret 
guarantees and indemnities. Academic text and case law surrounding the area of 
suretyship meticulously differentiates between an indemnity and a guarantee by 
employing primary and secondary notions of obligation. In order to understand 
these features, this section adopts a pendulum model to explain the shift in the 
nature of liability from the principal debtor to the surety provider. In an 
interesting twist, this section attempts to replace the usual method of explaining 
liability and discharge of responsibility by focusing on the pendulum’s central 
pivot, hypothetically, as an agreement. In view of the host state courts declaring 
off-take agreements null and void, or in the event of the state’s breach of such 
agreements, a contention emerges suggesting that it is unlikely that the state will 
honour sovereign guarantee provisions. Consequently, a structural change is 
proposed in the investment regime, wherein a sovereign guarantee instrument is 
re-named.   
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The third contention relates to the discussion surrounding the presence of both an 
indemnity and a guarantee instrument in one agreement. Despite a general belief 
that the two instruments cannot operate under one contractual document, this 
section refers to cases from private law wherein the two terms were indeed used 
under one contractual arrangement. Indemnity and guarantee agreements (or, as 
referred to in this chapter “InG” agreements) are a common measure of security, 
especially in a project finance context. Their immediate presence within a 
contractual framework may be ignored—primarily because a guarantee may exist 
in a ‘vacuum’, because the parties’ real intention is to agree to indemnification. 
However, the inclusion of political risk insurers in a project finance context 
provides a reassuring account of the role of InG agreements under the framework 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
3.1.1 Historical Significance 
Guarantees, unlike many recent tools of financial engineering, are not a new 
concept.142 Under the umbrella of suretyship, guarantee agreements are said to 
have come into existence as early as 4700 years ago.143 Early traces of suretyship 
resemble those of the modern concepts of a guarantee and an indemnity. Morgan 
refers to a tablet found in the Library of Sargon I, King of Accad and Sumer. The 
tablet provides a stark reflection of the principles underlying modern concepts of 
guarantee. The tablet outlined the terms of a contract between two farmers: a 
                                                
142 See Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v The King [1921] 3 K B 500. The facts of the case are as 
follows: the claimant steamship company had sent its vessel during the First World War to a 
British port. The claimants sought a guarantee from the British Legation in Stockholm that the 
boat should be allowed free passage without being detained in Great Britain. The vessel was 
detained by the Crown on its second journey, and the claimants sought damages for breach of 
contract.  
143 James O’Donovan and John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010) 4-8. 
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merchant from the City of Accad was appointed to act as a guarantor for the 
farmer’s performance to cultivate and produce crops on the other farmer’s land 
while he carried out military service.144 Similarly, the Code of Hammurabi, 
enacted in 2250 BC, almost 500 years after the Sargon I regime, illustrates how 
the contemporary concept of guarantee has been derived from ancient times.145 
Under the Code, the governor insured the fidelity of any person who came within 
the jurisdiction of the city. As a result, any person who entered the city was 
insured against the dishonesty of others.146 
Sargon’s tablet is a reflection of the modern law on guarantees: in order to secure 
performance of a given transaction in a prescribed manner under the terms of the 
agreement, a third party guarantees or agrees to answer for the debt of the party 
whose performance is rendered. Therefore, a guarantee is to act as a collateral in 
case a party does not perform as promised under the terms of the contract.147 
                                                
144 Willis D Morgan, ‘The History and Economics of Suretyship’ (1926-1927) 12 Cornell L. Q. 
153; also see Philip K Jones, ‘Roman Law Basis of Suretyship in some Modern Civil Codes’ 
(1977-1978) 52 Tul L Rev 129; William H Loyd, ‘The Surety’ (1917) 66 Uni of Penn L Rev 40, 
42; Thomas Hewitson, Suretyship: Its Origin and History in Outline (1st Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1927) 70. 
145 Willis D Morgan, ‘The History and Economics of Suretyship’ (1926-1927) 12 Cornell L Q 
153. 
146 James O’Donovan and John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010); also see Claude Hermann W Johns, ‘Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, 
Contracts and Letters (Library of Ancient Inscriptions) as quoted by Willis D Morgan, ‘The 
History and Economics of Suretyship’(1926-1927) 12 Cornell L Q 153. 
147 A good illustration of this notion is illustrated in the case of Spar Shipping AS v Grand China 
Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 718 wherein the following clause was used in 
all the three guarantee documents issued (save for the names of each vessel): “we hereby 
unconditionally and irrevocably guarantee as primary obligor the full and timely performance by 
the Charters of each and every obligation of the Charter Party, and in the event of any one or 
more defaults in performance by the Charters, we undertake on your first written demand to 
promptly rectify each and every default and hereby accept the responsibilities of any liability, 
losses or damages that you suffer as a result or arising out of any such default”. The facts of the 
case are as follows: the respondents, GCS were in arrears. Spar recouped some losses by 
exercising lien over sub-freight, however these were still not adequate. Spar called GCL for 
payment guarantees, withdrew the vessels and terminated charters. Spar commenced arbitration 
proceedings against GCS. GCS went into liquidation in Hong Kong. Arbitration proceedings 
were stayed. Spar claimed against GCL under the guarantee for balance of hire under the 
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Modern facets of suretyship are not a conjured product of recent globalisation, 
which has led to the inception of many commercial instruments. Recent 
innovations within financial markets have only further distressed and damaged 
the harmony of the financial services industry.148 Unlike an ordinary financial 
instrument, the underlying rationale of a guarantee instrument features execution 
of an agreed performance under a contract in the event there is a failure to 
perform. Moreover, it provides an ancillary form of security for lenders and 
creditors to seek recourse from principal debtor in an event there is a breach.149 
This ancillary framework of security under a guarantee or an indemnity has since 
been used in both national and international contexts to uplift the confidence of 
the parties within a financial transaction.  
3.2  Definition of Suretyship   
The underlying features of a surety are predicated upon the principles of 
obligation. Obligation, like many words ending in ‘ation’ in the English 
                                                                                                                               
charters, damages for loss of bargain in respect of the unexpired term of the charters, and the cost 
of the arbitration proceedings against GCS. Spar were successful in their claim.  
148 The Economist, ‘The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course’ The Economist (London, 
07 September 2013) <http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-
crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article> Accessed 14 January 2015; RPC, ‘Sub-prime and 
related Northern Rock credit crisis force tighter lending criteria but put mortgage lenders and 
brokers at greater risk of mis-selling claims by existing customers’ Lexology (Dec 13, 2007) 
<www.lexology.com/library> Accessed 22 March 2015; also see Barry Ritholtz, ‘Lehman didn’t 
cause the financial crisis, no matter what the partisans say’ The Washington Post (21 September 
2013). 
149 It can be derived from the academic literature that the modern facts of suretyship have been 
originally derived from Roman law. With the Romans, suretyship was the most important means 
of securing debts, a means that—especially because of the stringency and effectiveness of 
personal execution—surpassed even real security in practical importance and juristic-technical 
refinement. See Max Kaser, Roman Private Law (2nd Edition, Rolf Dannenbring Trans, 1968) 
233; Gaius is quoted by James O’Donovan and John Philips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee 
(2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010). They explain how suretyship was incorporated by the 
Romans. The adpromissor, or surety, was of three varieties; the sponsio, the fidepromissio, and 
the fideiussio. Sponsors and fidepromissors could act as such only on verbal contract, where 
jidejussor could be a surety on any undertaking “whether re verbis, litteris, or consensus”. The 
other two forms of securing obligation of another were mandatum credendae precuniae and the 
constitutum debiti; also see Philip K Jones, ‘Roman Law Basis of Suretyship in Some Modern 
Civil Codes’ (1977) 52 Tul L Rev 129. 
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language, can be used in both an abstract and concrete sense.150 While the term 
in its abstract capacity highlights the need to do something, or have the sense to 
do something, the term under a suretyship framework refers to the financial 
protection offered by a surety in respect of payment obligations. In private law, 
matters involving breach of contract of suretyship involve repercussions oriented 
towards individuals who are party to these transactions. However, from a state’s 
standpoint, breach of suretyship or guarantee obligation can have long lasting 
financial and economic repercussions.  
Suretyship contracts can be defined as one where a party contracts with an actual 
or possible creditor of another to be responsible to him by way of security for the 
whole or part of the debt.151 Seminal cases such as Harburg India Rubber Comb 
Company152, Yeoman Credit Ltd153 and Thomas Lakeman154 point to the 
possibility of an obligation of a surety as a collateral postulating the liability of 
another, the principal debtor. In Yeoman Credit Ltd, a finance company entered 
into a lease agreement with the first defendant. The first defendant was an infant 
at the time of the signing of the agreement. In order to provide recourse for the 
finance company in case there is a default on payment(s), the finance company 
sought a ‘hire-purchase indemnity and undertaking’ from Defendant 2. 
                                                
150 Inspiration derived from J Roland Pennock and John W Chapman, Political and Legal 
Obligation (Nomos XII, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 
1970). 
151 David Marks and Gabriel Moss, Rowlatt on Principal and Surety (6th Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011).  
152 Harburg India Rubber Comb Company v Martin [1902] 1 K B 778. Brief facts of the case are 
as follows: the plaintiffs a foreign company carrying on business in Germany were judgment 
creditors of an English company called the Crowdus Accumulator Syndicate Limited, of which 
the defendant was a director and held large number of shares. The defendant, in a bid to resolve 
the issue, met with the plaintiff’s agent in England, Mr Winter. The defendant promised Mr 
Winter that he would endorse two bills of exchange, each for half the amount of the debt. The 
defendant failed, and the plaintiffs brought a claim against the defendant for breach of promise.  
153 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828. 
154 Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17. 
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Defendant 1 defaulted on his payments to the finance company. The finance 
company repossessed the car and sold it. The sums generated as a result of the 
sale of the car were inadequate, therefore the finance company sought indemnity 
against the loss suffered from Defendant 2. Holroyd Pearce LJ found that the 
agreement was one of indemnity and not a guarantee as held by the court of first 
instance. Holroyd Pearce LJ made an interesting observation, arguing that ‘in its 
widest sense a contract of indemnity includes a contract of guarantee’. Broadly 
then, suretyship is an umbrella that encompasses both guarantees and 
indemnities. Despite various disputes before the courts, both terms have been 
used interchangeably. However, their differential characteristics set them apart. 
This chapter provides a discursive analysis of both terms, in a bid to explain the 
security arrangement involved in each legal concept.  
Through research undertaken for the purposes of this study, it is argued that the 
term ‘guarantee’ is more commonly used in security arrangements than 
‘indemnity’, in an international project finance transaction. However, as 
discussed in the following section and a theme recurrent throughout this thesis, it 
is argued that the wording and structural framework used in issuing guarantees in 
general, and sovereign guarantee in particular, resonate an indemnity. This legal 
conundrum is an exercise widely practised as outlined in Vossloh, wherein the 
court observed that ‘due to the nature of the wording, similar characteristics, and 
similar rights and duties arising between the parties, it is not unusual to find the 
term guarantee used loosely to describe what is in reality an indemnity’.155 In 
Vossloh, the Vossloh Group was a subsidiary of VAG, and entered into several 
                                                
155 [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch), (2011) 2 All E R (Comm) 307. Also see Geraldine Andrews and 
Richard Millet, The Law of Guarantees (6th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 4.  
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agreements with Angel Trains (which was later renamed Alpha Trains) for the 
sale of locomotives. The Royal Bank of Scotland, former owner of Angel Trains, 
sought several guarantees in this regard from the VAG Group. Alpha Trains 
brought an action against VAG Group for sixty-three G1206 cargo locomotives, 
which suffered from engine and gearbox defect. An action was brought against 
VAG group under the 2009 guarantee. Whereas the primary issue underlying this 
was predicated on the construction of the words in an instrument, Sir William 
Blackburne noted that ‘in the current context…a contract of indemnity denotes a 
contract where the person who gives the indemnity, guarantees to undertake his 
obligation…’156  
Two conclusions can be drawn from the interchangeable use of ‘guarantee’ and 
‘indemnity’ provisions. First, it highlights the lack of understanding by the 
parties as to what each term entails. Second, parties consider a ‘guarantee’ 
provision to be more reassuring than an ‘indemnity’ under similar circumstances. 
As Lord Diplock observed in Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd and others ‘…even 
the use of the word guarantee is not in itself conclusive. It is often used loosely in 
commercial dealings to mean an ordinary warranty. It is sometimes used to mis-
describe what is in law a contract of indemnity and not a guarantee’.157 Case law 
                                                
156 Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch).  
157 [1972] 2 W L R 1175. Brief facts of the case are as follows: creditors were forwarding agents 
for the Company (the principal debtor). The company’s managing director held all but one share 
of the company. He was also the guarantor of the company to the creditors. By a written contract, 
the creditors agree to relinquish their lien over the debtor’s goods in return for the debtor 
agreeing to pay £40,000 over a course of six weekly payments. The debtor defaulted and the 
creditors treated this as wrongful repudiation of the agreement. The appellant (previously the 
defendant) was held liable for the damages that ensued as a result of the breach.  
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indicates that without prejudice to whichever term incorporated in an agreement, 
both terms bear serious financial burden and risk.158 
In an attempt to introduce the umbrella term, this section provided an 
introduction to the overarching concept of suretyship. Suretyship in this study 
has been used interchangeably with guarantee and indemnity provisions. This is 
primarily because the available text on this subject refers to indemnity providers 
and guarantors as surety. Moreover, in light of the submissions forwarded in 
Vossloh and Moschi, it seems that in a wider context, parties in a bid to secure a 
robust security framework often confuse the two main notions of suretyship, 
guarantee and indemnity. In order to understand the main features of an 
indemnity and a guarantee, the next section aims to provide a discursive analysis 
of both terms by reviewing case law available on the subject. 
3.2.1 Principles underlying a guarantee  
A contract of guarantee comprises binary responsibilities subject to the 
provisions of the contractual arrangement between the parties. The creditor can 
seek a guarantor’s contractual assurance by which the surety agrees to answer for 
some existing or future liability of another party (the principal), to a third party 
(the creditor). Second, the creditor can seek a guarantor’s assurance to ‘see to 
                                                
158 James O’Donovan and John Philips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010) 11. The author also submits that ‘indeed it is hard to imagine a more versatile 
arrangement than a contract of guarantee; Also see Lord Reid’s explanation in Hyundai Heavy 
Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos [1980] 2 All ER 29 wherein it is expressed that a (Guarantee) 
is an ‘accessory’ obligation which is valid only if the borrower’s obligations under the loan 
agreement are valid. If the borrower’s obligations are or later become void or unenforceable, a 
conditional payment obligation has no advantage over a pure guarantee. Neither can be enforced; 
also see General Produce Co v United Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255, 258; also see Alan 
Berg, ‘Rethinking Indemnities, Part 1’ (2002) 9 Journal of International Banking and Financial 
Law 360. 
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it’159 that the principal debtor performs. In the process of guaranteeing the 
performance or liability of one party to another, the party acting as a guarantor 
bears the liability in addition to, and not in substitution for, the liability of the 
principal.160 An obligation for a guarantee can exist as a provision within a 
contract or in a scheme of larger arrangements, as a separate agreement. In the 
context of the theme of this study and the principal question—are sovereign 
guarantees an adequate measure of security?—it is argued that this chapter will 
emphasise the existence of a guarantee as a separate contractual arrangement, 
and as a ‘see to it’ transaction.   
A guarantee is therefore an accessory contract providing an additional form of 
security wherein the promisor undertakes to pay the promisee, or be answerable 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another party.161 In essence, the liability of 
the principal debtor and guarantor is normative to a pendulum. The pendulum of 
responsibility shifts on the occurrence of an event. In a guarantee transaction, 
there are two pendulums deriving their motion from one pivot: the central 
                                                
159 Also see Lord Diplock’s submission in Moschi v Lep Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 ‘…at 
common law, a guarantee gives rise to an obligation on the part of the guarantor ‘to see to it’ that 
the debtor performs his obligations to the creditor. The obligation of the guarantor ‘is not an 
obligation himself to pay a sum of money to the creditor, but an obligation to see to it that 
another person, the debtor, does something’. 
160 Vossloh AG v Alpha Train (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch), [2011] 2 All E R (Comm) 307 
per Sir William Blackburne; also see Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828; also see 
Paul McGrath, ‘The nature of modern guarantees: IIG v Van Der Merwes’ (2009) 1 CRI 10; these 
cases need to be distinguished from Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 
17 wherein Lord Cairns submitted that Mr Lakeman stepped in and undertook himself, as a 
matter of primary liability. The construction of the words is a crucial element in determining 
whether liability is secondary or primary.  
161 See Pitts and Others v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 wherein Smith L J submitted ‘a 
guarantee on the other hand is a specific type of indemnity whereby the guarantor promises to 
answer for the debt or default of another person’. In Pitts and Others, the defendant was a 
majority shareholder in a company. The Defendant made a provisional agreement with another 
party to sell his shares within the company. In order to convince the minority shareholders that 
they will be paid handsomely, the Defendant convinced them to waive their right of pre-emption. 
The purchase did not pay the claimants and this lead to the dispute.  
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agreement. The liability imposed on the principal debtor is primary, and the 
guarantor bears a secondary obligation.  
This submission is illustrated in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below. Figure 3.1 
(Pre-Default) illustrates the pendulum of responsibility affixed to the principal 
debtor. Figure 3.2 (Post-Default) illustrates the pendulum affixed to the 
guarantor in a different time frame, on the same level, corresponding 
simultaneously to any movement in the pendulum in Figure 3.1. When the 
principal debtor defaults on its payment, depending on the nature of a guarantee, 
the pendulum in Figure 3.2 comes into operation. Thus, depending upon the 
words within the guarantee instrument, this shift from one time frame to another, 
post-default, affixes the responsibility to discharge debt of the principal debtor 
(as illustrated in Figure 3.2) onto the guarantor. The trigger point in these time 
frames will be predicated upon the principal debtor’s default under the payment 
terms or a prescribed act in the agreement.162 From a project finance standpoint, 
it is argued that this prescribed term can be invoked upon the non-payment or 
default by the off-taking body under the PPA. However, as outlined earlier, the 
guarantor’s liability will be in addition to and not as a substitution for the 
liability of the principal debtor.163  
                                                
162 See Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch). As per Sir William 
Blackburne: ‘There is no liability on the guarantor unless and until the principal has failed to 
perform his obligation. The guarantor is generally only liable to the same extent that the principal 
is liable to the creditor. This has the consequence that there is usually no liability on the part of 
the guarantor if the underlying obligation is void or unenforceable.’  
163 It is important to note that, as outlined by Lord Reid in Moschi ‘where on the true construction 
of the contract, the surety undertakes that the principal will carry out his contract and will answer 
for his default. In such a case, if for any reason the principal fails to act as required by his 
contract he not only breaks his own contract, but he also puts the surety in breach of his contract 
with the creditor, thereby entitling the creditor to sue the surety, not for unpaid debt but for 
damages. See Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331.  
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The pendulum of responsibility is suspended from the pivot representing the 
central agreement. Consequently, any movement in the pendulum of 
responsibility is derived through the same central agreement. If the central 
agreement is null and void, there will be no pendulum of responsibility, nor will 
the secondary guarantor be liable.164 HUBCO and Riqo Diq are recent cases 
illustrating how this rule can prove detrimental for the investors and the project 
company in light of the treatment accorded to null and void agreements by local 
courts. HUBCO165 and more recently Riqo Diq166 illustrate the problematic 
nature of the ‘old chestnut’. In Riqo Diq, public policy was employed as a 
ground for revoking the principal concession agreement.167 Pakistan’s Supreme 
Court found the principal agreements void for reasons of public policy, rejected 
the doctrine of separation for arbitration clauses within these agreements168, and 
                                                
164 See Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch). Sir William 
Blackburne submitted that ‘there is no liability on the guarantor unless and until the principal has 
failed to perform his obligation. The guarantor is generally only liable to the same extent that the 
principal is liable to the creditor. This has the consequence that there is usually no liability on the 
part of the guarantor if the underlying obligation is void or unenforceable’; James O’Donovan 
and John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 11. 
The author also submits that ‘indeed it is hard to imagine a more versatile arrangement than a 
contract of guarantee; also see Lord Reid’s explanation in Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v 
Papadopoulos [1980] 2 All ER 29 wherein it is expressed that a (Guarantee) is an ‘accessory’ 
obligation which is valid only if the borrower’s obligations under the loan agreement are valid. If 
the borrower’s obligations are or later become void or unenforceable, a conditional payment 
obligation has no advantage over a pure guarantee. Neither can be enforced; also see General 
Produce Co v United Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255,258; also see Alan Berg, ‘Rethinking 
Indemnities, Part 1’ (2002) 9 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 360. 
165 HUBCO Power Company Ltd v Pakistan WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841). 
166 Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch & Others v Government of Balochistan & Others (PLD 2013 
Supreme Court 641). 
167 Doctrine of separation was held not applicable; see HUBCO Power Company Ltd v Pakistan 
WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841) wherein HUBCO was restrained from invoking the arbitration 
clause of the agreement for the following reasons: ‘the allegations of corruption in support of 
which the above mentioned circumstances do provide prima facie basis for further probe into 
matter judicially and, if proved, would render these documents as void, therefore, we are of the 
considered view that according to the public policy such matter…are not referable to 
Arbitration’. The court further expressed ‘the disputes between the parties are not commercial 
disputes arising from an undisputed legally valid contract, or relatable to such a contract, for, 
according to the case of WAPDA on account of these criminal acts disputed documents did not 
bring into existence any legally binding contract between the parties, therefore, the dispute 
primarily relates to the very existence of a valid contract and not a dispute under such a contract’. 
168 The counsel relied on Harbour Assurance v Kansa (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455 wherein the 
Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause will survive where the main contract in which it 
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consequently rejected any application for arbitration proceedings in ICSID. 
Cases like HUBCO and Riqo Diq diminish the economic value of such 
guarantees, and illustrate that any guarantee provisions will eventually be 
circumvented by the host state.   
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Figure 3.1: Pre-Default 
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Figure 3.2: Post-Default 
An agreement of guarantee is therefore an act of reassurance for the creditor. 
Several transactions, reviewed for the purposes of this study, illustrate that there 
are several names that can be accorded to such security arrangements. However, 
                                                                                                                               
appears to be invalid ab initio on grounds of illegality—so that the illegality issues themselves 
can properly be referred to arbitration.  
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parties need to exercise caution in according a certain name to a security 
document. In Kleinwart Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Bhd169 the 
Court of Appeal held that ‘a letter of comfort in these terms was merely a 
statement of present fact regarding intentions and that it was not a contractual 
promise as to future conduct’.170 In Klienwort Benson Ltd, the defendants 
indirectly, wholly owned a subsidiary to operate as a ring-dealing member of the 
London Metal Exchange. Due to the inadequacy of the capital available they 
sought financial help from the plaintiffs (Kleinwort Benson). The plaintiff sought 
from the defendants an assurance as to the responsibility of the subsidiary for the 
repayment by the London Metal Exchange of any sums lent by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants did not furnish a ‘joint and several liability’ or a guarantee to the 
plaintiffs. Instead, they gave them a comfort letter outlining that ‘it is our policy 
to ensure that the business of [the London Metal Exchange] is at all times in a 
position to meet its liabilities to you under the above arrangements’. The tin 
market collapsed and the London Metal Exchange went into liquidation. 
Consequently, the plaintiffs sought money from the defendant under the ‘comfort 
letter’ that was issued to the plaintiffs. The court found in favour of Malaysia 
Mining Corporation. Ralph Gibson LJ observed that: 
the concept of a comfort letter, to which the parties had resort 
when the defendants refused to assume joint and several 
                                                
169 [1989] 1 WLR 379, CA. 
170 Also see Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV, MSC Belgium N V [2008] EWHC 1265 
(Comm). The facts of the case are as follows: Ferryways signed a 5-year agreement with the 
claimant, Associated British Ports, under which ABP guaranteed a five-hour turnaround of 160 
units at its port at Ipswich at designated slot times. ABP’s charges for handling the units carried 
by Ferryways. At the time of the second agreement was executed, a written agreement was 
concluded between ABP and MSCB which, inter alia, included a comfort letter clause. The court 
held that the guarantor, MSCB, was not liable under the letter agreement for any sums due from 
Ferryways to ABP. The court discussed the letter of comfort issue in detail.  
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liability or to give a guarantee, was known by both sides at least 
to extend to or to include a document under which the 
defendants would give comfort to the plaintiffs to assuming, not 
a legal liability to ensure repayment of the liabilities of their 
subsidiary, but a moral responsibility only. 
It is therefore argued that it is the substance and not strictly the form of such 
security arrangements that determines its actual ramifications. Despite common 
use of letters of comfort in infrastructure development and in highly-leveraged 
project financings, it is argued that parties require more than letters of comfort 
from the host state. Sponsors and lenders need contractual reassurances from 
third parties in cases where the principal debtor defaults partially or fully in 
paying their debt. Developed and under-developed economies use guarantees as 
an accessory in their bond markets171, project finance transaction and in 
infrastructure development projects.172 These guarantees can relate to the 
completion of a project on time, supplying or generating an agreed capacity of 
energy, and more importantly, guarantee for payment if an off-taker breaches its 
contractual payment.  
3.2.2 Underlying features of an Indemnity 
Unlike a guarantee instrument, there is no dearth of definitions available for the 
term ‘indemnity’. As stated earlier, a guarantee is, in an abstract sense, an 
indemnity. Without prejudice to some legal procedures the two terms entail 
                                                
171 See Marina Von Newmann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment 
(Princeton University Press, 1965) 67. 
172 Also see Comptroller and Auditor General, Amyas Morse, UK Guarantees scheme for 
infrastructure: report, National Audit Office (2015). 
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similar outcomes. Their primary purpose is to provide a robust means of security. 
An indemnity can be defined as: 
…[R]ecompense for any loss or liability which one person has 
incurred, whether the duty to indemnify comes from an 
agreement or not173…obligation to indemnify another may also 
arise out of a contract of indemnity, and the term “contract of 
indemnity” is also used in more than one sense…174  
A more simple definition of the term indemnity is provided by Chitty on 
Contracts, wherein it is stated that an indemnity can be considered to be an 
undertaking to make good a loss suffered by another party.175 An indemnity is a 
recompense for any loss or liability which one person has incurred, which may 
arise by contract or by operation of law. An example of an obligation to 
indemnify arising as a result of a contract can be contract of insurance.176 
A contract of indemnity is essentially a contract between Party A and Party B 
wherein by the operation of the law or contract, Party B is to keep Party A from 
suffering loss or to make good any such loss suffered.177 The aforementioned 
definition of the term ‘indemnity’ in Chitty on Contracts states that in its widest 
                                                
173 Pitts v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301, [2008] 2 W L R 1289. 
174 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts: General Principles Volume I (31st Edition, Sweet& 
Maxwell, 2012). 
175 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts: General Principles Volume I (31st Edition, Sweet& 
Maxwell, 2012). 
176 James O’Donovan and John Philips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010). 
177 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 at 831; Argo Caribbean Group Ltd v Lewis 
[1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 289 at 296. In Argo Caribbean Group, L Co agreed to lend money to F Co. 
In return, F Co was to create a debenture in favour of L Co. Additionally, ‘A’ and ‘R’ were to 
guarantee Party F’s performance to L. Party ‘D’ agreed to indemnify Party ‘A’ if there is a breach 
by Party ‘F’ for any of the terms of the agreement. 
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sense a ‘contract of indemnity includes all contracts of guarantee…’ however, 
legally and structurally, a guarantee is different from an indemnity not only in 
the outset but also procedurally. There are two fundamental differences that 
distinguish a guarantee from an indemnity. First, the statutory requirement of 
certain types of contracts to be evidenced in writing applies to contracts of 
guarantee (and not to a contract of indemnity)178. Second, the guarantor’s 
liability is treated as being co-extensive with that of the principal; the guarantor’s 
liability will be affected by the discharge of the principal or by the fact that the 
principal contract is void or unenforceable. It is however expressed that an 
indemnifier’s liability is less likely to be affected by these matters.179 The 
principal agreement being void or unenforceable needs to be distinguished from 
when a contract has been repudiated. In Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v 
Papadopoulos and Others180 the court rejected the argument that acceptance of 
repudiation of contract was equivalent to its variation so as to release a guarantor 
from his obligations. The case concerned an agreement entered into between 
Pitria Pride Navigation Co, a Liberian company, and the respondent (hereinafter 
referred to as the “builder”) whereby it was agreed that the builder should “build, 
launch, equip and complete” a 24,000 ton deadweight multipurpose cargo ship, 
and deliver and sell her to the buyer for US$14,300,000. This litigation arose 
from the non-payment of the second instalment on the due date, which the 
                                                
178 Refer to s 4 of the Statute of Frauds Act 1677. Harman L J submitted in Yeoman Credit v 
Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 at 835 ‘…the need to distinguish guarantees from indemnities for the 
purposes of the statute of Frauds “has raised many hair-splitting distinctions of exactly that kind 
which brings the law into hatred, ridicule and contempt by public”. Please note that the non-
application of written requirements for an indemnity means that the institutional incapacities 
leading to declaration of an agreement being declared null and void will not lead the surety party 
to be discharged from their duty to make good the loss suffered. 
179 See Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828; Goulston Discount Co Ltd v Clark 
[1967] 2 Q B 493. 
180 [1980] 1 W L R 1129. 
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appellant argues due to repudiation of the contract has discharged the guarantor 
from indemnifying the loss of the other party. Viscount Dilhorne submitted that:  
…[M]oreover, the suggested rule would make nonsense of the 
whole commercial purpose of suretyship: you would lose your 
guarantor at the very moment you most need him—namely at 
the moment of fundamental breach by the principal promisor. 
Take a usual case giving rise to suretyship that of a trader with a 
bank overdraft. The bank forebears to close the account in 
consideration of the trader finding a guarantor of overdraft and 
agreeing to pay it off by instalments. The Trader thereafter 
repudiates his obligation to pay off the overdraft by instalments; 
whereupon the bank closes the account, so terminating the 
contractual relationship of banker and customer. It would be 
absurd to suppose that the guarantor of the overdraft was 
thereby discharged from his liability as surety. 
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Figure 3.3: The Indemnity Pendulum of Responsibility 
An indemnity poses a primary liability even if the principal agreement is held 
void.181 The obligation of the party indemnifying the creditor shall be a 
continuing obligation, independent of the obligations of the principal debtor.182 
Referring to our example of an oscillating pendulum, please see Figure 3.3. It is 
submitted that the transaction for an indemnity provision is undertaken in two 
different paradigms, wherein the pendulum of responsibility will rest on both the 
principal debtor and the surety simultaneously. The liability of the two parties, ie 
the principal debtor and the surety, will exist separately. However, both parties 
will have a primary responsibility to discharge the debt, unlike in a guarantee 
                                                
181 See Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch). Sir William 
Blackburne submitted that ‘there is no liability on the guarantor unless and until the principal has 
failed to perform his obligation. The guarantor is generally only liable to the extent that the 
principal is liable to the creditor. This has the consequence that there is usually no liability on the 
part of the guarantor if the underlying obligation is void or unenforceable’. 
182Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828; also see James O’Donovan and John Philips, 
The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010). 
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transaction. An obligation to indemnify will accrue once the principal debtor 
defaults. Therefore, a time frame analogy can be used. This must however not be 
confused with the one discussed above.  
In Lakeman v Mountstephen, the defendant provided a verbal assurance in the 
following words ‘M, go on and do the work, and I will see you paid’. The 
claimant did indeed carry out the work and sought payment. The defendant 
refused the claimant’s claim on the basis that the main contention in the case was 
concerning the debt of another, the council. Since, the transaction was one of a 
guarantee, it imposed a secondary liability on the defendant. Moreover, it did not 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds Act condition. The court of the first instance agreed 
with the defendant’s argument. The House of Lords, with the leading judgment 
delivered by Lord Cairns, argued that there was strong evidence to suggest that 
Mr. Lakeman stepped in and undertook himself, as a matter of primary liability, 
to pay for the work done.183 Therefore, the construction of the pendulum is 
predicated upon the words and the actions of the surety. Since the surety or the 
party that agrees to indemnify is acting as a principal debtor, in the event that the 
first primary agreement is declared null and void, the indemnity agreement or 
provision is still enforceable. 
3.3 Co-Existence of Indemnity and Guarantee—The InG Agreements 
The co-existence of a guarantee and an indemnity provision within one 
contractual arrangement is no legal anomaly. Whereas previous sections refer to 
the two terms in an independent, abstract sense, the use of an indemnity in a 
                                                
183 Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17. 
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guarantee framework is not an alien concept, especially in a political risk 
insurance context. For example, referring to our pendulum example in previous 
sections, it is argued that in an instance where there is a shift in the pendulum of 
responsibility from the principal debtor to the guarantor, the principal debtor 
must indemnify the guarantor. Subject to the rules of insolvency in a corporate 
finance context, this involves seeking repayment from whatever assets remain 
within the corporation. However, there is no absolute presumption that such right 
vis a vis indemnification will arise from the same contractual agreement. 
Conversely, the two legal concepts can exist within a single agreement or a 
financial transaction. However, it is argued their operation within an agreement 
is in their own matrix. As a result, if the provisions contained within an 
agreement permit, the guarantee, and indemnity will have separate repercussions 
for the parties to the agreement. Consequently, both instruments will act as an 
additional form of security in the event of default. In Vossloh184 the agreement 
was treated as a guarantee, with an indemnity as an additional form of 
security.185 
Provisions in cases like Vossloh illustrate the parties’ intention and their 
endeavour to protect themselves against any loss they may incur. However, this 
occurrence of the two legal instruments within a single agreement or provision 
can be problematic. In light of the discussion undertaken in the previous sections, 
it is argued that the underlying concepts of an indemnity and a guarantee within 
one agreement creates a discord and even conflict amongst the two instruments, 
                                                
184 Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch). 
185 This is similar to the risk insurance model discussed in Chapter 5.  
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primarily because of their distinctive nature. Whereas an indemnity poses a 
primary liability upon the surety, the guarantee imposes a secondary liability. 
Incorporation of these words within one agreement may seem a robust form of 
protection for the parties; however, such an incorporation can create issues 
insofar as the interpretation of the two terms.  
Alternatively, this predicament can be viewed from a creditor’s lens. Project 
finance transactions are highly leveraged. Consequently, there is a certain degree 
of risk concerning the future revenue stream of the project company. Parties, 
especially the creditor, attempt to use both indemnity and guarantee as a method 
to secure payment. Another contention that seems relevant concerns the trigger 
of an event of default provision invoked by the creditor. This may have 
repercussions for finance arrangements between the project company and other 
lenders. Acceleration of loan agreements is predicated on the understanding that 
the primary debtor will be unable to pay.186  
In any case, the existence of the security provisions within a single agreement 
can often create a discord between what the parties really intend. As outlined in 
Alfred McAlpine187 the distinction between the two legal instruments is often 
blurred, and care must be exercised in drafting the two clauses. In Vossloh, the 
parties used the following provision in their agreement: ‘the Guarantor hereby 
unconditionally and irrevocably as a continuing obligation and as a principal 
                                                
186 For an interesting discussion on acceleration clauses in loan agreements please see David 
Hahn, ‘The Role of Acceleration’ (2009-2010) 8 DePaul Bus & Comm L J 229. 
187 See Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Unex Corp Ltd [1994] 38 Con L R 63. The facts of 
the case are briefly outlined hereinafter. The respondents, Alfred McAlpine, are contractors under 
a contract dated 2 November 1989 for the construction of a substantial office building and multi-
storey car park in Cambridge. Their employers are the developers of the site, Panatown Ltd. 
Panatown Ltd is a subsidiary of Unex, and Unex is accordingly entered into a contract described 
as a parent company guarantee.  
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debtor and not merely as a surety, as a separate continuing and primary 
obligation…’188 
In a bid to secure payment, the drafters of the agreement in Vossloh employed 
both a primary and a secondary liability. This illustrates the predicament 
highlighted earlier. Parties are implicitly drawn by the contextual, abstract use of 
the two legal instruments, without bearing in mind the legal ramifications of the 
provisions. Whilst relying on IIG Capital LLC189 and Marubeni Hong Kong190, 
Sir William Blackburne stated that within the context, the words were ineffective 
to convert secondary obligations into primary obligations. Sir William 
Blackburne submitted that ‘the opening words were more consistent with an 
intention to set out in what followed a mixture of primary and secondary 
obligations’. Even though the main contention in this case did not concern the 
classification of whether such a security provision was an indemnity or a 
                                                
188 Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch). 
189 IIG Capital v Van Der Merwe [2008] EWCA Civ 542. The facts of the case are as follows: 
IIG entered into a loan agreement with Hurst Parnell Imports and Exports Ltd (HPIE). The Van 
Der Merwes were directors of HPIE and executed ‘deed of guarantee’ in favour of IIG. Before 
the court of first instance, the Van Der Merwes relied upon defences (under New York Law 
which was governing law of contract) that there would be implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing which would require IIG to have given reasonable notice of its demand and that such 
notice had not been given thereby providing HPIE a complete answer to the claim; also see 
Trafalgar House Construction (Regions) Ltd v General Surety & Guarantee Co Ltd [1996] A C 
199. 
190 Marubeni Hong Kong v Government of Mongolia [2005] EWCA Civ 395. Brief facts of the 
case are as follows: Hong Kong Company agreed to supply a Mongolian company with textile 
plant and machinery in the sum of US$18million. The agreement was backed by a letter issued 
by the Minister of Finance unconditionally pledging on a simple demand payment of the amounts 
due under the agreement, and a letter of the same date issued by the Deputy Minister of Justice 
referred to the Finance Minister’s letter as a ‘guarantee’ and stated that the Minister has full 
authority. Also see Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo v Gold Coast Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1806. 
In Caja de Ahorros, the claimant (the buyer) was the assignee of a contract with Spanish 
shipbuilder to build a tanker for approx. $38.5 million. The buyer’s obligation to make stage 
payments was conditional on simultaneous delivery of refund guarantees in a prescribed form 
from issuers acceptable to the buyer’s bank in the amount of the payment. The ship was due for 
delivery on 1st October 1999, however was not delivered. The buyer rescinded the contract for 
non-delivery and claimed repayment of the payment it had made amounting to 80% of the 
purchase price. The builder denied that the buyer was entitled to default and instead declared the 
buyer in default. 
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guarantee, the court expressed that under the current circumstances they are 
likely to find that it was the latter. 
Moreover, in Sofaer’s case, Lewison J reviewed the provision in the agreement 
containing both instruments. The agreement’s provision stipulated as follows: 
[T]he guarantor (a) guarantees the payment and the discharge of 
the Liabilities and (b) undertakes on demand to pay the Lender 
any liability which is not paid and to perform any liability 
which is not performed when due to be paid or performed.191 
This provision is a good example to illustrate the parties endeavouring to 
incorporate both primary and secondary means of liability, in order to strengthen 
the security framework. Lewison J’s observation in Sofaer revolves around the 
determination of whether the liability arising in an agreement containing both 
instruments will constitute primary or secondary liability.192 The rights ensued 
from the provision shall be determined by reviewing the substance of the 
provision and not merely the form. The court in Vossloh observed this 
conundrum and submitted: ‘…contracts of suretyship, of which 2009 guarantee 
is an example, are an area of law bedeviled by imprecise technology and where 
                                                
191 Sofaer v Anglo Irish Asset Finance Plc (2011) EWHC 1480 (Ch). The facts of the case are as 
follows: S had executed a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favour of X to secure the liabilities 
of various companies, together with charges over 12 properties owned by the borrower 
companies or their nominees. S’s liability was capped under the guarantee. Following X’s written 
demand to S, the appointment of a fixed charge receivers, X served a statutory demand on S 
stating that no sums had been received and that the whole amount of £8.4million under the 
guarantee now fell due. S, having failed to have the demand set aside, and in order to avoid 
bankruptcy, proposed an individual voluntary arrangement. At the subsequent creditor’s meeting 
X voted against adopting an IVA, and voted in favour of a revised figure of £9.2million. 
192 See Harburg India Rubber Comb Co v Martin (1902) 1 K B 778; please note that the 
principal/primary obligation must exist, it must also remain unchanged through the life of the 
guarantee. 
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therefore it is important not to confuse the label given by the parties to the 
surety’s obligation’.193  
However, it can be argued that the operation of both instruments can be viewed 
as operating separately, in their own matrix. Consequently, they can exist 
together without interfering in the operation of the other matrix. For example, if 
an off-taker breaches their off-take agreement, the project company can invoke 
an indemnity clause within the agreement. Moreover, in an event that the state 
has issued a sovereign indemnity the project company can invoke the indemnity 
clause for payment. In light of the discussion undertaken in the previous section, 
concerning the validity of the agreement in an indemnity scenario, it will be 
irrelevant. Therefore, the surety—the party indemnifying—will be paying the 
dues as debt and not as damages.194 
3.3.1 Guarantee or Indemnity? An Old Chestnut 
The principal purpose of extensively discussing guarantee and indemnity as two 
separate legal instruments is to provide a basic understanding of the two concepts 
for the purposes of outlining the underlying frameworks for a sovereign 
guarantee framework. Guarantee and indemnity instruments have a binary use in 
security agreements. Within the security arrangements, the guarantee and 
indemnity can co-exist in one agreement, and separately define the relationship 
                                                
193 Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited (2010) EWHC 2443 (Ch). 
194 The scope of this thesis does not allow for a detailed discussion on the issue concerning debt 
and damages. However, for the purposes of understanding their underlying nature, we have 
provided brief definitions. A debt is a definite sum of money fixed by the agreement of the 
parties as payable by one party in return for the performance of a specified obligation by the 
other party or upon the occurrence of some specified event of condition. Damages may be 
claimed from a party who has broken his contractual obligation in some way other than failure to 
pay such a debt. See Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts: Volume I (31st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012) 1762. 
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(and liability) of two separate parties. The presence of an indemnity provision 
within a sovereign guarantee framework is to the extent of the host state 
indemnifying the project company against a guarantee issued on behalf of the 
off-taking body. In PRI scenario, the host state indemnifies the multilateral risk 
insurer, and in return the risk insurer guarantees payment of the off-taking body.  
Within these arrangements it can be submitted that the legal notion of guarantee 
and an indemnity has been used interchangeably, and therefore it is correct to 
argue that the two are elusive concepts. Andrew and Millet submit that the law 
surrounding guarantees and indemnities is inconsistent and arcane.195 As outlined 
in the cases of Vossloh196 and Moschi197 the parties may have wished to use the 
term ‘indemnity’, however the features of the provisions were indicating 
otherwise. The courts have been explicit to highlight that the use of the words 
‘indemnity’ or a ‘guarantee’ are not entirely conclusive by themselves. Parties 
loosely refer to or incorrectly describe a term wherein it may have completely 
different results.    
The courts have attempted to address this ambiguity by reviewing the substance 
and not the form of both the legal instruments. However, this predicament is a 
vindication of the parties’ endeavour to safeguard their interest and seek a robust 
form of security, even if such endeavour entails using and confusing both surety 
legal instruments. An interchangeable use of these two legal notions illustrates a 
commitment towards protection of investment and certainty of payment. It is 
                                                
195 Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millet, The Law of Guarantees (6th Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012) 
196 Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 (Ch).  
197 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd and Others [1972] 2 W L R 1175 Per Lord Diplock.  
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primarily because of this effort to secure payment and performance that recent 
project financings have incorporated escrow accounts and letters of credit as an 
alternative, or an additional means of creating a more robust security. In the 
Chad-Cameron Oil Development and Pipeline Project, the World Bank 
conditioned its financing of the project on the establishment of a petroleum 
revenue management plan (hereinafter referred to as “RMP”). Under the RMP, 
all revenues including royalties, dividends, taxes and custom duties would be 
deposited into a dedicated escrow account to be monitored by the World Bank.198 
Similarly, London’s new drainage construction project involves payment of dues 
to the project company during construction work, even though the infrastructure 
will not be capable of supplying any services until the project completion. This 
measure is in addition to the government guarantee drawn under the United 
Kingdom’s Infrastructure (Financial Assistance) Act 2012. 
3.3.2 Release of a Guarantor?  
In addition to the use of both an indemnity and a guarantee in one transaction or 
contractual frameworks, there is an increasing mention of ‘unconditionally’ and 
‘irrevocably’199 in international lending agreements. Upon perusal of various 
energy agreements, one theme that emerges is the recurrent use of the ‘separate 
continuing and primary obligation’ notion upon a surety, in a bid to convert a 
                                                
198 See Alexander Van de Putte, David F Gates and Ann K Holder, ‘Political risk insurance as an 
investment to reduce oil and gas investment risk and manage investment returns’ (2012) Journal 
of World Energy Law and Business, Vol 5, No 4 284. 
199 The terms ‘unconditional’ and ‘irrevocable’ appear as rhetoric in all the government guarantee 
documents perused by the author. The use of these terms acts as a basis to describe the guarantee 
that can be enforced immediately on a default without a requirement that the project company 
first exhausts his remedies against the government; see Philip Wood, International Loans, Bonds, 
Guarantees, Legal Opinions (The Law and Practice of International Finance Series, Vol 3, 2nd 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell). 
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secondary obligation into a primary obligation.200 These efforts primarily rest 
upon the parties’ intention to mitigate risk by incorporating the two instruments, 
as discussed earlier. This fusion of the two legal instruments creates a discord for 
courts to reconcile the intention of the parties and the legal outcome. As 
illustrated in various academic texts and cases, the distinction between an 
indemnity and a guarantee is often blurred.201 As a result, the courts reconcile the 
two legal instruments by employing ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ notions of 
responsibility, in order to resolve the co-existence of the two legal instruments. 
However, the determination of the characteristics of the two legal notions is 
fraught with implications insofar as the title that will be accorded to the 
instrument. As a result, the delay in payment under the relevant contractual 
framework will have repercussions for the parties.  
In Associated British Ports (hereinafter referred to as “ABP”) the claimant 
appealed against the decision of Field J202, arguing that a letter agreement 
between ABP and the second defendant, MSCB, contained a guarantee, rather 
than an indemnity. This had been discharged by an agreement giving the first 
defendant and primary debtor (Ferryways) time to pay. In the preliminary 
proceedings by ABP against Ferryways and MSCB, Field J held that the time to 
pay agreement discharged the liability of MSCB under the letter agreement, 
which he construed as a guarantee and not an indemnity. ABP appealed against 
the court of first instance’s decision arguing that the letter agreement was an 
                                                
200 Sir William Blackburn held that these words were ineffective to convert into primary 
obligations, obligations that were otherwise secondary in nature. See Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains 
(UK) Ltd (2010) EWHC 2443 (Ch); (2011) 2 All E R (Comm) 307; also see Sofaer v Anglo Irish 
Asset Finance Plc (2011) EWHC 1480 (Ch). 
201 James O’Donovan and John Philips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010); Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd (2010) EWHC 2443 (Ch). 
202 Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV & Anor [2009] EWCA Civ 189. 
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indemnity or a legally binding letter of comfort, so that in either case, the 
defendants would discharge any liability. Upon appeal the court dismissed the 
claimant’s plea, Maurice Kay L J noted: 
Guarantee or indemnity? That old chestnut was one of the 
issues that fell to be considered by Field J in this case and it is 
the only part of his decision, which is challenged on appeal. The 
issue arises most often because the law treats the two concepts 
differentially when it comes to formality. A guarantee is subject 
to the formal requirements of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 
1677 but an indemnity is not.203 A guarantee is, in the words of 
the Statute, a promise “to answer for the debt default or 
miscarriage of another person”. There must be another person 
who is primarily liable. The liability of the guarantor is 
secondary. By an indemnity, on the other hand, the surety 
assumes primary liability.  
Maurice Kay L J further went on to state:  
…[H]owever it illustrates another difference between a guarantee 
and an indemnity. Because the liability of a guarantor is 
secondary, it is usually discharged by a bilateral variation of the 
contract between the creditor and the debtor. In the absence of an 
express provision to the contrary in the contract of guarantee, the 
                                                
203 The need to distinguish guarantees from indemnities for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds 
‘has raised many hair-splitting distinctions of exactly that kind which brings the law into hatred, 
ridicule and contempt by public’, as expressed by Harman L J at 835 in Yeoman Credit Ltd v 
Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 
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giving time by the creditor to the debtor will generally discharge 
the guarantor.204   
Maurice Kay L J’s submission is relevant for two reasons for the purposes of this 
study. First, in light of the discussion concerning liquidity issues within 
distribution companies in Pakistan’s energy sector, any variation in payment 
structure, late payment or no payment will mean that the government, as a 
guarantor, will be discharged from their duty to recompense or hold a secondary 
liability in any transaction unless the guarantee instrument states otherwise.205 
Maurice L J’s remarks vindicate the pendulum analogy made earlier. In the 
context of the pendulum illustrating in Figure 3.1, it is argued that in the event of 
a breach, the pendulum oscillates from primary to secondary liability in a 
guarantee. In an indemnity context, the pendulum illustration features both a 
primary and a secondary liability on a parallel scale. Consequently, both parties 
assume primary liability. In the event that a concession agreement or the PPA is 
held void, the stronger protection offered under the security measure will be 
provided by an indemnity contract. As a result, in view of recent cases like IPCO 
v Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC)206 it is submitted that an 
                                                
204 See Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) wherein it is 
submitted that ‘…in practice any well-drawn contract of suretyship will nowadays expressly 
permit variation of the obligations or the giving of time, without discharging the surety’. 
205 The court in the case of Associated British Ports relied upon Polak v Everett [1876] 1 QBD 
669 wherein Blackburn J said ‘it has been established a long time, beginning with Rees v 
Berrington to the present day, without a single case going to the contrary, that on the principles 
of equity a surety is discharged when the creditor, without his assent, gives time to the principal 
debtor, because by so doing he deprives the surety of part of the right he would have had from the 
mere fact of entering into suretyship, namely, to use the name of the creditor to sue the principal 
debtor, and if this right is suspended for a day or an hour, not injuring the surety to the value of 
the one farthing, and even positively benefitting him, nevertheless, by the principles of equity, it 
is established that this discharges the surety altogether.’ 
206 [2016] UKSC 16. The rationale in this case is not relevant for the purposes of this study, as 
they relate to monetary security and Arbitration rules derived from the New York Convention. 
However, the facts of the case are important for the purpose of highlighting an investor’s 
dilemma. IPCO instituted a claim in the Nigerian National court in 2004. The case has still not 
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indemnity instrument impose a more reassuring, onerous obligation on the host 
state to discharge the sponsor’s debt. Second, Maurice Kay L J’s remarks ‘there 
must be another person who is primarily liable’ are of immense importance for 
the purposes of the discussion undertaken in Chapter 4. A logical conclusion that 
can be drawn from Maurice Kay L J’s submission is that in order to satisfy a 
guarantee framework, there needs to be another party that guarantees the 
performance of another party. In the event that SOEs are incapable of operating 
at an arm’s length with the state, will that render any guarantee instruments void 
due to procedural inadequacy?  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter is a primer to the law of suretyship from a common law perspective. 
There are three main contentions discussed in this chapter. First, in an effort to 
understand the two surety instruments, this chapter provides an outline of both 
guarantee and an indemnity instrument. A guarantee has been defined as an 
accessory contract providing an additional form of security wherein the promisor 
undertakes to pay the promisee or be answerable for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another party.207 A guarantee is thought of as a ‘see to it’ 
obligation, wherein the guarantor will not only indemnify the creditor in the 
event of a breach, the guarantor is to ensure that the principal debtor performs 
their contract. This definition varies according to the terms of the agreement. 
                                                                                                                               
been resolved. Nigerian authorities are content to file another suit to discuss the merits of the 
actual contract. This case bears resonance with the case of Riqo Diq.  
207 See Pitts and Others v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 wherein Smith L J submitted ‘a 
guarantee on the other hand is a specific type of indemnity whereby the guarantor promises to 
answer for the debt or default of another person’. In Pitts and Others, the defendant was a 
majority shareholder in a company. The Defendant made a provisional agreement with another 
party to sell his shares within the company. In order to convince the minority shareholders that 
they will be paid handsomely, the Defendant convinced them to waive their right of pre-emption. 
The purchase did not pay the claimants and this lead to the dispute.  
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This chapter adopts a pendulum of responsibility model to illustrate how the two 
instruments are different. These illustrations help to understand how the notions 
of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ liability work and function under a guarantee 
framework. Through aid from the illustration outlining the pendulum, it is argued 
that the guarantor and the principal debtor exist in a parallel time space. The 
concept of time space is contingent upon default by the principal debtor, at which 
point the guarantor’s surety is triggered and he is to discharge the principal 
debtor’s liability.  
In contrast, indemnity instruments have been defined as an undertaking to make 
good a loss suffered by another party. The pendulum of responsibility illustrates 
the nature of liability in order to differentiate an indemnity with a guarantee. 
Unlike the time space argument submitted in the guarantee section, in an 
indemnity the pendulum is affixed on both the parties in separate matrices. As a 
result, both parties are primarily liable towards the creditor simultaneously.  
The second contention refers to the nature of suretyship agreements involving 
guarantees. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the liability of the guarantor is secondary 
to that of the principal debtor. Consequently, an extinguished liability of the 
principal debtor would discharge the guarantor. The illustration in Figure 3.1 
assists in explaining this submission. However, from an indemnity perspective, it 
is argued that since the principal and the surety are both primarily liable, the 
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liability arising therefrom will exist even after the principal debtor has been 
discharged from performance.208  
It is submitted that with a variation in a contract of guarantee, by allowing time 
to the debtor, the creditor extinguishes the secondary liability of the guarantor. 
This is an imperative feature of a guarantee contract that extinguishes any duty 
owed by the guarantor to the creditor. Within the ambit of investment in 
developing countries, it is argued that an extension in payment of dues is a 
common practice.209 In reference to Maurice L J’s submission, the guarantor will 
be discharged of their duty in case an extension in time is agreed between the 
project company (creditor) and the off-taker (debtor). An interesting facet of the 
investment regime through project finance is revealed through interviews 
conducted with various government officials and practitioners to discuss this 
predicament. In order to prevent SPVs calling on the sovereign guarantees, the 
Government of Pakistan restructures the outstanding dues under the PPA, and 
not under the guarantee agreement. As a result, despite a delayed payment, a 
fixed sum is paid out through the terms of the original PPA and not the sovereign 
guarantee agreement. This contention leads to create an ambiguity over the entire 
sovereign guarantee framework. It begs the question, is the guarantee provided 
by the sovereign, adequate? Or even necessary?  
                                                
208 See Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter (1961) 1 W L R 828; Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen 
(1874) LR 7 HL 17 wherein Lord Selbourne expressed ‘there can be no suretyship unless there be 
a principal debtor, who of course may be constituted in the course of the transaction by matters 
ex post, and need not be so at the time, but until there is a principal debtor there can be no 
suretyship. Nor can a man guarantee anybody else’s debt unless there is a debt of some other 
person to be guaranteed…’. 
209 This study makes reference to these practices in the later chapter, however it is submitted that 
due to fiscal constraints and other unforeseeable circumstances, there are examples where the 
host state government or the off-taker within the host state has been unable to pay dues and 
requires an extension. This practice has been seen in Moldova, Hungary, India, Kenya, and more 
importantly in Pakistan, wherein off-taking bodies delay payments and seek extension in 
payment. 
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In view of the suggestion outlined in this chapter concerning a change in 
sovereign guarantee instruments to sovereign indemnity, this chapter contends 
that this re-shaping policy will address the primary rationale for adopting these 
security measures by securing robust measures of security. However, it is 
submitted that re-naming the sovereign guarantee structure alone will not address 
the primary issues. There is a need for a complete regulatory overhaul in 
Pakistan’s energy sector.  
The third contention reviews the InG agreements. This chapter refers to the co-
existence of guarantee, and indemnity provisions under one agreement. In order 
to provide a general understanding of how political risk insurance framework 
functions, this chapter illustrates the existence of both these instruments existing 
in an agreement in a bid for the creditors to secure the performance of the 
principal debtor. Especially in a project finance context, InG agreements are in 
common use. However, it is contended that the use of the two is operationally 
predicated on their existence in their own matrix. As a result, for example, if an 
off-taker breaches their off-take agreement, the project company can invoke an 
indemnity clause within the risk insurance arrangement and still seek recourse 
from the host state. As such, both will run concurrently in their own matrices.  
In addition to the use of guarantee and indemnities as a measure to secure 
performance, parties have adopted various additional measures in order to 
safeguard their investment. As highlighted in an example from Chad-Cameron 
and London’s drainage project, there are other methods that can potentially 
create a more certain and robust security framework. It is however submitted that 
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the presence of the additional instruments does not displace or replace the 
security offered under the guarantee and indemnity instrument framework. 
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Chapter 4  
Sovereign Guarantees: Post Gunboat Diplomacy to Trade Diplomacy 
4.1 Introduction  
Risk exists in various forms in a highly-leveraged energy project. Risk is multi-
dimensional, and therefore is not limited to market or commercial risks. In view 
of risk in highly leveraged projects, it is argued that parties seek mitigation 
methods in order to protect their investment. Sovereign guarantees are one of the 
risk mitigation methods in a project finance transaction normative to Pakistan. 
The following discussion aims to review the underlying features of sovereign 
guarantee instruments, and attempts to determine its adequacy.  
There is a close nexus between an efficient law for the creation, protection and 
enforcement of security interests, and an increased access to credit. These factors 
also directly contribute towards a reduction in the cost of credit.210 In view of an 
increase in infrastructure development requirements and the scarcity of funds, 
investment portfolios have seen a rise in investment security instruments to 
mitigate risk.  
Project finance alone cannot mitigate risk. Therefore, investors, especially in a 
developing country context, require the provision of sovereign guarantees as a 
measure of security. From a SPV context, sovereign guarantees are immensely 
important, as the entire transaction is predicated on the future revenue generated 
                                                
210 Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor and Vikrant Vig, ‘How Law Affects Lending’ (2010) 
23(2) Review of Financial Studies 549; George Affaki, ‘Increasing Access to Credit: Reforming 
Secured Transactions Laws’ (2010) International Trade Centre; Charles Calomiris, Mauricio 
Larrian, Jose Liberti and Jason Sturgess, ‘How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral 
Activity’ (2014) Working Paper Draft < http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/hit-refined/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/wp.020.pdf> Accessed 14 May 2017. 
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by the project company. Sovereign guarantees are therefore a form of contingent 
liability, with the states liability being co-extensive to the off-taking body. In the 
event that there is a breach by the off-take body for payments under a PPA, a 
sovereign guarantee offers protection to the SPV.  
A detailed discussion on the nature of these sovereign guarantee frameworks is 
undertaken hereunder. This chapter is sub-divided into three sections, and 
reviews the central contention of this thesis: the adequacy of sovereign 
guarantees.  
First, an introduction to the concept and context of sovereign guarantees is 
presented. In view of an increasing use of sovereign guarantee measures, the 
following discussion highlights the notion of sovereignty, in order to introduce 
the sovereign guarantee phenomenon. It attempts to establish the relationship that 
exists between the provision of sovereign guarantee and infrastructure 
development. Whilst providing a brief account of sovereignty in an abstract 
context, this section discusses the departure from a state-centred matrix to a more 
liberal, de-centralised mode of operation as a tool to facilitate free flow of 
capital. This section rebuts a common perception concerning states no longer 
exercising absolute sovereignty within their jurisdiction. It attempts to associate 
the issuance of sovereign guarantees as a favourable behaviour wherein the state 
plays a pivotal role.  
Second, in order to forge an argument and canvass an understanding of sovereign 
guarantee instruments, three separate features of the sovereign guarantee 
instrument are reflected upon, in order to determine the instrument’s adequacy in 
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an abstract and contextual sense. There are three strands to consider in examining 
the adequacy of the sovereign guarantee instruments. The first strand of this 
section should be read in conjunction with the basic features of a guarantee 
instrument. This section adopts the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Articles”). In the past, enforcement of 
‘collateral engagement’ was through invading countries to ensure that the debt of 
a country’s citizen was honoured.211 Wars were waged in an endeavour to meet a 
sovereign’s quest for compensation or redress for the loss suffered by their 
subject, as a result of default by another sovereign. The multifaceted nature of 
threats posed to foreign investment in an alien jurisdiction has always been a 
cause of concern. There are numerous examples from history that facilitate this 
argument.212 Investors have been subjected to prejudicial treatment by the host 
state in their application of laws, security of investment in general, host states 
exercising expropriation, and non-payment of dues to the project company. It 
was not until the eighteenth century that the notion of state responsibility 
emerged to address and hold states accountable for injuries to aliens within their 
jurisdiction.213  
                                                
211 Also see Marina Von Neuman Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment 
(Princeton University Press, 1962).  
212 See Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (1st Edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). Donnelly expresses that ‘militarised debt collection was a well-accepted part of 
International relations in the nineteenth century’; also see Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of 
Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (1st Edition, Cornell University Press, 
2003) expressed that militarised debt collection amongst powerful sovereign states was an 
“accepted practice” until the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Also see Michael Tomz, 
Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (Princeton 
University Press 2007). 
213 ‘State responsibility’ was originally conceived as a set of international rules governing states’ 
international obligations in their relations with other states. A state’s primary obligation is to pay 
compensation or make reparation for injuries suffered by nationals of other states. In traditional 
international law, state responsibility constituted a classic way of dealing with violations of 
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Draft Articles seek to formulate, by way of codification and progressive 
development, the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of 
state for their internally wrongful acts. These Draft Articles address state 
responsibility and its attribution to the state.214 In order to discuss the adequacy 
of sovereign guarantees, this strand provides a useful discussion on whether the 
guarantee framework discussed in the previous chapter is satisfied. This section 
adopts Articles 4 and 5 as a starting point to conceive whether in reality, the 
SOEs engaged in facilitating the sovereign guarantee instruments are de facto the 
state, and whether the responsibility of discharging the off-taking body’s debt 
rests with the state. Reliance has been placed on cases from international forums 
to address the question of what amounts to a SOE being part of the state, and 
what factors detest this contention. As an exercise, this section is useful towards 
the determination of the adequacy of sovereign guarantee instruments.  
The second strand reviews an abstract argument. Predicated on the utility of 
sovereign guarantee instruments, this section is an extension on the discussion 
concerning sovereignty. This section argues that there is an ‘expectation gap’ 
between what the parties expect and what they are really offered under the 
sovereign guarantee framework. In view of the liquidity issues primarily due to 
T&D losses, this section argues that the state may not have the financial capacity 
to provide such guarantees and, therefore, there is a gap between what the 
investors expect under the sovereign guarantee framework.  
                                                                                                                               
customary international law. See Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘State Responsibility and International 
Liability under International Law’ (1995-1996) 18 Loyola L A Int’l & Comp L J 821; also see 
Michael Feit, ‘Responsibility of the State Under International Law for the Breach of Contract 
Committed by a State-Owned Entity’ (2010) 28 Berkeley J Int’l L 142. 
214 International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, General Commentary’ [2001] 2(2) Y B Int’l L Comm’n 30, 31-32 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> Accessed 23 
March 2017. 
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The third strand offers an economic perspective, and reviews the legislative 
impediments in issuing such guarantees. This section offers to review Pakistan’s 
Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Debt Limitation Act”). The Debt Limitation Act outlines that the ‘total public 
debt at the end of the tenth financial year does not exceed sixty percent of the 
estimated gross domestic product for that year’. An extensive discussion 
concerning the legitimacy of these sovereign guarantees is reviewed under the 
current legislative limitations in Pakistan’s context. A wider approach is adopted 
to offer an economic perspective, insofar as the economic repercussions caused 
as a result of issuing sovereign guarantees in breach of the Debt Limitation Act. 
This section argues that in contravention of the Debt Limitation Act, there is 
likelihood that all sovereign guarantees issued are void.  
Last, an alternative approach to the contractual guarantee instrument is 
discussed. This discussion is predicated on adopting a parliamentary insurance 
programme, wherein the sums are appropriated in view of the increasing demand 
for investment. As a measure of security, this section bases its reasoning on the 
model adopted in the United Kingdom, and suggests that blanket guarantees are a 
thing of the past; selective guarantees are a thing of the future.  
4.2 Shifting Sands: Sovereign within Sovereignty? 
The inception and evolution of ‘gunboat’ diplomacy to the present day ‘trade 
diplomacy’ can be traced back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
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centuries.215 These ideals were primarily focused to perpetuate and encourage 
further Industrialisation globally, and support influx of foreign investment in 
countries to promote infrastructure development.216 Johnson & Gimblett have 
succinctly discussed the ‘gunboat’ diplomacy era in the Yearbook on 
International Investment Law.217 They submit that the apogee of Britain’s 
attitude towards ensuring redress was given as a result of the injuries inflicted 
upon a British subject in Greece, more famously known as the Dan Pacifico 
Affair. In this case, the Greek government refused to compensate a British 
subject. In response, the British sent their Royal Navy fleet to carry out a 
blockade of the Athenian port of Piraeus. Lord Palmerston rejected seeking 
redress from the court of a country where the wrong was committed, arguing 
that: 
[I]n the first instance, redress should be sought from the law 
courts of the country; but in cases where redress cannot be so 
had—and those cases are many-to confine a British subject to 
that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the protection 
which he is entitled to receive.218 
Lord Palmerston’s submission implicitly indicates that if the courts of a foreign 
jurisdiction will not be willing to correct or address a wrong that was committed 
                                                
215 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Second 
Edition, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
216 This period also marks the shift in infrastructure development from a strictly public sphere to 
a deregulation, inclusive market involving private participation.  
217 Thomas Johnson and Jonathan Gimblett, ‘From Gunboats to BITS: The Evolution of Modern 
International Investment Law’ published in the Karl P Sauvant (eds), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy (Oxford, 2010-2011) 649-692 
218 Thomas Johnson and Jonathan Gimblett, ‘From Gunboats to BITS: The Evolution of Modern 
International Investment Law’ published in the Karl P Sauvant (eds), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy (Oxford, 2010-2011) 649-692. 
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on their soil, use of force is justified to ensure that those rights are safeguarded 
according to the rules of natural justice or contractual obligations. Similarly, as 
submitted by Collier, in 1833 the US military forces were deployed in Buenos 
Aires to protect the interests of the United States and other countries during an 
insurrection in Argentina.219 The French too landed troops at Vera Cruz in 1838 
to recover debt owed to its nationals by the Mexican Government.220  
The situation has since improved.221 The ideological driving force behind 
‘gunboat’ diplomacy has now been replaced with ‘trade diplomacy’ in a bid to 
improve cross border relations by employing trade as a tool. Arch-rivals Pakistan 
and India have used this method in the past to promote peace talks, and promote 
stability in the region.222  It is submitted that some authors are of the opinion that 
the use of military force against sovereign states in order to enforce judgements 
or to seek redress is predicated upon the occupation during the colonial era; 
enforcing rule of law through invasion. However, this shift in attitude is a 
                                                
219 Ellen C Collier, ‘Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Forces 
Abroad, 1798-1993’ (Oct 1993) <http//www.history.navy.mil/wars> Accessed 23 February 2015. 
220 Rodrigo O Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) 
5. 
221 Rodrigo O Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) 
6, wherein it is expressed that the law did change (reference is made to Twycross case, discussed 
later) and this meant that foreign sovereigns could be hauled to court in a foreign jurisdiction 
(without their consent) for matters involving a sovereign’s debt instruments; also see Hal S Scott 
and Anna Gelpern, International Finance Law and Regulation (3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012) 12. This literature discusses the benefits of globalisation of finance. An outline of the 
potential benefits of unrestricted capital flows are as follows: (i) access to worldwide capital 
markets allow the country to smooth its financial needs; borrowing in bad times and lending in 
good times (ii) international markets can promote domestic investment and growth by allowing 
countries to import capital (iii) removing restrictions on the movement of firms and capital may 
discipline regulator; Also see Hali Edison, Ross Levine, Luca Ricci, and Torsten Slok, 
‘International Financial Integration and Economic Growth’ (2002) 21 Journal of International 
Money and Finance 749; Ayhan M Kose, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and Eswar Prasad, 
‘Financial Globalisation: A Reappraisal’ (August 2006) IMF Working Paper 06/189 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=934448> Accessed 15 June 2016. 
222 Pakistan, India and Iran agreed on a gas pipeline through Pakistan and to India. The volatile 
situation in this region can benefit significantly through measures such as these undertaken at a 
state level. See Kashif Kiani, ‘Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to be completed by 2017’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 29 Jan 2015) <http://www.dawn.com/news/1160072> Accessed 29 January 2015. 
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consequence of an international endeavour to synchronise investment regimes, 
and to increase cooperation through creating global networks that perpetuate on 
formulation of a framework to enforce rights of foreign nationals.223 Bilateral 
treaties and various International conventions are an example of this endeavour. 
To provide a more holistic view, it can be argued that these measures have been 
introduced to regulate market behaviour and to penalise any adverse behaviour 
impacting investment. This in effect has meant that there has been a dramatic 
shift from use of force to seek redress from international bodies, courts both 
within home states and in other states. Sovereignty is no longer subject to the 
rules of the state alone; the state is subject to a whole gamut of international 
obligations and factors governing or rather regulating sovereignty.224  
Sovereignty is an elusive subject, which has confounded academic scholarship 
and has led to a whole gamut of opinion on the subject.225 The aberration from a 
state centred matrix to a more liberal, de-centralised mode of operation insofar as 
                                                
223 See Paul L Lee, ‘Central banks and sovereign immunity’ (2003) 41 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 327, at 394. It is submitted that a disruption in the economy of a country 
might trigger a crisis of considerable magnitude to force creditors to examine their legal options 
for recovery. In case that recovery is not possible due to covenants as to filing suit against a state, 
it is expressed that this would lead to detrimental effects on the FDI regime across the board (not 
just for a particular country); Michel Troper, ‘Sovereignty’, in Michel Rosenfield and Andras 
Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, 2012). 
224 See Max Rheinstein, ‘Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society’, Translated from Max 
Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (1954) wherein it is expressed that ‘time and again 
international law has been said not to be “law”, because it lacks a supra-national enforcement 
agency’.  
225 Jayan Nayar, ‘On the Elusive Subject of Sovereignty’ (Nov 2014) Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 2014/17, Warwick Law School; see Ashis Nandy, ‘History’s Forgotten Doubles’ 
(1995) History and Theory 34, No 2: 44-66, at 54 expresses ‘sovereignty, however 
problematised, is a thing-in-the-world, a ‘reality’, in some way intrinsic and indispensable to 
being-in-the-world, whether thought of as a ‘cage’; Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Utopia with a  Topos’ 
(2003) History of Human Sciences 16, no1:11-25 describes sovereignty as a malleable and 
floating possibility; also see Dora T  Kostakopoulou, ‘Floating Sovereignty: A Pathology or a 
Necessary Means of State Evolution? (2002) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 22(1), pp 135-
156; Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) regards 
sovereignty as a product of political relationship between the people and the state; Stephen 
Tierney, ‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-state national societies and contemporary challenges to 
the nation state’ (2005) 54 Int’l & Comp L Q 161. 
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commerce has allowed for capital to flow from one country to another, freely.226 
Some academics have termed this decentralisation as deregulation of economic 
policies under which the state previously operated. Deregulation of economic 
policies predominately occurred due to the values under which the contemporary 
international law operates. Without cooperation amongst countries, the concept 
of creating consistent global conditions to promote cohesive investment regime 
seemed bleak.  
The term ‘sovereign guarantee’ consists primarily of two terms; sovereign and 
guarantee. Guarantees have been extensively discussed in Chapter 3. There is no 
strict definition of the term ‘sovereignty’. There is quite a variance as to what 
amounts to sovereignty227 and the impact it may have upon the areas that a state 
operates in. Sovereignty, in a broader context is the right of a state to enact 
laws228 that are in accordance with the values and the norms within that state. A 
more apt definition of sovereignty can be inspired from Foucault’s definition of 
‘liberalism’.229 Sovereignty has evolved from a strict sphere dominated by 
                                                
226 Aberration in this context refers to shift of states to exercise authority through State-owned 
entities (SOEs), effectively regulate them, and then privatise these institutions. For a detailed 
discussion on SOE, see World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: 
A toolkit’ (Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 
2014).  
227 Also see Jean J Rousseau, Social Contract, in Rousseau, Social Contract and Discourses 
(London: Everyman, 1993) wherein it is expressed that ‘sovereignty’ is inalienable, indivisible, 
and it cannot err. 
228 See Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies [1945] (Routledge, 2002) wherein 
Hobbes has argued that a sovereign authority is a necessary guarantor of peace and security 
within a society, but liberals have claimed that on the contrary, an unchecked power is dangerous, 
and asked ‘whether we should not strive towards institutional control of rulers by balancing their 
powers against other powers?’; also see Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, 
and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Law, State, and Practical Reason,  Oxford, 1999) 
wherein it is expressed that sovereignty is not like property ‘which can be given up only when 
another person gains it’, but ‘more like virginity, something that can be lost by one without 
another’s gaining it’. 
229 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (eds), Foucault and Political Reason: 
Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government (1st edition, University College 
London Press Limited, 1996). Foucault submits that ‘liberalism is not a theory, an ideology, 
judicial philosophy, or any particular set of policies adopted by a government. Liberalism is 
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outdated values and norms to a thinkable and practicable art. It does not denote 
or prescribe a set of policies, ideology, judicial philosophy; it is merely a term 
that has evolved from the strict sphere of unfettered, absolute authority within a 
certain jurisdiction, to being more accountable and judicial comity.230 Despite 
being considered ‘degraded, suspended’231, Nandy submits that ‘sovereignty, 
however problematised is a thing-in-the-world, a “reality”, in some way intrinsic 
and indispensable to being-in-the-world, whether thought of as a “cage”.232 This 
definition, which may seem open ended, draws us to the concept that the 
enactment of a state’s laws, as it pleases, may be prejudicial towards the interests 
of a foreign state. Therefore, the shift from the strict definition of sovereignty 
under the ‘Westphalian’ model, to a more liberal and ‘global’ concept of 
sovereignty has been facilitated. Therein was a model that made the state from 
national to (inter) national. This shift was conducive towards establishing a 
model that promoted infrastructure development, flow of capital and human 
resource to previously restricted, highly regularised jurisdictions.  
                                                                                                                               
described as a particular way in which the activity of the government has been made both 
thinkable and practicable as an art’. 
230 See Janet McLean, ‘Government to State: Globalisation, Regulation, and Governments as 
Legal Persons’ (2003) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1. In this 
academic literature, the question ‘is the state dead, in retreat, or increasingly significant?’ is 
raised. It is further contended that the state’s ‘sovereignty’ depends as to which discipline is 
invoked; however as dominant legal conceptions are shifting, fresh insights into the phenomenon 
can be provided. 
231 Dora T Kostakopoulou, ‘Floating Sovereignty: A Pathology or a Necessary Means of State 
Evolution? (2002) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 22 (1), pp 135-156. 
232 Ashis Nandy, ‘History’s Forgotten Doubles’ (1995) History and Theory 34, No 2: 44-66, at 
54. 
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The normativity of sovereignty from a philosophical scope, and as a legal-
economic concept has provoked academic debate.233 A US official described 
sovereignty as: 
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main 
characteristics: First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys 
supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force within its territory. Second, it is capable of 
regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its 
foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognised by other 
governments as an independent entity entitled to freedom from 
external intervention. These components of sovereignty were 
never absolute, but together they offered a predictable 
foundation for world order. What is significant today is that 
each of these components—internal authority, border control, 
policy autonomy, and non-intervention—is being challenged in 
unprecedented ways.234  
This challenge that Haas refers to has been highlighted by various academics. 
Jackson submits that the term ‘sovereignty’ is ‘invoked in a context or manner 
                                                
233 Some argue that sovereignty has been compromised to achieve globalisation which is more 
beneficial to the investment state than to the host state. See Peter Payoyo, ‘Economic Sovereignty 
in International Law: The state of the art’ (1990-1991) 65 Phil L J 129. Payoyo expresses 
‘contemporary international law is based, more and more, on values whose satisfaction cannot be 
achieved other than through cooperation, including the creation of a global conditions for making 
expanding cooperation possible. This idea of an emerging “international law of cooperation” 
indeed provides a satisfactory framework for the identification and analysis of principles and 
norms in international economic law’.  
234 Richard N Haas, former ambassador and director of Policy Planning Staff, US Department of 
State, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at the School of Foreign 
Service and the Mortara Centre for International Studies, Georgetown University, at 2 (Jan 14, 
2003) <http://www/georgetown.edu/sfs/documents/haas_sovereingty_20030114.pdf> Accessed 
13 September 2015. 
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designed to avoid and prevent analysis, sometimes with an advocate’s intent to 
fend off criticism or justifications for international infringements on the activities 
of a nation-state or its internal stakeholders and power operators’.235 Henkin 
wants to do away with the concept of sovereignty altogether.236 While there is a 
variance of opinion as far as the concept in its abstract and concrete sense, it is 
submitted that we cannot completely dispense with the concept of sovereignty. It 
will exist in one form or another: the right of a state over its resources, the right 
to legislate, and the supreme right to enforce the laws that a state determines are 
right. 
It is, however, contended that the time of absolute sovereignty has passed; its 
theory was never matched by reality.237 While Jackson finds that the concept of 
sovereignty is fundamental to the logical foundations of international law, and 
any effort to do away with the concept will create a discord that undermines the 
very existence of international law, he proposes a new paradigm. He submits that 
the concept of sovereignty modern is a more analytical and dynamic process of 
disaggregation and redefinition than a ‘frozen-in-time’ concept or technique.238 
To an extent, it is submitted that perhaps the definition of sovereignty is stagnant, 
and there is a need to evolve the definition as per the requirements of the market. 
As otherwise contended, it is submitted that there has not been a reduction in the 
                                                
235 John H Jackson, ‘Sovereignty—Modern: A new approach to an outdated concept’ (2003) 
American Journal of International Law, Vol 97 (4), 782-802. 
236 Louis Henkin, ‘That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 
68 Fordham L Rev 1 (1999). <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/1> Accessed 01 
October 2014. 
237 As per the submission of the Secretary General United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the 
Security Council. An Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and 
Peacekeeping, Report on the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/47/277-5/24111 Para/17 (1992), UN 
Sales No E 95 1 15(1995). 
238 John H Jackson, ‘Sovereignty—Modern: A new approach to an outdated concept’ (2003) 
American Journal of International Law, Vol 97 (4), 782-802. 
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role of the state. In order to achieve ‘economic integration’, there has been a shift 
towards more open policies, as submitted earlier. Picciotto argues that: 
[T]he privatisation of state-owned assets and the reduction of 
direct state economic intervention have not led to a reduced role 
of the state but to changes in its form, involving new types of 
formalised regulation, the fragmentation of the public sphere, 
the decentering of the state and the emergence of multilevel 
governance.239  
Dwelling further and exploring the concept of sovereignty will require a 
separate, more serious undertaking. This section now aims to focus on the 
concept of ‘sovereign’ within the sovereign guarantee framework. There is no 
strict definition of the term ‘sovereign guarantee’.240 Despite being used by 
                                                
239 Sol Picciotto, ‘The retreat of the state: challenges to law and lawyers’ (2006) Regulatory 
Networks and Global Governance Paper presented at the WG Hart Legal Workshop. Institute for 
Advanced Legal Study, University of London, London, 27-29, June 2009. 
240 See Rederiaktiebolaget Amphirite v The King (1921) 3 K B 500 as per Rowlatt J: ‘…all I have 
got to say is whether there was an enforceable contract, and I am of the opinion that there was 
not. No doubt that government can bind itself through its officers by a commercial contract, and 
if it does so it must perform it like anybody else or pay damages for the breach. But this was not a 
commercial contract; it was an arrangement whereby the government purported to give assurance 
as to what its executive action would be in the future in relation to a particular ship in the event of 
her coming to this country with a particular kind of cargo. And that is, to my mind, not a contract 
for the breach of which damages can be sued for in the court of law…my main reason for so 
thinking is that it is not competent for the government to fetter future executive action, which 
must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises. It 
cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the 
state’. Also see Olugbenga Shoyele, ‘State succession and governmental contracts in African 
states’ (1997) 9 Srilanka J International 125; also see Birkdale District Electric Supply Co Ltd v 
Southport Corporation (1926) AC 355 at 364, wherein it was expressed ‘if a person or public 
body is entrusted by the legislature with certain powers and duties to expressly or impliedly for 
public purpose, those persons or bodies cannot divest themselves of these powers and duties. 
They cannot enter into any contract or take any action incompatible with the due exercise of their 
powers or the discharge of their duties’. Brief facts of the case are as follows: by a provisional 
order of 1898, Birkdale Council were constituted as electricity undertakers in Birkdale. Birkdale 
Council transferred these powers to an electric supply company with a provision for retransfer if 
the company made default in their obligations as undertakers. The electric company charged 
more than the agreed maximum tariff. Council brought an action to restrain the company’s 
breach of agreement. The company contended that that supplemental agreement was ultra vires 
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numerous emerging and developed countries241 in their bond markets, debt-
restructuring mechanisms, and under various contexts at the sovereign state 
level, the term has not attracted its due share within the academic literature. For 
the purposes of discussing sovereign guarantee, it is argued that role of a 
sovereign within a commercial sphere exists in various tiers; fragmented. The 
academic literature available mainly consists of either a critical review of the 
contours of sovereignty, or how the shift from a strict state orientated concept to 
a more liberal, deregulated form has been beneficial. Sovereignty co-exists with 
deregulation and liberalisation. Consequently, sovereignty and the role of the 
sovereign in its strict form still exists in three tiers.  
First, sovereignty exists in a meta-sovereign form. Essentially all states are 
commercial actors in some of their dealings as a state.242 ‘Meta’ within this 
context for the purposes of the ‘sovereign’ form denotes the commercial dealing 
of the state with other sovereigns and their subjects. In this situation the 
sovereign has relinquished most of its contractual rights, for example, 
immunity.243 The state retains the right to regulate within their jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                               
both under the Electric Lighting Act 1882, which prevented the Council from divesting 
themselves of their statutory powers without the consent of the Board of Trade, and under the 
general law.  
241 See National Audit Office’s Report on UK Guarantees Scheme for Infrastructure, HM 
Treasury (Jan 2015). <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/UK-Guarantees-
scheme-for-infrastructure-summary.pdf> Accessed 22 March 2015.  
242 A state’s decision to enact a new tax law is predicated on economic principles and the impact 
it may have on the economy in general and a government’s political ambitions. A state’s 
commitment to eradicating poverty, improving the health benefits or generally a foreign policy 
decision has economic repercussions. This renders the state to be a commercial actor.  
243 See Vicki C Jackson, ‘Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and judicial 
independence’, (2003) George Washington International Law Review 35, 521; for a detailed 
discussion see NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina (2011) 2 AC 495. Facts of the case are 
that the claimant, NML Capital sought enforcement in England of a judgment given in its favour 
by a court in New York against the D state, Republic of Argentina. One of the primary issues 
before the UK Supreme Court was whether the present proceedings for recognition and 
enforcement of the New York Court’s judgement were “proceedings relating to…a commercial 
transaction”; Knighthead Master Fund LP and Others v Bank of New York Mellon and Another 
[2014] EWHC 3662 (Ch); Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad (1958) AC 397. Case concerns an 
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however, in a capacity wherein there is mutual consent between the investor and 
the host state.244 The second tier of sovereignty exists in relations between the 
subjects of the state A, and subjects of another state B. Seemingly, the role of the 
state A in this instance might seem trivial, however there are aspects that only the 
state can play (reference can be made to bilateral investment treaties and 
protections offered therein). The wide array of expertise brought into a 
transaction can all be void if the host state changes their policy surrounding an 
investment. The state plays a pivotal role therein, regulating the relationship that 
exists between subjects of their state and those of the foreign state. Finally, the 
third tier establishes the relationship that exists between the state and its subjects. 
This study will primarily be dealing with the first two tiers, due to their 
significance within the sovereign guarantee structure.  
From an energy sector standpoint, even though there are various parties involved 
in a typical project finance transaction, there are always the financial lenders245, 
the EPC contractors, sponsors and an SPV. The relationship that exists between 
the investing state and the host state is crucial. The host state, by allowing a 
                                                                                                                               
amount in Nizam of Hyderabad’s account transferred to the Pakistani High Commissioner’s 
account for and on instructions of the State of Pakistan. See the judgment delivered by Lord 
Denning; Seema Bono, Mark Hilgard, Sarah Reynolds and Others, ‘Sovereign immunity and 
enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Navigating International Boundaries’ (2012) Working paper 
published by Mayer Brown <www.mayorbrown.com/publications/sovereign-immunity-and-
enforcement-of-arbitral-awards- navigating-international-boundaries-02-21-2012> Accessed 14 
April 2015. 
244 The idea of a state relinquishing its rights or retaining them is questionable. It is submitted that 
some BITs and other investment agreements provide favourable rights to the investor such as tax 
holidays, exemption from customs etc. This is considered an encroachment on a state’s 
sovereignty, if looked at from a strict sovereign perspective.  
245 These financial lenders are primarily foreign banks interested in higher returns for undertaking 
higher risks. Author’s fieldwork has revealed that local banks have also started to participate in 
domestic syndicates to finance energy projects. However, they are not as widespread and limited 
to a few projects. See Nexif, ‘Financial close of 50 MW Metro Wind and signing of debt 
agreements for 50MW Gul Ahmed Wind – two power projects developed by Nexif in Pakistan’ 
Nexif Singapore (23 February, 2015) <http://www.nexif.com/news/pakistan-wind/> Accessed on 
23 February 2015. 
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subject of the investing state to invest in their jurisdiction is exercising their 
sovereignty. Wood succinctly explained this concept in the following words: 
‘…state in-charge of its own law making machinery can therefore change its 
laws and compel its court to give effect to changes’.246  
In essence, the exercise of sovereignty forms part of the security package that the 
host state has to offer. Security, like sovereign guarantee, is a nebulous term; 
some might argue, one with no precise meaning.247 In its earliest form, the term 
‘security’ did not specifically refer to a document or arrangement, which was 
either secondary, or formed part of a collateral obligation. Bamford submits that 
in some circumstances the term security could refer to the instrument that created 
primary obligation.248 This is an interesting remark, and leads to the debate 
whether an indemnity would fit the definition that Bamford associates with 
security more appropriately than a guarantee?  
4.2.1 Sovereign Guarantees and Infrastructure Development 
Sovereign guarantee frameworks serve two purposes. First, they are risk 
mitigation tools; second, they provide an ancillary support for attracting capital. 
All investments are predicated on risk249; some are risker than others. Risk 
associated with a transaction determines the cost of return. As a result, risker 
                                                
246 Philip Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State loans (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 
99; Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002); David Gardner 
and James Wright (HSBC) ‘Project Finance’ <www.hsbcnet.com-gbm_attachments_products -
services_financing-project- finance> Accessed 12 April 2015. 
247 See Colin Bamford, Principles of International Financial Law (Second Edition, OUP, 2015). 
The term security is also looked at in a wider context to mean ‘something which makes the 
enjoyment or enforcement of a right more secure to certain’. See Jowitt’s Dictionary of English 
Law (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1977).  
248 Colin Bamford, Principles of International Financial Law (Second Edition, OUP, 2015); also 
see Jones v IRC (1895) 1 QB 484. 
249 Alistair Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 109.  
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transactions bear higher rewards.250 Complex financial instruments packaged to 
allure investors to invest are a good example of how risky investments can be 
rewarding. Parties investing in volatile, under-developed economies seek 
methods to either mitigate risk or diminish them altogether.251 
Sovereign guarantee, like a guarantee, is a contract wherein the state agrees to act 
as a collateral to indemnify the SPV against any breach of contract or delay in 
timely payments by the off-taker. Traditionally, sovereign guarantees were 
regarded as instruments designed to assist developing countries to attract foreign 
investment, managerial know-how and infrastructure for economic 
development.252 They are now increasingly considered as risk mitigation 
provisions that allow greater access to credit for a developing economy. 
However, as discussed later, the provision of sovereign guarantees has now 
become more obscure and merely a condition precedent. Lenders require state 
guarantees for projects to achieve financial close (hereinafter referred to as 
“FC”).253  
                                                
250 See Peter K Nevitt and Frank Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney Books 
London, 2000) 131. 
251 While there are several financial mechanisms employed in order to mitigate risk ie leveraged 
finance (debt to equity ratio) these have been discussed in project finance chapter, insurance 
(discussed in the political risk insurance chapter), sovereign guarantees are widely used in the 
infrastructure industry as a tool to mitigate risk, or rather to give the impression that the host state 
sovereign undertakes to protect such investment; also see Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University Press, 1962). This book largely revolves 
around the limitations and effectiveness of state guarantees in international law.  
252 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 
para 33 wherein the court submitted ‘when a state admits into its territory foreign investments of 
foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection 
of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be offered to them’.  
253 Fatouros offers an insight into the primary purpose for government guarantees. He argues that 
‘the primary goal of such measures is designed to promote stability. Their ultimate purpose 
should be to assist growth by eliminating some of the unfavourable consequences of instability. 
But to recognise the dangers of uncertainty and instability is not to consider instability as the 
principal aim’. He further adds that ‘it is prudent, however, to avoid exaggerating their 
importance or the extent to which they can affect economic development. Such guarantees relate 
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In essence, the sovereign guarantee framework can provide such assurances that 
are deemed necessary by the investor, however, in this present instance this 
assurance is two pronged. The guarantee not only assures the lenders that their 
investment is secure254 against any regulatory change or expropriatory measure, 
it also promises the SPV that the off-taker, an SOE, will purchase the electricity 
from the SPV via an off-take agreement255 and make timely payments. The latter 
form of security is vital for project finance purposes. The entire structure of a 
project finance transaction is predicated on a smooth future revenue stream for a 
project company, and as a result secures debt payment obligations for the project 
company. Sponsors and lenders seek legal certainty when making investment 
decisions.256  
One of those certainties sought by investors is a credible mechanism for securing 
their investment against contractual breaches, expropriation etc.257 This 
                                                                                                                               
only to a few of the factors affecting the international flow of private capital, namely, the factors 
generally included under the heading of “investment climate”’. See Arghyrios A Fatouros, 
Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University Press, 1962) 6.  
254 Reference has been made to an agreement perused by the author. It is submitted that the 
agreement expresses  this in the following manner section 15.6(a)(ii) ‘if there occurs a PPFME or 
a CLFME that prevents or delays the construction of the complex or reduces the Company’s 
ability to declare available capacity, the Power Purchaser shall within 30 days of the delivery by 
the Company for an invoice there for, pay to the Company, for each Month an amount equal to (i) 
the carrying cost if the PPFME or the CLFME occurs prior to the occurrence of the Commercial 
Operations Date, or (ii) the full capacity payment if the PPFME or the CLFME occurs after the 
Commercial Operations Date’. There are also generally provisions relating to expropriation, 
change in law to the detriment of the company etc.  
255 See Edward R Yescombe, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002); see section 
15.5 of the PPA reviewed wherein it is expressed that ‘upon the occurrence of any Force Majeure 
Event after the Commercial Operations Date, then during the pendency of a Force Majeure 
Event, the Power Purchaser shall pay to the Company Energy Payments for Net Electrical Output 
delivered during the pendency of such Force Majeure Event plus Capacity Payments for the 
prevailing Tested Capacity that the Company has been able to demonstrate through testing that it 
can make available during the pendency of such Force Majeure Event’. 
256 See Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment 
(Princeton University Press, 1965). The general rule recognised by economists is that fear of the 
unfamiliar will often lead an investor to keep his money at home, even when he could earn more 
on it abroad; also see Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Fourth Edition, Penguin Classics, 1999). 
257 Such assurances outline and work as an underlying assurance for investors and the project 
company that the sovereign will pay the project company/SPV under the implementation 
agreement, if and when a sovereign guarantee is called upon.  
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obligation perpetrates the suggestion that in such scenarios, a foreign investor is 
assured that in the event of a dispute, as a result of breach of contract, 
expropriation or any contingency arising as a result of governmental action, the 
host state will compensate the sponsors.258 Recent examples from various 
countries indicate otherwise. Evidence from countries such as Pakistan, India259, 
Kenya and Nigeria260 highlight a precarious financial chasm, due to liquidity 
issues faced by off-taking bodies, and the direct consequence of such issues 
resulting in default on payments despite sovereign guarantee assurances.  
Inability to meet expectations of the sponsors under a sovereign guarantee 
framework lead to the following narrative: either there are procedural 
inadequacies in Pakistan’s sovereign guarantee framework, or there is an 
expectation gap between what the investors expect, and what is being offered. 
Delayed payments due to fiscal constraints can create an environment of 
uncertainty and lead to a crisis of enormous magnitude.261 It is submitted that 
                                                
258 This also builds on the argument submitted in Chapter 2, concerning risk mitigation in project 
finance. As Nevitt and Fabozzi submit, the key to successful project financing is when there is as 
little recourse available to a sponsor as possible, while at the same time providing sufficient 
credit support through guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor or a third party so lenders can be 
satisfied of credit risk. See Peter K Nevitt and Frank Fabozzi, Project Financing (7th Edition, 
Euromoney Books London, 2000). 
259 See the Dabhol Power Project; see Kenneth Hansen, Robert C O’Sullivan, W Geoffrey 
Anderson, ‘The Dabhol Power Project Settlement—What Happened? And How?’ The 
Infrastructure Journal <http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/a5aa1e52-4285-4bb5-87e6-
7201123895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-40fc-a293-
720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol_InfrastructureJournal12_2005.pdf> Accessed 03 May 2016; also see 
Kiran Stacey, ‘Debt burden slows India’s rollout of reliable electricity supply’ Financial Times 
(New Delhi, 20 February 2017).  
260 See Timi Soleye, ‘Guest post: The imminent collapse of Nigeria’s power privatization is a 
good thing’ Financial Times (Lagos, 14 Oct 2014) <www.ft.com> Accessed 14 October 2014. 
261 Specific reference is made to issues pertaining to acceleration clauses and material adverse 
change (MAC) clauses in syndicated loan agreements. See Concord Trust v Law Debenture Trust 
Corporation plc [2005] UKHL 27; BNP Paribas S A & Others v Yukos Oil Company [2005] 
EWHC 1321 (Ch). Brief facts of the case are that a Russian oil magnate was subject of major 
investigations by the Russian tax authorities. As a result, the defendant company, which was 
subject of majority shareholding of the magnate, was adversely affected. The claimant 
accelerated their loans and the case was surrounded by debate around MAC clauses; also see Paul 
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default on payments by a government on their contractual obligation results in 
the lenders restricting the flow of investment.262 This means that infrastructure 
development is adversely affected. Concrete evidence supporting the use of 
sovereign guarantees in infrastructure development indicates a fierce competition 
amongst emerging economies and even developed countries for FDI. Sovereign 
guarantees in infrastructure development can, inter alia, be considered as an 
additional form of security263, incentivising investment to flow to a jurisdiction 
that would otherwise not attract the same.264  
                                                                                                                               
L. Lee, ‘Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity’ (2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 327, at 394. 
262See Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia 
University Press, 1962) wherein it is argued that ‘the lack of security in investments in foreign, 
and especially underdeveloped, countries is due to, and is manifestation of, the general lack of 
stability in today’s economic and political situation. It is not possible to provide complete 
security for investment where the underlying economic and political conditions are unstable’; see 
Guido Sandleris, ‘Sovereign Defaults, Credit to the Private Sector, and Domestic Credit market 
institutions’ (March-April 2014) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume. 46, No 2-3. 
This paper analyses whether there is a relationship between the sovereign defaults and decline in 
foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector; also see Arteta Carlos and Galina 
Hale, ‘Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private Sector’ (2008) Journal of International 
Economics, 74, 53-69; Sturzenegger Federico, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Debt Defaults and lesson 
from a Decade of Crises (Cambridge MA MIT Press, 2006); also see Douglas Baird, Robert H 
Gertner, and Randal C Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard University Press, 1994) 
wherein it is expressed that a law that gives lender the ability to call upon the state to enforce its 
claim provides parties with a way of transforming a game with a sub-optimal equilibrium into 
another game with an optimal equilibrium. To say that legally enforceable contracts facilitate 
mutually beneficial trade is not to say that the existence of such trade depends on it. Trade can 
exist and indeed flourish in the absence of legally enforceable contracts. Mechanisms such as 
reputation can bring about long-term cooperation even if there is no enforceable contract. The 
prospect of losing future deals both with another party and with people who know that party may 
be sufficient to ensure that each party performs.  
263 Security was defined by Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson in Bristol Airport Plc v Poudrill and 
others [1990] 2 WLR 1362 as follows: ‘security is created where a person (the “creditor”) to 
whom an obligation is owed by another (the “debtor”) by statute or contract, in addition to the 
personal promise of the debtor to discharge the obligation, obtains rights exercisable against 
some property in which the debtor has an interest in order to enforce the discharge of the debtor’s 
obligation to the creditor’. Brief facts of the case are as follows: an insolvent charter airline had 
debt totaling £11 million. The applicants, airport operators, were two of its unsecured creditors 
and were owed £1.5m. Administrators were appointed for the charters, and they told the creditors 
that there is a prospective sale that could equally beneficial for the creditors. At a meeting 
between the representatives of the four airport operators, including the two applicants, it was 
agreed that none of them would exercise power of detention over the aircraft, which were 
operated by the airline under leasing agreements.  
264 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2nd Edition, 
Hart Publishing, 2012). Also see Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in 
Foreign Investment (Princeton University Press, 1962). It is argued that British investment in 
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This study focuses on black letter law perspective, highlighting what constitutes 
sovereign guarantee and its ability to act as a risk-mitigating measure. It would 
be appropriate to briefly highlight that the concept of risk mitigation is not only 
contained within the perimeter of guarantees, it also correlates to regulatory 
means present within a jurisdiction. Effective regulation is one of the endemic 
features of effectively mobilising investment finance, ensuring good performance 
insofar as meeting contractual expectations. An alternative initiative to effective 
regulation, as illustrated in EBRD’s working paper, is sovereign finance. 
However, sovereign finance is neither practicable nor desirable from an incentive 
standpoint.265  
4.3 Are Sovereign Guarantees Absolute or Obsolete? The Case for a Faulty 
Structure 
Developing countries have become increasingly concerned about the lack of 
infrastructure to facilitate their rapid growth supplying cheaper products to the 
developed countries. It is estimated that by 2030, Asia alone will require 
approximately US$24 trillion in order to sustain and meet its infrastructure 
demands.266 These competitive market conditions create a space for investors, 
both domestic and foreign, to provide access to capital to facilitate local 
                                                                                                                               
infrastructure abroad increased steadily, other countries caught the fever, and by the 60’s and 
70’s, Canada, France, Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were all using the guaranty system 
to attract foreign capital into the railway department; Nick Seddon, ‘The Interaction of Contract 
and Executive Power’ <flr.law.an.edu.au/sites/flr.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Seddon.pdf> Accessed 20 
November 2015. 
265 David Kennedy, ‘Power sector regulatory reform in transition economies: program and 
lessons learned’ (Feb 2003) EBRD Working Paper No. 78 
<http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0078.pdf> Accessed 23 
May 2016. 
266 See Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion Per 
Year, Double Previous Estimates’ ABD News Release (28 February 2017) < 
https://www.adb.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-year-double-previous-
estimates> Accessed 05 March 2017. The total figure is approximately US$26 trillion if climate 
change and other costs are taken into account.  
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businesses to compete in the international markets. This study has made 
continuous references to the government’s inability to participate and invest in 
infrastructure development. A better means of being able to facilitate private 
investment, provide the requisite conditions, and provide a collateral safety net is 
through sovereign guarantees. As outlined in a report from the International 
Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IMF’), ‘guarantees are a form of 
government intervention. Their general motivation is to respond to market 
failure, tempered by concerns that inappropriate or excessive intervention can 
lead market failure to give way to government failure’.267   
The state employs an indirect approach through the utility of sovereign guarantee 
frameworks to avoid and deter government failure to enhance investment regime. 
The current framework of guarantee contracts used globally involve either a 
contractual provision within the PPA, MOU, or are executed in a separate 
agreement, more commonly known as a letter of support (hereinafter referred to 
as “LoS”). Over the past 25 years, governments of all persuasions in Western 
democracies have increasingly resorted to contracts as a means of carrying out 
governmental tasks and achieving policy outcomes.268 Whilst an attempt has 
been made in the preceding chapter to explain what guarantees are, and what 
constitutes an indemnity, this section aims to discuss the sovereign guarantee 
structure normative to these principles.  
                                                
267 See IMF, Public-Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk 
(Washington, IMF, 2006). 
268 Nick Seddon, ‘The Interaction of Contract and Executive Power’, 
<flr.law.an.edu.au/sites/flr.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Seddon.pdf> Accessed 14 November 2015 
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There are two main issues that need to be addressed in order to establish the 
adequacy of sovereign guarantee: first, whether sovereign guarantees are a robust 
measure to avoid or deter default by SOEs. Second, whether the reasons for these 
defaults are predicated upon the lack of defined frameworks that exist within the 
state’s organic structure. Subsequent to this lack of defined framework is the 
notion of whether these SOEs are in fact organs of the state, and therefore fall 
within its organisational structure.269 The first issue is fairly straightforward. This 
study has extensively discussed the failure of Pakistan’s SOEs to fulfil and make 
timely payments to the project company. India, Kenya, Nigeria, Cameroon and 
other developing countries are experiencing similar difficulties. India’s circular 
debt is ten times that of Pakistan, standing at approximately US$64bn.270 
Similarly, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine have made progress towards 
independent regulation, in addition to the privatisation of the distribution 
companies.271 Dabhol Power Project’s failure is a good example of state failure 
to provide adequate protection under a sovereign guarantee framework.272 It is 
therefore submitted that the implicit argument concerning any real security being 
accorded under a sovereign guarantee is inadequate due to the non-payment and 
default on payments by the off-taking bodies, and the state’s failure to indemnify 
private parties subsequently.  
                                                
269 See R Doak Bishop, James Crawford and W Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
270 See Kiran Stacey, ‘Debt Burden slows India’s rollout of reliable electricity supply’ Financial 
Times (New Delhi, 20 February 2017); also see Victor Mallet and James Crabtree, ‘India 
restructures $35bn of power debt’ Financial Times (New Delhi, 24 September 2012). 
271 David Kennedy, ‘Power sector regulatory reform in transition economies: program and 
lessons learned’ (Feb 2003) EBRD Working Paper No 78 
<http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0078.pdf> Accessed 23 
May 2016. 
272 It is interesting to note that there were two guarantees issued to the Dabhol Power Project. 
One was issued as a ‘letter of comfort’ by the Ministry of Power, India. Another guarantee 
agreement titled ‘state support agreement’ was signed between the State of Maharastra and the 
Dabhol Power Project.  
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The second issue is more complex. From Pakistan’s standpoint, there have been 
numerous efforts by multilateral agencies to secure divestment of the state from 
the affairs of the SOEs. The more prominent example of this deregulation 
strategy was the ‘Energy Sector Restructuring Program’ (hereinafter referred to 
as the “ESRP”), using financial support from the IMF, the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank.273 Almost two decades later, there has not been a 
complete overhaul in Pakistan’s energy sector. In the event that the off-taking 
body breaches their PPA provisions, and fails to make timely payments, it is 
argued that the burden shifts to the state. The primary contention adopted for the 
purposes of this project is whether the off-taking body is an organ of the state, 
and as a result, forms an integral part of the state’s organic structure. 
Consequently, in view of the principles of guarantee law, the state is 
guaranteeing its own performance.  
The primary rationale to undertake this study was prompted by the inadequate 
nature of these sovereign guarantees. This has primarily been due to the endemic 
circular debt crisis and limited fiscal space for state to finance, and meet the 
financial cost of issuing such guarantees. Inter alia, sovereign guarantee 
structures also reflect upon the lack of understanding insofar as to what is being 
offered by the state. In broad terms, the sovereign guarantee is a promise 
associated to the off-taking bodies’ performance in meeting their contractual 
commitment towards the project company. Therefore, a sovereign guarantee acts 
                                                
273 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program (Performance 
Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-energy-sector-restructuring-
program-0> Accessed 14 January 2017. 
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as a deterrent, or an instrument of deterrence, that facilitates unqualified access 
to foreign capital for infrastructure development.274   
The concept of a sovereign guarantee derives its existence from the very idea of 
security, and is predicated upon the principles of collateral obligation. The 
sovereign authority, through its delegated power to a SOE, guarantees the 
performance of the off taking body in a bid to provide robust protection. This 
study primarily focuses on Pakistan as a case study, and as a result reviews 
existential issues facing the investment regime therein. This sovereign guarantee 
model is prima facie followed globally, especially in developing, emerging 
economies. As a result, the failure of robust protection offered under sovereign 
guarantee indicates a proposition that in the absence of a well-defined regulatory 
framework, their purpose is fallacious. This submission is predicated on the 
following three strands: first, a guarantee instrument involves a guarantor 
promising the creditor to be responsible for due performance or discharge of 
contractual promise by the principal of their existing or future obligations. This 
obligation is predicated on the failure of the principal to perform any part of 
these obligations.275 Whereas it seems implausible to displace the long standing 
principle regarding companies’ separate legal status, this section argues that 
these SOEs are organs of the state and, as a result, the ultimate responsibility to 
                                                
274 See Jonathan Eaton, ‘Public debt guarantees and private capital flight’ (May 1987) The World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol 1, No 3, pp 377-395, wherein Eaton argues that deterring a default 
by the central government will have a much stronger incentive to maintain access to foreign 
capital markets for other potential borrowers within the host country. Moreover, he also contends 
that ‘an inability to enforce contracts between private agents without public intervention can 
generate capital flight’. 
275 See Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd (2010) EWHC 2442 (Ch), as per Sir William 
Blackburne; also see IIG Capital LLC v Van Der Merwe (2008) EWCA Civ 542; Associated 
British Ports v Ferryways NV & Anor (2009) EWCA Civ 189; also see Gautam Bhattacharyya, 
Victoria Reynolds and Antony White, ‘Differentiating and Identifying Primary and Secondary 
Liability Instruments in the Law of Guarantees’ (2005) Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation 488. 
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honour the sovereign guarantee lies with the state in any case.276 The second 
strand relates to what is being offered under a sovereign guarantee, and what is 
really being accorded under a sovereign guarantee instrument. This section 
discusses the ‘expectation gap’ within the provision of these instruments. The 
third strand discussed in this chapter is predicated on economic principles that 
underlie the basic mechanism involved in legislative restrictions, and their ability 
to fetter any sovereign undertaking. It reviews the enforceability of such 
undertakings in light of legislative restrictions, and aims to discuss whether such 
restrictions affect the sovereign guarantee undertaking.   
4.3.1 Sometimes A Cigar Is Just A Cigar277 
There is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that the provision of sovereign 
guarantee facilitates investment and increases investor confidence. However, 
interviews conducted for the purpose of this study suggest that sovereign 
guarantees facilitate and help in the uplift of creating the impression that the host 
state is favourable towards investors.278 This section reviews the structural 
inadequacies of sovereign guarantee framework by employing Article 4 and 
Article 5 of the Draft Articles. The underlying purpose of this section is to 
determine whether the entities involved within the sovereign guarantee 
framework are independent of the state. This exercise is imperative, in 
                                                
276 James Crawford, ‘Investment Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility’ 
(Spring 2010) ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal Vol 25 Number 1. Crawford 
argues that ‘the state is regarded as a single person in international law and is responsible for the 
conduct of all its organs, whatever their status… for the purposes of attribution, it is irrelevant 
whether the constitutional structure of the state gives the federal government power to compel the 
component unit to abide by the state’s international legal obligations. These units are nonetheless 
organs of the state and their conduct is attributable to the state’.  
277 Quote taken from Sigmund Freud’s expression. 
278 Interviews involved engaging with members of PPIB, NTDC and attendees of workshop 
hosted in London.  
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establishing whether, from a guarantee law perspective, there are three parties 
involved in the sovereign guarantee framework.279 
In the absence of an international framework designed specifically to determine 
whether an entity is an organ of the state—the purposes of sovereign guarantee 
adequacy determination—the Draft Articles will act as a guide to perform the 
same. A typical sovereign guarantee structure involves a government agency 
acting on behalf of the state, guaranteeing the project company against any 
breach perpetrated on behalf of the off-taker under the PPA. Prima facie, this 
contention is not as straightforward as it may seem. Since the inception of SOEs, 
states in a bid for excessive economic power have refashioned themselves.280 
The state is no longer content to wield traditional forms of public power. As a 
result, some of the strategic functions of the state are now carried out by 
SOEs.281 However, in the absence of well-defined regulatory frameworks, there 
is ambiguity surrounding the independence of the entities that facilitate a 
sovereign guarantee structure. Unlike privatised entities, SOEs do not operate in 
a regulatory or institutional vacuum. Their existence per se, along with their 
operational abilities, is in close nexus with the state. As a result, the performance 
of these SOEs in execution of sovereign guarantees, and contracting abilities 
insofar as PPAs and IAs, is the state discharging its contractual liability under the 
guarantee contract. Without a clear legal framework, and without the state 
                                                
279 This submission has been extensively discussed in Chapter Three. See Lord Selbourne’s dicta 
in Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17 wherein he argues that ‘there 
can be no suretyship unless there be a principal debtor… nor can a man guarantee anybody else’s 
debt unless there is a debt of some other person to be guaranteed’.  
280 Larry C Backer, ‘Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, State-owned enterprises, and the Chinese Experience’ (2010-2011) 19 Transnt’l L 
& Contemp Probs 3. 
281 Michael Feit, ‘Responsibility of the State under International Law for Breach of Contract 
committed by a State-owned entity’ (2010) 28 Berkley J Int’l L 142. 
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completely divesting itself of the function and structure of these entities, it seems 
futile to award sovereign guarantees through SOEs. 
The structure of this section is divided into two. First, this section endeavors to 
discuss the nature of the SOEs under Article 4 of the Draft Articles. Several 
arbitral tribunal awards have been reviewed hereunder, and consequently the 
possibility of the National Transmission Despatch Company (hereinafter referred 
to as “NTDC”), the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (hereinafter referred 
to as “PPIB”), and the Central Power Purchasing Agency Guarantee Ltd 
(hereinafter referred to as “CPPAG”) as part of the state’s organic structure are 
discussed. Thereafter, this chapter progresses to discuss the nature of the act that 
these entities exercise, and review their nature under Article 5 of the Draft 
Articles. This discourse will attempt to assist in the determination, and highlight 
whether for the purposes of a guarantee law context there are in fact two 
different entities: the principal debtor and a guarantor.  
4.3.1.a Separation of the State from SOE: Myth and Delusions revisited 
under Article 4 
Article 4 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility states:  
The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under International law, whether the organ exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever 
position it holds in the organisation of the state, and whatever 
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its character as an organ of the central Government or of a 
territorial unit of the state. 
The state is viewed as a group comprising individual units. Unless these entities 
can be recognised as duty bearing units, acting on their prerogative, possessing 
rights-obligations, it is hard to see how these units can be considered as separate 
legal entities. Draft Articles commentary expresses this notion in the following 
manner ‘…the reference to “state organs” covers all the individual or collective 
entities which make up the organisation of the state and act on its behalf’.282 As 
early as 1897, the courts concluded that the company at law is a different person 
altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum.283 Lord McNaughten in 
Saloman submitted that:  
[T]he company is at law a different person altogether from the 
subscribers to the memorandum; and though it may be that after 
incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the 
subscribers or trustee for them.284 
It is submitted that displacing the long-standing principle of separate legal 
personality is neither desirable nor the primary contention of this study. The 
separate legal personality is considered an important cog in the present financial 
                                                
282  International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, General Commentary’ [2001] 2(2) Y B Int’l L Comm’n 30, 31-32 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> Accessed 05 May 
2017. 
283 Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd (1897) A C 22.  
284 Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd (1897) A C 22. 
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world. From doctrinal company law perspective, little has changed.285 A 
company remains a separate legal personality to its subscribers, deeply insulated 
from them. However, it is subject to some exceptions.286 The underlying 
argument deals with the notion of sovereign guarantees. The narrative discussed 
in this study would be different if the term sovereign guarantee was rephrased as 
sovereign indemnity. 
As part of the support provided by the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank under ESRP, Pakistan’s Water and Power Development 
Authority (hereinafter referred to as “WAPDA”) was restructured in order to 
enhance governance and strengthen regulatory frameworks.287 NTDC and 
subsequently CPPAG were formed as companies registered under Pakistan’s 
Companies Ordinance 1984, to provide a restructured model for foreign 
investors. PPIB’s role was previously being carried out by the Ministry of 
Planning and Ministry of Finance. Through funding from the World Bank, in 
                                                
285 See Eilis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (Second Edition, 
OUP, 2014); also see a contrasting view in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) UKSC 34. 
Brief facts of the case are as follows: concerns a divorce case wherein the wife claimed that the 
husband was using several off-shore companies to hold various properties as the beneficial 
owner. She therefore sought relief under the relevant provisions of the Matrimonial Act. The 
court of first instance found in favour of the wife. The CA allowed an appeal by the companies. 
On wife’s appeal, after an extensive review of the area surrounding corporate legal personality 
and lifting of the corporate veil, the Supreme Court found in favour of the wife.  
286 See Eilis Ferran, ‘Company law reform in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 5 Singapore Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 516. Ferran argues that ‘there is an administrative process 
involving form-filing and the disclosure of information but the requirements are not burdensome. 
Making the corporate form so readily available is a deliberate policy choice, which is intended to 
encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise; also see Barclay Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Waypharm 
LP (2012) EWHC 306 (Comm). In Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) UKSC 34, Lord 
Sumption went to the extent to submit that the use of the corporate form for the purposes of 
concealment is required. 
287 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program (Performance 
Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-energy-sector-restructuring-
program-0> Accessed 14 April 2017. 
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1994 Pakistan decided to create a ‘one window facilitator’. It was not until 2012 
that PPIB was instituted as a statutory body.288  
Section 3(2) of the PPIB Act outlines that ‘… (PPIB) shall be independent in the 
performance of its functions and shall be body corporate having perpetual 
succession and a common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Act’. 
Under its current regulatory framework, it is hard to imagine how PPIB can 
operate under the auspices of a corporate body and still exercise puissance 
publique. However, all three bodies under their ostensible structures are body 
corporates. The Commentary on the Draft Articles submits that the status and 
function of various entities cannot alone be determined by law, but also need to 
be reviewed by practice.289 As a result, this section reviews the position of 
NTDC, CPPAG and PPIB in light of Article 4 Draft Article, and reviews relevant 
case law to discuss the attribution of responsibility to discharge SOE’s debt. 
An SOE is a double-edged sword. Their role within current international capital 
market creates confusion insofar as their structure. States, on the basis of the 
nature of a particular dispute, determine the character or persona that they wish 
to associate with a SOE, or an organ of the state. In the seminal case of Trendtex 
Trading Corporation, the Central Bank of Nigeria claimed immunity against a 
claim for repudiation of contract, and damages pursuant to such breach. The 
Central Bank claimed that they are an emanation of the state and therefore 
immune from proceedings. Upon the Plaintiff’s appeal, it was held that the 
                                                
288 Private Power Infrastructure Board <http://www.ppib.gov.pk/N_legislation.htm> Accessed 23 
March 2017. 
289   International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, General Commentary’ [2001] 2(2) Y B Int’l L Comm’n 30, 31-32 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> Accessed 02 
April 2017.  
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bank—which had been created as a separate legal entity with no clear expression 
of intent that it should have governmental status—was not an emanation, arm, 
alter ego or department of state of Nigeria, and was therefore not entitled to 
immunity.290 The court in this case was primarily driven by the rationale upheld 
in the case of Rahimtoola, wherein Lord Denning submitted that:  
[I]f the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative 
or international transactions of a foreign government, or the 
policy of its executive, the court should grant immunity if asked 
to do so, because it does offend the dignity of a foreign 
sovereign to have the merits of such dispute canvassed in the 
domestic courts of another country.291  
This principle has been upheld by courts today insofar as sovereign immunity for 
entities claiming to be an emanation of the state. An important observation made 
by the court in Trendtex was regarding the relationship that exists between a SOE 
and the state. The court pointed out that the proper test of a body is what it does, 
and what its relationship is with the Crown or the state.292 While this position 
resonates with the discussion of a SOE’s separate legal personality in view of a 
claim under sovereign immunity, various disputes in international arbitration 
                                                
290 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529.  
291 See Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] A C 379, 422; this principle was restated in 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v Government of Pakistan, Directorate of Agricultural Supplies 
[1975] 1 W L R 1485, 1491.  
292 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529. The court further 
outlined that ‘if the instrument which establishes the body says it is to be a government 
department that is conclusive. If it does not, it does not enable to court to say that is conclusive. 
One looks at the nature of the body itself’. 
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have further expanded on the principle normative to the actions perpetrated by 
states. This study refers to the principle outlined in Maffezini.293  
In Maffezini, the primary contention of the claimant was that prima facie, 
SODIGA is a state entity acting on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain. As a result, 
all its acts and omissions are attributable to the Kingdom of Spain. The tribunal, 
whilst following a similar line of reasoning in Trendtex, submitted that a 
structural test alone could not be used to determine responsibility for organs of 
the state. The tribunal introduced a functional test within the existing equation of 
determining responsibility of the state. This test has been widely accepted in 
various arbitrations to determine and associate responsibility of SOEs to the 
state. As a result, the following discussion adopts both tests in order to discuss 
whether the aforementioned SOEs are in effect organs of the state.  
First, this section reviews the position of the SOEs involved in the sovereign 
guarantee framework from a structural test standpoint. In Noble Ventures Inc., 
the claimant argued that with regard to the purported violations, Romania is 
responsible for the breach since both entities involved were acting as organs of 
the Romanian state.294 Prima facie, the claimants argued that the tribunal should 
consider whether an entity is a state organ, whilst employing the structural and 
functional test. The claimants cited the appointment procedures of the board and 
the chairman of the State Ownership Fund (hereinafter referred to as “SOF”), and 
submitted that ‘SOF was no mere commercial enterprise, but a state agency 
subordinated directly to the Prime Minister’. While the claimant’s contention 
                                                
293 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7. 
294 See Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11.  
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was unsuccessful for the purposes of Article 4, this structural debate plays a 
pivotal role in determining whether an entity is in fact an organ of the state. 
Section 3(2) of the PPIB Act outlines that PPIB ‘…shall be independent in the 
performance of its functions and shall be a body corporate…’. It is questionable 
whether PPIB is an independent entity. Section 6 and section 7 of the PPIB Act 
outline the composition of the board of directors, and the appointment procedure 
for Managing Director, respectively.  
Section 6. Composition of the PPIB- 
(1) The general management and administration of affairs of the PPIB 
shall vest in the Board, which shall consist of the following, namely:- 
a) Minister for Water and Power, Government of Pakistan-
Chairman; 
b) Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan-
Member; 
c) Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan or his 
nominee not below the rank of Additional Secretary or equivalent-
Member; 
d) Secretary; Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, 
Government of Pakistan or his nominee not below the rank of 
Additional Secretary or equivalent-Member; 
e) Secretary, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan or his 
nominee not below the rank of Additional Secretary or equivalent-
Member; 
f) Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue-Member; 
g) Chairman WAPDA-Member; 
h) Managing Director, PPIB-Member; 
i) Chief Secretaries of Provinces and AJ and K or their nominees not 
below the rank of Additional Secretary or equivalent-Member; 
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j) One representative each from Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and FATA to 
be nominated by Chief Minister, GB and Governor Khyber 
Pakthunkhawa respectively; and 
k) One representative from private sector from each Province to be 
nominated by the respective Provincial Government”295 
Section 7. Managing Director and other members- 
(1) There shall be a Managing Director of PPIB who shall be appointed 
by the Federal Government”296 
The composition of the board consists primarily of members from the federal 
government (with an exception of one member from the private sector). 
Moreover, the appointment procedure of the Managing Director rests with the 
federal government. These are strong indications that PPIB is an organ of the 
state. This endemic issue is practiced throughout the developing world with some 
exceptions. These issues exist primarily due to an absence of clear legal 
frameworks.297 SOEs can be considered a legal hybrid between state organs and 
privatised entities. However, despite multitude of recommendations by 
multilateral institutions to privatise NTDC and CPPAG, privatisation of these 
entities is often viewed as problematic. As outlined in the World Bank’s report, 
the likelihood of scandal accompanying privatisation may create issues for an 
elected government in the future. Moreover, the results achieved through 
                                                
295 PPIB Act 2012, section 6 < http://www.ppib.gov.pk/ppibact.pdf> Accessed 03 May 2017. 
296 PPIB Act 2012, section 7 << http://www.ppib.gov.pk/ppibact.pdf> Accessed 03 May 2017. 
297 International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment (IEA, 2017). The report argues that in 
2016, nearly two-thirds of global investment in power generation and networks took place in 
countries with single-buyer or vertically integrated systems. This share, the report argues, is set to 
change in the near future, with China, Japan, Mexico and Korea moving towards more open 
wholesale markets and retail price competition, creating opportunities for new players. Japan 
introduced full liberalisation of the retail market in 2016. This eliminates boundaries for 
vertically integrated, regional electricity companies (EPCOs) and opens their markets to new 
entrants. 
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effective privatisation are medium to long term, whereas its costs are 
concentrated and often subjected to critique by vocal, and powerful groups.298  
Another issue that perpetrates confusion regarding the character of SOEs is 
predicated upon the power of appointment, dismissal of senior management, and 
members of the board.299 Exercise of such power rests with the government. The 
World Bank’s toolkit concludes that these practices promote corruption in these 
legal hybrid institutions.300 However, a more endemic issue relates to lack of 
corporate governance measures that are internally regulated in order to deter any 
government influence.  
NTDC was recently divested of its central power-purchasing arm, and formed 
into a new entity, CPPAG. This divestment has created further legal issues 
insofar as the existing regulatory problems for Pakistan. One benefit that can be 
drawn from the divestment of the CPPA’s role from NTDC is that it can be 
privatised, at a later date as a distribution arm. However, it is to be noted that 
WAPDA’s restructure took place in 1998. Approximately, two decades later, 
there is yet to be an extensive, formal privatisation plan within Pakistan’s energy 
sector.301 In an informal interview, the Managing Director of PPIB outlined the 
goals of this divestment.302 His primary contention was that the divestment of 
NTDC’s CPPA role ‘outlines the government’s further commitment to ensure 
                                                
298 World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014). 
299 In the case of PPIB, such powers rest with the Federal Government under section 7(5) of the 
PPIB Act wherein the Act states ‘The Managing Director shall, unless he resigns or is removed 
from office earlier by the Federal Government…’. 
300 World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014). 
301 With the exception of Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC). 
302 An informal discussion with the Managing Director of PPIB at a workshop organised by the 
author.  
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independence of the off-taking body’. It is unusual for senior members of the 
bureaucracy to admit influence exercised by government functionaries on various 
SOEs. However, two recent events involving NTDC and NEPRA, Pakistan’s 
energy regulator, contradict the notion of ‘independence’ of these SOEs.  
The World Bank’s toolkit recognises the endemic issues concerning the absence 
of ill-defined legal frameworks, and argues that ‘the state often assumes the 
functions that should in essence be carried out by the board’.303 The 
inconsistency that is existential within the preamble of these SOEs outlining their 
‘independence’ has allowed scope for political interference in their management. 
As a consequence, NTDC’s top management was suspended and later dismissed 
through direct orders from the Prime Minister.304 Reports published around this 
time make no reference to any summary/recommendation being sent to NTDC’s 
board to initiate any disciplinary procedure. Conversely, this practice also 
proposes that SOEs boards are a mere ‘rubber stamp’ for government decision 
making.305 Similarly, Pakistan’s energy regulator NEPRA was recently 
restructured to be directly under the administrative control of the Ministry of 
                                                
303 World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014). 
304 See Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, ‘Top NTDC, NPCC officials suspended over power breakdown’ The 
Dawn (Islamabad, 30 January 2016) < http://www.dawn.com/news/1160445> Accessed 05 
February 2016; Iftikhar Alam, ‘Power Ministry all set to remove NTDC chief’ The Nation 
(Islamabad, 23 January 2016) < http://nation.com.pk/national/23-Jan-2016/power-ministry-all-
set-to-remove-ntdc-chief> Accessed 05 February 2016. 
305 See World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014). The 
report outlines that board members are often government employees without experience in 
managing companies and are appointed for political reasons rather than on the basis of technical 
and financial expertise.  
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Water and Power. ADB’s report observes that ‘although NEPRA is autonomous 
to set electricity tariffs, its rulings are often overridden by government’.306  
In view of this submission, it seems anomalous to mention ‘independence’ and 
the ‘overriding’ power of the government in one sentence. An institution may be 
independent to determine tariff rates; however, a regulator’s role is rendered 
redundant where such authorities do not have the power to enforce such tariffs. 
These examples illustrate further the conundrum that exists within Pakistan’s 
energy sector, insofar as the independence of the concerned SOEs.  
The fabric of this entire argument rests on the presumption and indicates that the 
entities involved in performing, and satisfying the sovereign guarantee structure 
ought to be viewed as organs of the state under Article 4. However, this is not a 
straightforward presumption to adopt. In Jan de Nul N V the claimant was a 
leading dredging company that was awarded the tender for dredging the Suez 
Canal. However, the claimants demanded further compensation as a result of an 
increase in costs associated directly with the nature of drilling. This request was 
refused and a dispute arose. The claimant decided to file an action in court 
claiming that the actions of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) are attributable to 
Egypt. The tribunal after reviewing submissions made by the parties submitted 
that: 
…[I]t (SCA) is a public entity, created to take over the 
management and utilisation of nationalised activity. There is no 
                                                
306 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program (Performance 
Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-energy-sector-restructuring-
program-0> Accessed 15 January 2017. 
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doubt that from a functional point of view, that the SCA can be 
said to generally carry out public activities, as acknowledged by 
the Respondent. However, structurally it is clear that the SCA is 
not part of the Egyptian state.307  
It is clear after reviewing Noble Ventures Inc and Jan de Nul N V that there is no 
yardstick to measure whether an entity will or will not be part of the state’s 
organic structure. It is not a straightforward determination. As a result, the 
structural test can be difficult to establish for the purposes of Article 4.  
In another case, Deutsche Bank AG308, the claimant’s primary contention was 
concerning an oil hedging agreement between Deutsche Bank and Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”). The claimant was 
arguing that the actions of the CPC should be attributable to Sri Lanka. The 
claimant made three important submissions that are relevant for the purpose of 
this study. First, in order for an entity to be considered as an organ of the state, it 
must act in “complete dependence”. Second, the state ought to exercise control 
over the day-to-day affairs of the entity to an extent that the entity lacks any real 
autonomy. Third, an entity’s fabric gives the impression that the conjecture of 
separate legal personality is to give it an aura of independence.  
The first two submissions are predicated on the rationale outlined in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro.309 For the purposes of Article 4, it can be 
                                                
307 Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/13 
308 Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/09/02 
309 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Judgement ICJ Reports 2007, p 43. 
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argued that an entity will be considered an organ of the state, if the state 
exercises control over the affairs of the entity. Even though control has not been 
defined in the Draft Articles per se, upon construction from the submissions 
made in case law it is argued that control would mean that the ‘entity lacks any 
real autonomy’. As outlined in the above submissions concerning the 
appointment procedures it can be submitted that these SOEs in Pakistan’s context 
lack any real autonomy. In Deutsche Bank AG, the tribunal looked at the state’s 
control over CPC. There was discussion on the CPC’s 100% ownership stake by 
the state, and reference was also made to the Minister of Petroleum reserving the 
right to appoint directors in the CPC. It can be construed from the tribunal’s 
analysis that an entity ought to be genuinely independent, and its form as a 
separate legal entity cannot be conclusive alone. This is an interesting remark.   
The third strand outlined in the claimant’s submission, and to which the tribunal 
made reference, was upon reliance on a Sri Lankan case, Dahanayaka v De Silva 
and others.310 In Dahanayaka the domestic court held that:  
[A] legal hybrid bred by the Government to engage in 
commercial business tailor made to suit its style of business. It 
is a Government creation clothed with juristic personality so as 
to give it an aura of independence, but in reality it is just a 
business house doing only the State’s business for and on behalf 
of the State. 
                                                
310 Dahanayaka v De Silva and others [1978] 1 SLR 41, 10 September 1979, paras 53-54 
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While it is difficult to displace the separate legal personality presumption, as 
discussed in the previous section, it is argued that the reality of these SOEs is to 
facilitate the state’s business under the fabric of a separate legal personality. In 
light of the dismissal of the NTDC’s top management and sections outlined from 
PPIB’s Act, it is argued that there is a strong presumption that these bodies under 
Pakistan’s existing regulatory framework are in fact organs of the state.  
If both the Jan de Nul N V and Deutsche Bank AG cases are compared, one 
conclusion that can be drawn is the subjective nature of these cases.311 While the 
standard of proof is high in order to attribute responsibility, it can be argued that 
where the evidence supports the contention that an entity is highly dependent 
upon the state, it is likely that the entity will be considered an organ312 of the 
state. More recently in Flamingo Duty Free Shop313, the Flamingo Group 
acquired a struggling Polish duty-free operator, BH Travel, along with BH 
Travel’s fixed-term leases with PPL at Warsaw’s Chopin Airport in 2010. Within 
two years, Flamingo Group transformed BH Travel’s business into a successful, 
profitable establishment at Chopin Airport. In early 2012, PPL, Poland’s state-
owned airport authority took a series of steps to evict BH Travel from Chopin 
Airport without compensation. The tribunal in this case was faced with a 
question of determining whether the actions of PPL can be attributed to Poland. 
                                                
311 The Commentary on Draft Articles describes the element of attribution as ‘subjective’. 
However, as outlined by Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, the Articles avoid using such 
terminology. See R Doak Bishop, James Crawford and W Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment 
Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014) 
312 It is important to note that the term organ is to have a very broad meaning and is not limited to 
the organs of the central government but extends to organs of government of whatever kind of 
classification, exercising whatever functions, and at whatever level. International Law 
Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, General 
Commentary’ [2001] 2(2) Y B Int’l L Comm’n 30, 31-32 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. Accessed 06 
June 2017. 
313 White & Case, ‘White & Case Wins Award for Indian Investor Against Poland’, White & 
Case <https://www.whitecase.com/news/white-case-wins-award-indian-investor-against-poland> 
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The claimant’s primary contention was predicated on the notion that the airport, 
even though managed by the Director General, comes under direct control of the 
minister responsible for transport and infrastructure—who, in essence, appoints 
and dismisses the Director General. The respondent’s contention was to dismiss 
these allegations, arguing that the PPL was ‘an independent and commercially 
run entity and that approvals by the Ministry of certain PPL actions were mere 
formalistic rubber-stamping’.314 This contention revolves around the submissions 
made in the case of Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ticaret, wherein the tribunal stated 
that ‘state entities and agencies do not operate in an institutional vacuum. They 
normally have links with other authorities as well as with the government’.315 
This argument also relates to the submission made earlier, concerning various 
tranches of sovereignty, wherein one of the tranches relate to the relationship that 
exists between the host state government and its subject, implicitly referring to 
state organs.  
The claimant’s in Flamingo were arguing that PPL was an organ of the state. 
They relied upon the regulatory structure of PPL as a de facto organ of the state, 
with powers to appoint and dismiss the management of PPL resting with the 
relevant Ministry. Moreover, the claimant also argued that the Ministry conferred 
the powers exercised by PPL. These, the claimants argued, were subject to 
supervision and change as per state policy. As a result, the tribunal was of the 
considered view that these notions of quasi independence did not tip the scales 
and therefore the respondent is in fact an organ of Poland. Similarly, as discussed 
                                                
314 Flamingo Duty Free Shop Private Limited v The Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, 12 August 
2016; also see <http://0-www.iareporter.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/articles/in-new-bit-
award-arbitrators-deem-state-owned-company-to-be-a-state-organ-and-see-fet-and-expropriation-
violations-due-to-contract-termination/> Accessed 25 September 2016. 
315 Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ticaret Ve Sanayi A S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ARB/03/29. 
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earlier, in the Deutsche Bank AG case the tribunal found that a state-owned 
petroleum company was a de facto State organ, having noted, in particular, that 
the relevant minister exercised significant control over the company’s personnel, 
finances and decision-making. 
It is argued that in the absence of a formal legal framework, PPIB, NTDC and 
CPPAG are operating under the auspices of the state, and more importantly, 
PPIB is “within the structure”316 of the state for the purposes of a structural test. 
Conversely, the corporate fabric of NTDC and CPPAG can be subjected to 
debate insofar as their structure as organs of the state, their board’s composition 
and the powers of appointment and dismissal resting with the Ministry of Water 
and Power renders their exclusion from the state’s structure very unlikely for the 
purposes of a structural test. The state is an organisation comprising individual 
units acting in consonance with each other. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, it is 
argued that SOEs should not be viewed as mutually exclusive entities. SOEs are 
a sub-set of the state. In fact, SOEs are an extension of the state and its interests. 
Their primary objective is to perform and facilitate the state’s policy objectives. 
In order to satisfy the test of independence for these SOEs, Michoud, in his 
seminal work, outlined that ‘for legal science, the notion of person is and should 
remain purely juridical notion. The word signifies simply a subject of rights-
duties, [sujet de droit] a being capable of having the subjective rights properly 
belonging to him’.317 In the absence of clearly defined concession agreements, 
the contention that a body is a ‘being capable of having subjective rights properly 
                                                
316 Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia, Award dated 3 March 2010, ICSID Case Nos ARB/05.18 
and ARB/07/15. 
317 Michoud, La Notion de Personnalite Morale, (1899) 11 Revue Du Droit Public, 1, at 8 quoted 
by John Dewey, ‘The historic background of corporate legal personality’ (1925-1926) 35 Yale L 
J 655. 
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belonging to him’ is problematic. Therefore, the state ought to be viewed as an 
aggregation of head and body with neither a head by itself or a body by itself.’318  
State
State 
owned 
entity
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of SOE and State 
In light of the aforementioned discussion, it is argued that there is strong 
evidence to suggest that PPIB, NTDC and CPPAG are organs of the state for the 
purposes of a structural test for Article 4 determination.  
The second contention relates to the functional test outlined in Maffezini. Unlike 
the determination of structural test, a functional test is not as straightforward. 
This section is a continuation of the discussion concerning attribution under 
Article 4. This section will address the same issues as outlined in the previous 
paragraphs, however, with a view to discuss the functional element normative to 
PPIB, NTDC and CPPAG.  
As discussed earlier, sovereign guarantees are used as a tool to promote 
investment in otherwise challenging, volatile jurisdictions. The primary function 
                                                
318 Inspiration of the phrase taken from Frederick W Maitland’s submission in David Runciman 
and Magnus Ryan, Fredrick W Maitland’s State, Trust and Corporation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 89. 
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of a sovereign guarantee is twofold: it aims to create a sense of security on behalf 
of the state to the sponsor (and implicitly the lenders), and it facilitates 
borrowing on more favorable terms with lower premiums. As a result, sovereign 
guarantees can cause a multiplier effect, wherein they provide conditions that 
lead to more investors and investment opportunities. Amidst these fancy words, a 
sovereign guarantee is essentially a contractual promise. The primary purpose of 
a contractual promise is to fulfil the subject matter of the contract, and seek 
recourse to the courts in case there is a breach on that contractual promise. A 
party cannot contract with another party knowing that they are unable to perform 
the contract. Similarly, a sovereign guarantee will no longer be a sovereign 
undertaking if such assurances are issued by private entities. In effect, an 
investor expects that the parties that are participating in the guarantee structure 
are contracting as organs of the state, and not as corporatised bodies.319 This 
brings us to the second strand of the test laid out in Maffezini. The debate within 
arbitral awards reviewed for the purposes of this study are encircled around three 
primary issues. First, whether an act in question is a commercial or a 
governmental act, and whether for the purposes of determination of an entity’s 
status, are they are performing a sovereign power? Second, whether this exercise 
of power bears strategic significance? And third, whether for the purposes of 
issuing a sovereign guarantee, the entity is financially reliant upon the state? 
                                                
319 This principle is also based on the academic literature in international law highlighting that the 
state is, generally speaking, responsible for acts of its organs and officials, not private parties. As 
a result, in order determine any legitimacy driven towards the sovereign guarantee structure it is 
outlined that the state needs to be viewed to cover all the individual or collective entities, which 
make up the organisation of the state and act on its behalf. See R Doak Bishop, James Crawford 
and W Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary 
(Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
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These issues are interconnected insofar as the determination of whether an entity 
is an organ of the state under the functional test. There is some ambiguity 
surrounding arbitral awards insofar as whether an act is governmental or 
commercial in nature. In Maffezini, the tribunal’s analysis provides two 
categories of acts for the purposes of application of Article 4. The tribunal was of 
the opinion that whereas commercial acts cannot be attributed to the Spanish 
state, governmental acts should be attributed. The tribunal, whilst reviewing the 
existing structure within this transaction between SODIGA and the claimant, 
argued that there has been a transition in the nature of entity in question. As a 
result of this transformation, ‘while originally a number of SODIGA’s functions 
were closer to being governmental in nature, they must today be considered 
commercial in nature. But at the time of transition, there was in fact a 
combination of both, some to be regarded as functions essentially governmental 
in nature and other essentially commercial in character’.320  
One can infer from the tribunal’s argument that if a perpetrated act is of a 
commercial character, then it is very unlikely that an act can be attributed to the 
state. In addition to the respondent’s argument in Noble Ventures Inc v 
Romania321 concerning the acts of the SOF not being attributable to Romania on 
the grounds that the SOF was a separate entity, and therefore not an organ of the 
state, the respondents also submitted that SOF’s actions were commercial in 
nature. The tribunal referred to Maffezini, wherein it was submitted that a 
commercial and governmental activity need to be distinguished, the former not 
being attributable to the state. Whereas the tribunal concluded that for the 
                                                
320 See Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7 
321 ICSID Case No ARB/01/11. 
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purposes of Article 4, the SOF was a legal entity distinct from the Respondent, 
the tribunal found in favour of the claimants under Article 5. Article 5 is 
discussed in the next section.  
A conclusive argument drawn from the rationale adopted by the tribunal in this 
case is that generally the use of commercial and governmental activity is 
commonly referred to in cases of sovereign immunity. In the proceedings 
concerning attribution of responsibility and determination of an entity’s status, it 
is argued that ‘it is difficult to see why commercial acts, acta jure gestionis, 
should by definition not be attributable while government acts, acta jure imperii, 
should be attributable’. Consequently, it can be argued that the defining line 
between the two notions, acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis has diminished 
due to the transition of former state organs into parastatal entities or corporatised 
bodies.322  
In view of the exercise of powers by PPIB, it is submitted that it issues a 
sovereign guarantee to the project company and thus exercises sovereign power. 
Whereas the PPIB Act 2012 states that PPIB is an independent body, it is argued 
that the measure of exercising and contractually binding the sovereign, until the 
PPA extinguishes, is problematic insofar as the categorisation of the power that 
is conferred. Findings from the workshop and interviews with sponsors provide 
an insightful conclusion. A general expectation by the investors and sponsors 
inter alia is that a sovereign guarantee entails the pinnacle of secure measures. 
This level of security cannot be provided by any entity other than the state itself. 
                                                
322 See Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No 
ARB/04/13. 
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Any body providing such assurance is in fact conducting its affairs as a 
representative of the state, exercising government powers. A disposition 
outlining otherwise would be a travesty insofar as the underlying rationale of a 
sovereign guarantee. 
Providing a security measure under the auspices of sovereign guarantee is an 
exercise of sovereign power. ‘Sovereign power’ is, however, an elusive term. 
The exercise of sovereign power can span from protection of rights of the state’s 
subjects to providing basic facilities. However, it is questionable whether an off-
taking activity, in this instance electricity, will constitute exercise of sovereign 
power. This study has intentionally used the notion of what the nature of the act 
is, and whether it will amount to sovereign power in one section. Primarily, the 
two are inter-connected inter alia given the composition of the body that is 
exercising these powers. In Bayindir Insaat323, the claimant argued that Pakistan 
exercised its sovereign power to undertake the breach exercised through the 
National Highway Authority (hereinafter referred to as “NHA”). The claimant’s 
primary contention was that the NHA is an organ of the state. The tribunal 
discarded the idea that the NHA was an organ of the state in light of the evidence 
presented. One way of looking at the tribunal’s analysis is that the act of breach 
was viewed in isolation from the exercise of a sovereign authority, and as a result 
the tribunal was not satisfied that the breach itself was the NHA exercising their 
sovereign power. The tribunal held that the breach in question was a contractual 
right being exercised, and therefore not within the purview of sovereign power. 
In reference to PPIB issuing a sovereign guarantee, can one apply the same 
                                                
323 Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ve Sanayi A S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ARB/03/29 August 
2009. 
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analogy? A sovereign guarantee is therefore a mere contract. It is interesting to 
note that the same would be true for an off-taking body that purports to purchase 
electricity from the IPPs. There is some ambiguity insofar as the off-taking body 
purchasing electricity from the IPPs; one can argue that the act needs to be 
determined in isolation from the general powers that are exercised by the state 
over the entity. In more general terms, the act of purchasing electricity is a 
contractual right that is being exercised by CPPAG under the PPA.  
The second strand addresses the ‘strategic significance’ notion in order to 
determine the functions of the SOE. Strategic significance can be determined by 
reviewing two sub categories; whether the act itself was of strategic significance, 
and whether that act served a strategic purpose. These questions evaluate 
whether an act exercised by the entity bears strategic significance through the 
operations that it carries out. Cases such as Trendtex Trading324, Jan de Nul N V 
Dredging325, and even Bayindir Insaat326 illustrate that the act itself, and the 
purpose for which they are being rendered, need to be evaluated in order to 
determine whether the function being performed forms part of the organic 
structure of the state.  
In AMTO, the claimants contended that Energoatom was a strategically 
significant state entity through its participation in the highly centralised and 
totally state controlled wholesale energy market. After due consideration by the 
tribunal, Energoatom was held as a separate entity despite the centralised 
                                                
324 [1977] Q B 529. 
325 Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No 
ARB/04/13. 
326 Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ve Sanayi A S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ARB/03/29 August 
2009. 
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structure of the market. The tribunal’s rationale in reaching this decision was 
predicated upon the consideration that despite the claimant’s submission that 
Energoatom was an organ of the state due to the significance of the functions 
being carried out. The tribunal found that ‘the conduct of Energoatom is 
attributable to Ukraine, in accordance with established principles of international 
law, when it is shown that Energoatom was exercising puissance publique or 
acted on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of the state in 
carrying out the conduct’.327 In light of PPIB’s mandate to grant sovereign 
guarantees, it can be argued that the act constitutes puissance publique due to the 
social impact that a sovereign guarantee bears in order to attract investment. The 
role of CPPAG and NTDC are debatable insofar as their function being 
considered as puissance publique. On the analysis undertaken above—the level 
of control being exercised along with the functions being carried out—there is a 
strong likelihood that PPIB will be considered an organ of the state. 
As a result of discussions held with various government officials in view of the 
level of control exercised by the state, and as outlined in PPIB’s yearly report328, 
it is questionable whether PPIB is a separate legal personality operating at an 
arm’s length from the state. Moreover, the role of NTDC and CPPAG in 
Pakistan’s energy framework cannot completely be ruled out for the purposes of 
establishing that their characteristics do correlate with the submissions regarding 
the level of independence exercised in their existing framework. There is lack of 
evidence to suggest that NTDC and, more recently, CPPAG have been awarded 
                                                
327  Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine, ARB No 080/2005. 
328PPIB, Annual Report 2012-13 (2014) 
<http://www.ppib.gov.pk/PPIB%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf> Accessed 25 April 
2017. 
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responsibilities, and carry out their functions as a result of well-defined 
concessions. In the absence of clearly defined framework, the presumption that 
these SOEs form part of the organic structure of the state cannot be ruled out. 
Despite ambiguity surrounding the determination of SOEs’ position in Pakistan’s 
energy sector, one prudent conclusion indicates that these entities are not entirely 
operating at an arm’s length from the state. However, such presumption has not 
been conclusively established, because of the subjective nature of the tribunal’s 
analysis in the cases discussed above. Consequently, their position perhaps needs 
to be discussed under Article 5. 
The third element for the purposes of the functional test relates to the financial 
independence of the entities involved in the energy framework in Pakistan. 
Parties’ contention in cases such as AMTO, Deutsche Bank, and Flamingo 
indicate that tribunals review the financial independence of the parties involved 
within the structure of the state in order to determine their independence. Whilst 
AMTO briefly reviews the financial model existing in Energoatom’s structure, in 
Flamingo Duty Free the tribunal draws on the claimant’s argument that 
Energoatom was part of the organic structure of the state since ‘the regulatory 
framework delegates to the Ministry of Transport the duty to audit and assess 
PPL’s operations and establish a structure to exercise control over PPL’s finance 
and staff salaries…’329 The initial funding stream to establish PPIB was provided 
by multilateral agencies, in order to further facilitate investment framework in 
                                                
329 Flamingo Duty Free Shop Private Limited v The Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL 12 August 
2016; also see http://0-www.iareporter.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/articles/in-new-bit-
award-arbitrators-deem-state-owned-company-to-be-a-state-organ-and-see-fet-and-expropriation-
violations-due-to-contract-termination/. Accessed 04 August 2017. 
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Pakistan’s infrastructure development industry. The federal government has 
since supported PPIB financially over the years. Recently however, PPIB’s 
primary source of revenue has been through the funds received from bank 
guarantee encashment.330 Even though there is no conclusive evidence available 
for perusal, senior members of PPIB submit that they are an independent entity 
from the state. The introduction of the PPIB Act almost a decade after the 
inception of PPIB further draws attention to the ambiguity that exists in the 
current regulatory regime.331  
The financial position of NTDC/CPPAG is more precarious. Their primary 
source of funding is derived from power sales to the distribution companies. 
However, after careful review of the energy sector’s structure, explained in 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, it can be gauged that government subsidies are paid to 
the CPPAG in order to ensure payment to the IPPs. Moreover, the endemic 
circular debt crisis has caused severe disruption in revenue generation from the 
IPPs. The lack of actual collection of revenues, and other issues discussed in the 
introduction of this study illustrate that there is likely to be a significant 
proportion of financial assistance being exercised by the state. In the absence of 
clear frameworks, a conclusive determination cannot be made insofar as whether 
PPIB, NTDC or CPPAG are financially dependent upon the state. Consequently, 
it is argued that unless a complete overhaul insofar as their deregulation through 
corporatisation or privatisation, their status as ‘independent’ bodies will remain 
                                                
330 This statement was outlined by Director Law at the PPIB in an interview during fieldwork 
undertaken by the author.   
331 Informal discussions with the members of PPIB has led the author to believe that there is still 
some government funding involved. For example, PPIB uses state recourses such as government 
car for their officials. This might seem trivial, however demonstrates that perhaps a certain 
percentage of the funding is still being derived from the state’s coffers. 
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questionable. This fabric of ‘quasi-independence’ and ‘quasi-autonomous’ 
framework further provides evidence that these entities are mere formalistic 
rubber-stamps, and conversely they will not tip the scales for an independent 
entity unless they are actually formulated into independent, self-governing and 
self-financing organisational units.   
4.3.1.b Hc Svnt Dracones: Article 5 and Exercise of Government Authority 
The Latin aphorism ‘hc svnt dracones’ was used in early 15th century to denote 
unexplored areas on the map. Application of Article 5 of the Draft Articles 
denotes an uncertain, ‘unchartered’ territory. As outlined in the previous section, 
there has been a transition from the orthodox exercise of power of the state. 
Whereas distinguishing between acta jure imperi and acta jure gentionis might 
have been relatively straightforward, the evolution of the state’s structure and 
particularly due to attempts to increase participation in the capital markets, the 
state is now involved in exercising commercial acts. However, the nature of the 
entities exercising these functions and the function itself make these transactions 
problematic. Article 5 of the Draft Articles is as follows:  
Article 5. Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements 
of governmental authority 
‘The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the 
State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that 
State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall 
be considered an act of the State under International law, 
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provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance’ 
Draft Article’s commentary state that Article 5 is intended to take account of the 
increasingly common phenomenon of ‘parastatal entities, which exercise 
elements of governmental authority in place of state organs, as well as situations 
where former state corporations have been privatised but retain certain public or 
regulatory functions’.332 In a bid to determine whether an entity can be classified 
as exercising governmental authority for the purposes of Article 5 it is not 
decisive whether the entity can be classified as public or private, the existence of 
state participation in its capital, or more generally, in the ownership of its assets. 
Article 5, as outlined in the commentary on the Draft Articles refers to ‘these 
entities being empowered, if only to a limited extent or in a specific context, to 
exercise specified elements of governmental authority’.333 
In Eureko B V the issue related to the sale of 30% in PZU. The respondent 
contended that the actions undertaken by the Minister of the State Treasury with 
respect to the Share Purchase Agreement and its first Addendum are not the 
result of the exercise of governmental executive powers, and thus are not 
attributable to the Republic of Poland. In essence, the respondents were arguing 
that the actions of the Minister of State Treasury were commercial in nature. The 
tribunal found that the State Treasury was acting pursuant to clear authority 
                                                
332 See Comment 1, Article 5 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001) < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> Accessed 05 April 
2017. 
333 See Comment 3, Article 5 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001) < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> 
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conferred on him by decision of the Council of Ministers of the Government of 
Poland in conformity with the officially approved policy of that Government. 
The tribunal’s analysis was founded upon the submission of James Crawford’s 
commentary on the ILC’s Draft Articles wherein he submitted that ‘it is 
irrelevant for the purposes of attribution that the conduct of a state organ be 
classified as “commercial” or as “acta jure gestionis”.’334 
In Jan de Nul335, the tribunal approached the question of attribution by following 
a two-stage test. The tribunal outlined that there are two cumulative conditions 
that need to be fulfilled in order to attribute the responsibility of an entity to the 
state. First, the act must be performed by an entity empowered to exercise 
governmental authority. Second, the act must be performed in the exercise of 
governmental authority. Consequently, the two primary questions before the 
tribunal in order to determine whether the Suez Canal Authority (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘SCA’) will be an organ of Egypt under Article 5 is whether the 
SCA is empowered to exercise governmental authority function, and whether the 
SCA exercise governmental authority in its dealings with the claimant? The 
tribunal in Jan de Nul, after thorough review of the powers exercised by the 
entity, outlined that in answer to the first question, the SCA acted like any 
contractor trying to achieve the best price for the services it was seeking. It did 
not act as a state entity. In determination of the second question, the tribunal 
argued that the bidding process is not sufficient to establish the exercise of 
                                                
334 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (2001) < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> Accessed 06 May 
2017. 
335 Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No 
ARB/04/13. 
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governmental authority especially in relation to the acts and omissions 
complained of by the claimants. What matters is not the “service public” 
element, but the use of “prerogatives de puissance publique” or governmental 
authority. As a result, the tribunal concluded that although the SCA is a public 
entity empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority, the acts of the 
SCA vis a vis the claimants are not attributable to the respondent, since they are 
not performed pursuant to exercise of governmental authority.  
From Pakistan’s standpoint, PPIB—as discussed in the previous section—
exercises the state’s authority to grant a sovereign undertaking to guarantee the 
off-taker’s performance. In their endeavor to provide such guarantees, PPIB is an 
entity that is authorised to exercise a governmental function, inter alia, issue a 
sovereign guarantee. Unlike the case of SCA, PPIB’s issuance of a sovereign 
guarantee does not involve any tender process. The act, whilst being viewed in 
isolation, can amount to an exercise of governmental authority. It is pertinent to 
mention the discussion undertaken later in this chapter concerning the 
‘expectation gap’ argument. PPIB’s issuance of a sovereign guarantee cannot be 
viewed as anything but an exercise of sovereign power. The second contention 
relates to whether PPIB exercises this governmental authority in issuing a 
sovereign guarantee. The answer is unequivocally positive. PPIB’s role as a one-
window facilitator is predicated upon the exercise of its governmental power in 
order to provide recourse for the SPV to state, and an additional security measure 
for the lenders in the event there is a breach under the PPA. Any other 
conclusion would be a travesty insofar as the security that is being offered under 
the context of infrastructure development. 
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The determination of the status of NTDC and CPPAG as organs of the state is 
not as straightforward. Primarily, their functions as an off-taker and distribution 
company, with the state being a majority shareholder, makes the proposition of 
the two entities problematic. Their composite structure as corporatised bodies 
with state ownership creates a fusion of both commercial and governmental 
activities being exercised. However, it is questionable whether in their exercise 
of functions they are using their prerogative de puissance publique. On the 
balance of probability, it can be argued that the nature of the activity being 
undertaken (distribution of electricity and off-taking electricity from the IPPs), in 
the absence of complete divestment of the state, are actions being undertaken on 
the state’s authority. Consequently, the act being exercised is that of a 
governmental nature. In Noble Ventures, the tribunal upon the determination of 
whether the SOF was exercising governmental authority concluded that ‘…no 
relevant legal distinction is to be drawn between SOF/APAPS, on the one hand, 
and a government ministry, on the other hand, when the one or the other acted as 
empowered public institution under the privatisation law’.336 However, the 
tribunal’s argument in Jan de Nul draws a closer connection with the present 
case. It can be argued that NTDC and CPPAG were authorised to exercise 
governmental authority, though no conclusive evidence to support this 
contention can be made; it can be submitted that the land ownership of the 
distribution framework for 500kv and 660kv transmission lines is facilitated 
through government owned land holding. However, the right to distribute and 
off-take electricity from the IPPs cannot be conclusively held as a governmental 
act, and can be argued to be an exercise of their contractual right in a competitive 
                                                
336 See Noble Ventures Inc and Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11. 
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environment. Unlike in Noble Ventures, the case of Jan de Nul does not attribute 
the sourcing of best price under the tender process as a governmental act. 
Primarily, this contention underlies the entity’s endeavor to find the most 
competitive price in order to off-take electricity, just as an independent 
contractor would ‘try to achieve the best price’ under a contract. For the purposes 
of academic debate, it can be argued that while the off-taking body, CPPAG, is 
not exercising governmental authority, NTDC, as a distribution company is so 
doing. It is interesting to note that in Shehla Zia v Federation of Pakistan337, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Article 9 of the Constitution of 
Pakistan, electricity comes under the guarantee of right to life. The distribution 
business, forming a vital component of the availability of electricity across the 
country, formulates a governmental activity and not a commercial activity. This 
contention however cannot be supported with substantial evidence. 
It can be submitted that the nature of the quasi-independent bodies makes the 
application of Article 5 as a means to determine whether they are organs of the 
state, problematic. There is some evidence to suggest that PPIB is an organ of the 
state for the purposes of carrying out the implementation of the government’s 
energy policy, and providing security measures vis a vis sovereign guarantees to 
the investors. Consequently, it can be indicated that PPIB is indeed exercising 
governmental authority. However, the case is not as straightforward for NTDC 
and CPPAG. The divestment of CPPAG’s functions from NTDC has perhaps 
defined their roles more prominently. However, structurally, it has created more 
ambiguities insofar as their status within the state’s structure.  
                                                
337 PLD 1994 Supreme Court 694. 
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4.3.2 The Expectation Gap 
The previous section illuminates the issues surrounding the structural and 
functional framework of a sovereign guarantee. It reflects on the sovereign 
guarantee framework by using Pakistan’s energy sector as a case study to outline 
the categorisation of entities involved in the sovereign guarantee framework. 
Conversely, this section reflects on a theoretical notion of sovereign guarantee 
framework. Sponsors, EPC contractors and practitioners working in the area of 
sovereign guarantees highlight a more subtle, abstract understanding of the 
security frameworks involved in attracting infrastructure development.  
When a private party contracts with a body that is issuing a sovereign guarantee 
and is representing the state, the logical conclusion drawn indicates that such an 
entity is, invariably, the state. There is an ‘expectation’ facilitated through the 
use of state machinery for contract negotiation and even minute details inter alia 
the location of the meeting, leading to the conclusion that the state is undertaking 
these negotiations through its organs. Whereas from a doctrinal company law 
standpoint, these assertions may not stand ground, from an investor’s perspective 
they are being given an assurance by the state through its machinery for 
recompense of any loss arising due to breach of PPA by a SOE. The primary 
significance of a sovereign guarantee, in an abstract sense, is its ability to provide 
a sense of security to investors by virtue of its association with the ‘sovereign’. 
Similarly, such guarantees within the ambit of international project finance are a 
demonstration of a state’s favourable attitude towards foreign investment.338 The 
manifestation of a grant of such assurance by the state emphasises their 
                                                
338 See Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia 
University Press, 1962). 
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commitment to provide a sense of security to the investor insofar as their 
investment is concerned, and provides a deterrent against likelihood of any 
breach of contract. Providing such guarantees, as Fatouros has pointed out, is ‘an 
acknowledgment of the investor’s special position and it has induced him to act 
on the basis of this recognition’.339 As a result, contracting with PPIB or any 
other body authorised to act on behalf of the state may be considered to be the 
state.340 In the absence of the state taking ownership of the bodies that are in 
effect issuing these guarantees, prima facie, it seems futile to issue them.  
As a result, it is argued that the underlying motive of issuing sovereign 
guarantees is to facilitate investment by providing a redundancy measure to 
satisfy and reassure the investors. Some of the SOEs discussed in this chapter are 
incapable of undertaking or providing guarantees to third parties due to financial 
limitations. Conversely, the sponsors are led to believe that the entities providing 
such guarantees are in reality state organs.  Under its current framework, wherein 
corporatised bodies are issuing guarantees, there is evidence to suggest that there 
is no actual security being provided, unless a state organ issues these assurances. 
In view of the current framework, these assurances are supposedly issued by 
independent entities, which create an expectation gap, and challenge the very 
foundations of a ‘sovereign guarantee’.  
                                                
339 Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University 
Press, 1962) 345.  
340 It is worth seeing the remarks made by Nick Seddon. Seddon argues ‘A government 
department which enters into a contract through one of its officers is simply the Crown (it is not a 
separate legal entity) and the appropriate contracting body is the Crown in right of the relevant 
polity. The same is true of a body, which is established by legislation…the fact that a government 
is one, vast legal entity with many arms is not convenient and probably does not accord with lay 
people’s expectations. A company or individual dealing with a department will naturally think 
that the department is the responsible body…The result would be a breach of contract by the 
government, albeit an inadvertent one. This appears to be a bizarre result but it follows 
inexorably from the concept of legal entity that is, in some senses, too crude’. See Nicholas 
Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (Fourth Edition, The Federation Press, 
2009).   
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4.3.3 Legislative Limitations, Imbalance and Restrictions 
Previous sections have extensively discussed the structural inadequacies and an 
expectation gap within the sovereign guarantee framework. Whereas the 
previous section has highlighted a more generic, abstract notion in consonance 
with a sovereign guarantee framework, this section is directly related to the 
investment guarantee regime rife in Pakistan. Statutory restrictions under 
Pakistan’s law lead to question the validity of sovereign guarantees. The Debt 
Limitation Act came into force in order to eliminate revenue deficit and reduction 
of public debt. This section argues that the sovereign guarantee issued by the 
PPIB is contrary to legislative requirements enshrined under the Debt Limitation 
Act. Section 3(3) (b) of the Act provides that: 
… [T]he total public debt at the end of the tenth financial year 
does not exceed sixty percent of the estimated gross domestic 
product for that year and thereafter maintaining the total public 
debt below sixty per cent of gross domestic product for any 
given year.341  
Moreover, section 3(3) (c) states: 
… [T]he total public debt is reduced by not less than two and 
half per cent of the estimated gross domestic product for any 
given year.  
                                                
341 <http://www.finance.gov.pk/publications/frdlo.pdf > Accessed 05 April 2015. 
 
188 
Under common law, there is no prerequisite for the existence of a statutory 
ground for the government entering into a contract.342As expressed by Seddon, 
there used to be a requirement that a government could not enter into a contract 
unless there was a specific statutory power to do so.343 However, this position 
has since changed. The government started to be viewed under international and 
contract law as a legal person: a single authority representing ‘all branches of the 
state and able to make commitment on behalf of the whole’.344 It was this fervour 
that led to the government being viewed as the state, in order to make contractual 
settings more robust.345  
However, in relation to the philosophical scope of sovereign guarantees acting as 
a collateral reassurance measure for investors, it is submitted that a limitation by 
the parliament upon government to contract in order to guarantee a debt 
obligation can prove fatal to the validity of the agreement, or render it void 
altogether.346 
                                                
342 There may be few exceptions to this rule in various jurisdictions. In relation to disposal of 
Crown lands, it is a constitutional requirement that such a contract must be authorised by 
legislation. See the discussion in Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Ltd v Chalk (1975) AC 520, 533 (Lord 
Wilberforce). Another exception is that under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 
1997 (Cth) s37 the Commonwealth cannot borrow money without specific legislative 
authorisation; see Nick Seddon, ‘The interaction of contract and executive power’ (2003) Federal 
Law Review, Vol 31. 
343 See Nick Seddon, ‘The interaction of contract and executive power’ (2003) Federal Law 
Review, Vol 31. 
344 Janet McLean, ‘Government to State: Globalisation, Regulation, and Governments as Legal 
Persons’ (2003) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1; Also refer to the 
previous section for a discussion on the state existing as one unit rather than individual units.  
345 Janet McLean, ‘Government to State: Globalisation, Regulation, and Governments as Legal 
Persons’ (2003) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1. 
346 See Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012); Commercial 
Cable Co v Newfoundland (1916) 2 A C 610. Brief facts of the case are as follows: new premier 
provided access of laying down cable connection in Newfoundland. However, the premier was 
soon ousted from office. The successive premier and government were dissatisfied with the 
agreement, and announced that it was regarded as not being binding in the absence of legislative 
sanction. The court held that in the event of a legislative restriction, an agreement will not be 
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In Yango Pastoral Company, the court expressed that there are four main ways in 
which the enforceability of a contract may be affected by a statutory provision, 
and render such a contract unlawful.347 One such way is wherein the ‘contract 
maybe one which the statute expressly or impliedly prohibits’. Also see section 
3(3)(d) wherein it is expressed that: 
[N]ot issuing new guarantees, including those for rupee lending, 
bonds, rates of return, output purchase agreements and all other 
claims and commitment that may be prescribed, from time to 
time, for any amount exceeding two per cent of the estimated 
gross domestic product in any financial year.  
It is argued that under the provisions contained within the Debt Limitation Act, 
any amount guaranteed in excess of the sum of 2% of the gross domestic product 
shall be held to be contrary to the Debt Limitation Act and therefore void. While 
there is no specific requirement for the appropriation of the money, as may have 
been expressed earlier,348 it is submitted that a limitation as to the guaranteeing 
of a debt can be contrary to the legislative requirements in Pakistan.  
                                                                                                                               
binding in the absence of such approval; also see Wade W H, Administrative Law (11th Edition, 
OUP, 2014). 
347 Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 C L R 41. The 
facts of the case are as follows: the respondent lent to the first appellant the sum of $132,600, 
repayment of which was secured by mortgage which incorporated a guarantee given by the other 
appellants. Default having been made in repayment, the respondent sued the appellants on the 
personal covenant in the mortgage. The appellants pleaded illegality. The appellants argued that 
the respondent, at the time of the transaction was entered into, was carrying out the business of 
banking.  
348 There is no requirement that there be a legislative appropriation of money for the validity of 
contracts that involve the expenditure of public money. See New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 
52 CLR 455. 
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Seddon argues that any limitation insofar as the ability of a government to 
contract in order to guarantee its performance, such limitation or restriction is 
merely directory and not mandatory.349 However, in Project Blue Sky Inc v 
Australian Broadcasting Authority350 the court rejected the distinction between 
directory and mandatory, in favour of asking whether it was parliament’s 
intention to render the relevant transaction as invalid if it was made in breach of 
the legislation. It is argued that the wording of the Debt Limitation Act’s section 
3 is coherent to this effect. The Debt Limitation Act explicitly outlines that public 
debt should not exceed 2.5% for any given year. This, in effect, is the 
Parliament’s intention. As a result, it is submitted that the overall debt figures 
including sovereign guarantee issuance to power projects render the entire 
sovereign guarantee structure problematic.351  
                                                
349 Nick Seddon, ‘The interaction of contract and executive power’ (2003) Federal Law Review, 
Vol 31 
350 (1998) 194 CLR 355, 389, 93. 
351 Pakistan’s current GDP is $236.62Bn wherein the total debt figure exceeds USD$70bn. As of 
2016, this figure is US$73bn <www.sbp.org.pk> Accessed 27 June 2016. Total debt percentage 
exceeds 60% limit (236.62-73=163.62. 163.62/236.62=0.69. 0.69x100=69%. It can be argued 
that even though this figure illustrates the entire debt (including that owed to multilateral 
agencies) as per the Act, the government can no longer issue guarantees; Kashif Kiani, 
‘Government breaches limit, adds $15.3Bn to external debt’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 10 May 
2014). A contrary view can be seen where a contract was held to be valid even though it was 
contrary to statutory procedures. See Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1989) 
166 CLR 454 in which the ABC failed to comply with a requirement in the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 that certain contracts be approved by the Minister, but the 
contract was held to be valid. The facts of the case are as follows: the respondent (Redmore) 
became owner of premises in Sydney in which the appellant (ABC) was the tenant. Tenancy 
dispute arose between the two parties. Negotiations took place and subsequently an agreement 
resolving that original dispute was negotiated, providing for the grant of a new tenancy of the 
premises of Redmore to the ABC. ABC claimed that negotiations were of no use and relationship 
was beyond repair, however Redmore argued that matters had proceeded beyond the stage of 
negotiation and that a new binding agreement had been made. The ABC denied the presence of 
any such agreement. ABC claimed that if there was an agreement, such would be unenforceable 
since ABC failed to obtain the prior approval of the responsible Minister as required by the 
provisions of s70(1)(a) of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983. 
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Despite repeated measures undertaken by the government352, it is submitted that 
the debt/GDP ratio stands at 69%, a clear violation of the Act.353 Comparing 
Pakistan’s external debt/GDP ratio with India’s, it is submitted that as of 
September 2016, India’s external debt figure stood at US$485.6bn with a 
debt/GDP ratio of approximately 24%.354  
The imposition of statutory limits on debt can be explained from an economic 
perspective.  Rogoff and Reinhart submit that with the gross domestic debt 
(GDP)355 accumulated to or exceeding 60% will cause an annual growth decline 
by about 2%.356 Some academics argue that the implementation of such a law 
generally leads to decline in inflation and interest rate, mitigating the crowding 
of private investment and reducing external imbalance.357 While the benefit of 
such enactment is beyond the purview of this study, it is submitted that such 
legislative measures have put a question mark on the validity of a sovereign 
guarantee, a concept that is already fraught with implications.  
                                                
352 Please note that due to the FDI influx after 9/11, total debt/GDP ratio fell steeply from 81.4% 
in 2001-2 to 56% within a decade. This reduction in debt burden was due in part to the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. There has, however, been a change in the 
composition of the debt. From 40.4% of the total in 2001-02, domestic debt has risen to 55% in 
2009-10. More recently to 68%; See Nadia Tahir, and Pervez Tahir, ‘Public Debt and Fiscal 
Responsibility in a Federal Structure: The case of Pakistan’ (2012) Romanian Journal of Fiscal 
Policy, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 27-47. 
353 Kashif Kiani, ‘Government breaches limit, adds $15.3Bn to external debt’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 10 May 2014). 
354 See <http://finmin.nic.in/reports/ExternalDebt_Dec16_E.pdf.> Accessed 05 April 2016.  
355 For a contrasting opinion on how GDP might not be a real indictor of growth see remarks of 
Joseph Stiglitz and Christine Lagarde in Stephanie Thomson, ‘GDP a poor measure of progress, 
say Davos economists’ World Economic Forum (23 January 2016) < 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/gdp/> Accessed 03 May 2016. 
356 See Kenneth S Rogoff and Carmen M Reinhart, ‘Growth in a time of debt’ (2010) American 
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Volume 100, pp 1-9 wherein they found that when 
gross external debt reaches 60% of the GDP, annual growth declines by about 2% and 
unanticipated high inflation rate can reduce the cost of debt servicing but is effectiveness depends 
on debt maturity and its structure 
357 George Kopits, and Steven A Symansky, ‘Fiscal Policy Rules’ (1998) International Monetary 
Fund’s Occasional Paper 162. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an outline of the concept underlying sovereign guarantee 
framework normative to Pakistan’s energy sector. In an attempt to explain the 
notion of sovereign guarantee instruments, this chapter discusses the role of the 
state and its inherent powers to regulate the flow of investment by introducing 
measures that are favourable towards the investors. Whereas the concept of 
security is lucid, it translates into measures more elusive than the provision of a 
few security instruments. In view of the challenges that are faced by developing 
countries in an absence of liberalised policies and deregulated energy markets, 
there is a wide array of challenges. More importantly, non-payment of dues by 
the off-taking bodies is a direct threat to the prospect of future investment. In 
view of these discussions, the aforementioned discussion focuses on Pakistan’s 
energy sector, discussing the adequacy of sovereign guarantee instruments and 
whether there is any plausible security rendered under these instruments.  
Discussion in this chapter is important primarily because default by a project 
company on a debt servicing agreement will result in the lenders taking over the 
project operations or realising their debt by selling the project assets. Whereas 
the argument is plausible, it lacks any real substance. In the event that lenders 
accelerate their loan, the project company will default, and the lenders will take 
over the project company’s assets. Consequently, the lender will have two 
options: first, they can consider selling the assets in a ‘fire sale’. This method of 
sale, commonly used in such scenarios, is unlikely to recover the entire debt 
amount. The second method could potentially involve lenders running the project 
company themselves, for example, the lenders running the affairs of the project 
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company either directly or by appointing their own O&M operator. However, in 
the latter form of intervention, the bank still faces liquidity issues from an off-
take body perspective. In the absence of any revenues being generated by the 
project company, there is little justification to undertake any measures unless the 
revenue stream is re-established.  
One of the interesting discussions undertaken in this chapter relates to the 
expectation gap that exists between the investors and the host state’s sovereign 
guarantee. A prudent conclusion drawn from this contention is predicated on the 
understanding that by including the term ‘sovereign’ within a guarantee issued 
by a state institution or SOE, there is given the impression that unlike a 
company, a sovereign cannot be dissolved or declared bankrupt.358 Therefore, it 
is argued that this contention creates a false sense of security amongst lenders, 
sponsors and the project company, without any real ramification of security. 
Moreover, sovereign guarantees are perhaps only a measure of condition 
precedent in order to secure project finance through financial institutions. In 
order to match the real expectations of the lenders it is argued that a sovereign 
guarantee should be re-named as a sovereign indemnity agreement.   
In general, a sovereign guarantee instrument is an indication of a state’s 
favourable attitude towards foreign investment. A state never issues a guarantee 
with the expectation of default. 359 The ramifications of breaching a sovereign 
guarantee are immense. Particularly, such breaches can have adverse 
                                                
358 See Rodrigo O Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2009) 41. A company, due to the separate legal principle, can be declared bankrupt with no 
recourse to its subscribers, directors unless there has been a fraud perpetrated against the 
creditors.  
359 Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University 
Press, 1962). 
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implications from the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral institutions, and 
their tranche payments may be affected. 
In view of the prevailing liquidity crisis, there are several questions that are 
raised as to the robustness of the sovereign guarantee frameworks. This chapter 
sheds light on the nature of the SOEs involved in a sovereign guarantee 
transaction by reviewing the structure and function of the entities involved in 
Pakistan’s sovereign guarantee framework. One of the principal arguments 
forwarded in this chapter corresponds to the lack of framework that exists at an 
international level dealing with the notion of SOEs in international commercial 
contracts. Consequently, this chapter adopts the Draft Articles as a framework to 
determine whether an entity will be independent or considered an organ of the 
state. Consequently, it can be argued that the ill-defined premise of SOEs in 
domestic frameworks, lack of independence, and engagement in carrying out 
sovereign power whilst operating within a fabric of separate legal entity creates 
uncertainty insofar as the issuance of sovereign guarantee framework. 
Sovereign guarantees are a response from the state to diminish market failure.360 
However, after reviewing the position of SOEs involved within Pakistan’s 
sovereign guarantee framework, greater uncertainty has emerged due to the lack 
of character of these SOEs. It is submitted that during a workshop hosted by the 
author, MIGA’s Senior Counsel, Shamali de Silva361 made an interesting remark 
regarding the status of these SOEs. She argued that an endemic problem with 
                                                
360 Alexander Van de Putte, David F Gates and Ann K Holder, ‘Political risk insurance as an 
instrument to reduce oil and gas investment risk and manage investment returns’ (2012) Journal 
of World Energy Law and Business, Volume 5, No 4, 284.  
361 Shamali de Silva is a Senior Counsel at the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), the World Bank Group. These remarks were made by Shamali de Silva at the workshop 
hosted by the author in London.  
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SOEs is their status. Despite being referred to as ‘independent entities’ they are 
nonetheless heavily influenced by the state. As a result, it is difficult to contract 
with these entities, and any prudent investor would determine if the SOE has 
financial independence vis a vis raising its own finances on the capital markets.  
Another aspect that is ancillary to this method of raising finance is predicated on 
credit ratings. Shamali argues that if an entity is independent and able to raise 
finance on the capital markets, they should also have a credit rating grade 
assigned to them. In view of Shamali’s observations, it is argued that the 
question of independence is elusive. It cannot be defined conclusively without 
raising questions insofar as the entity’s structure and function. The structural and 
function element of these SOEs under Article 4, and the exercise of their power 
under Article 5 have not been conclusively established in the discussion 
undertaken above. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that there is 
ambiguity surrounding the status of the SOEs in Pakistan’s energy sector. In the 
absence of clearly defined concession agreements, independent boards, and 
formal privatisation, it is highly unlikely that a result to the contrary can be 
achieved.  
Sovereign guarantees are a necessary evil. Whereas there is no available data to 
indicate that sovereign guarantees increase investment flow, there is a proverbial 
outline that sovereign guarantees are a sign that the host state will be favourable 
to the investor. As a result, providing sovereign guarantees can increase investor 
confidence. It is questionable whether sovereign guarantees offer any real 
protection. Sovereign guarantees may be thought of as a fire extinguisher: large 
construction projects, in order to secure health and safety and building approval 
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from local authorities, make provision for fire safety procedures. This is not 
because there is a likelier chance of a fire occurring—it is a precautionary 
measure that if there is a fire, there are tools to avert any major damage, as a 
sovereign guarantee similarly provides risk mitigation in the event of default.   
In the event that developing countries like Pakistan, Nigeria and Kenya continue 
to use sovereign guarantee measures as an indicator of favourable treatment 
towards foreign investment, it is suggested that a more robust alternative 
legislative cover is required.362 As outlined above, legislative restrictions inhibit 
the state’s ability to issue such guarantees. Moreover, it is questionable whether 
such guarantees will be enforceable if called into effect. However, a more robust 
model can be derived from the United Kingdom’s Infrastructure (Financial 
Assistance) Act 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the “Financial Assistance Act”). 
The Financial Assistance Act was enacted aiming to stimulate infrastructure 
investment in the energy sector, among other sectors within the United 
Kingdom.363 The Act stipulates that financial assistance, in the form of money, 
guarantee, or indemnity shall be payable to any person who in respect of 
provision of infrastructure has incurred such sum by undertaking the 
aforementioned agreement with the Treasury. This model ensures that the project 
company is contracting with the fiscal arm of the state, and as discussed 
throughout this chapter, contracting with a body that has the financial ability and 
fiscal space of its own. Whereas, amount of expenditure, actual or contingent 
                                                
362 For a detailed discussion of such guarantees being provided through parliamentary 
appropriation of money, see Colin Turpin, Government Contracts (1st Edition, Penguin). 
363 See <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/16/section/1> Accessed 23 May 2016. Refer 
to Section 2 wherein ‘infrastructure’ includes (a) water, electricity, gas, telecommunication, 
sewerage or other services, (b) railway facilities, roads or transport facilities (c) health or 
educational facilities (d) court or prison facilities, (e) housing.  
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liabilities incurred in giving, or in connection with giving, infrastructure 
assistance is capped at GBP£50 billion, it is submitted that the sum is likely to 
increase in the future given the increasing need for infrastructure development.364  
The Financial Assistance Act stipulates that any guarantee undertaking entered 
into by a private party investing in the UK has parliamentary legitimacy. From 
Pakistan’s infrastructure perspective in general and their energy sector in 
specific, it is submitted that unlike a sovereign guarantee, which is a contractual 
document365, an Infrastructure Financial Assistance Act would actually indicate 
towards actual funds appropriated by the state. It would also be a more robust 
‘sovereign’ guarantee, than a mere ‘government’ guarantee. Moreover, it reflects 
on the contention made earlier concerning such guarantee instruments to be 
renamed ‘sovereign indemnity’ instruments primarily because the state through 
the Ministry of Finance will agree to indemnify the project company as and when 
the off-taking body fails to pay under the PPA.   
It can be argued that a sovereign guarantee is merely a transaction of honour.366 
Experience working with investors in the energy sector led to the revelation that 
                                                
364 Patrick Mitchell, Adrian Clough, and David Wyles, ‘The UK Guarantee Scheme—A 
Foundation for Infrastructure Development?’ Sept 13, 2012. Herbert Smith Infrastructure e-
bulletin < http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/HS/L-130912-6.pdf> Accessed 16 May 
2015; an interesting argument concerning UK’s infrastructure regime is the impact Brexit will 
have on the existing transactions. As of 12/10/2016, Teresa May the Prime Minister has 
expressed concerns that the UK must adopt a US style model where foreign investment in critical 
infrastructure development is reviewed and given approval before a go-ahead is given.  
365 In 2014, 10 IPPs called Pakistan’s sovereign guarantee by issuing notices in this regard. 
Whether there is any practical implication for calling such guarantees and whether the issue feels 
obliged to issue payments after formal notices have been issued is questionable. See Khaleeq 
Kiani, ‘IPPs suspend notices calling sovereign guarantees’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 12 Dec 2014) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1150322> Accessed 09 October 2015. 
366 I refer to the Jessel MR in Twycross v Dreyfus (1877) 5 Ch D 605 ‘…the municipal law of this 
country does not enable the tribunals of this country to exercise any jurisdiction over foreign 
governments as such. Nor, so far, I am aware, is there any international tribunal which exercises 
any such jurisdiction. The result, therefore, is that these so-called bond amount to nothing more 
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a sovereign guarantee is one of the many conditions present within a list of 
documents required to secure debt financing. Protection under an Infrastructure 
Financial Assistance Act would not provide a blanket guarantee to every 
investor. It would involve a certain premium amount associated with any 
guarantee issued by the Ministry of Finance, payable by the project company on 
a yearly basis. Whether this premium will deter investment? Presumably not! As 
discussed in the next chapter, investors are willing to go out of their way to 
secure and mitigate risk. If certain recourse without the burdensome activity of 
going through courts can be avoided, investors would prefer taking out local, 
host state guarantee policies rather than seek the help of multilateral institutions.  
In this scheme, it is difficult to sum up whether a sovereign guarantee is a façade, 
which encapsulates the reality of investment finance; it is all about returns with 
commercial risk inherent within the price that is paid.367 Whether there is any 
real protection being offered under a sovereign guarantee is questionable. One of 
the conclusions that may be drawn from attending government meetings with 
sponsors reveal the lack of understanding of what real justification there is for 
                                                                                                                               
than engagements of honour, binding, so far as engagement of honour can bind, the government 
which issues them, but are not contracts enforceable before the ordinary tribunals of a foreign 
government’. It is however submitted that countries that do not honour such engagements have a 
detrimental effect on their FDI regime. The facts of the case are as follows: the defendants were 
agents of the Peruvian government in the UK. Peruvian government issued bonds at 6 per cent. 
The Peruvian republic, upon the national faith, pledged the general revenue of the republic, and 
especially that free proceeds of the guano imported by the republic in to the UK. The agents did 
not give the plaintiff the agreed amount of the guano. The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of 
himself and all other holders of the bonds, stating in his claim that the republic had from time to 
time forwarded to the defendants large quantities of guano for the purpose of paying the interest 
on the bonds, which they refused to apply for that purpose.   
367 See Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia 
University Press, 1962). Fatouros argues that the investment of capital may then be regarded as 
the counter-promise of the investor, his ‘payment’ for the state’s promises. Also see Hartley 
Shawcross, ‘The Promotion of International Investment’ (1960) 8 NATO Letter No. 2, 19 
wherein the author argues that ‘the quid pro quo for the borrowing states’ undertakings is in fact, 
in the English Vernacular, the provision of the ‘quids’, that the capital importing countries, in 
return for agreeing to abide by the generally recognised procedure of International law, will 
receive more private investment than would otherwise be the case.’ 
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using a sovereign guarantee in a project finance transaction. Radical shift in 
policy due to unforeseen circumstances, change in regime or deteriorating 
economic-fiscal conditions can have an impact on a state’s ability to meet their 
contractual promises.368 However, a state does not issue a sovereign guarantee to 
later revoke it. Whether a sovereign guarantee instrument is to be replaced with a 
more robust alternative is an anomaly. However, as suggested in the previous 
paragraph, legislative cover without offering a blanket guarantee can better 
facilitate infrastructure development security. The lack of infrastructure and 
electricity generation, as discussed in the earlier chapters, is taking its toll on the 
economy. Pakistan’s external debt is at an all-time high.369 Industries are 
relocating, and the change in weather conditions is adversely affecting the once 
agriculturally rich region. It is therefore submitted that the need for capital in 
such underdeveloped and developing countries is immense. Countries like 
Pakistan, Nigeria and even India cannot afford to alienate investors by failing to 
fulfil their contractual promises. 
  
                                                
368 Arghyrios A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University 
Press, 1962). 
369 IMF has painted a bleak and alarming picture of Pakistan’s economy. It is estimated that 
Pakistan’s external debt obligations would surge to USD$70.2 billion by the end of the current 
fiscal year, up from the USD$66.457 billion mark in September 2015. The debt to GDP ratio is 
set to surge to touch 65 percent mark. See Sabir Shah, ‘Pakistan external debt, debt-to-GDP ratio 
alarming’ The News (Islamabad, 01 February 2016) < http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/95260-
Pak-external-debt-debt-to-GDP-ratio-alarming> Accessed 14 February 2016. 
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Chapter 5  
Redundancy Measure: Political Risk Insurance 
5.1 Introduction 
An exponential increase in demand for infrastructure has created a significant 
burden on the existing state resources. Sovereign finance is no longer the answer 
to address these shortcomings within infrastructure development. As a result, 
states are increasingly content to seek financial assistance through private 
investment to facilitate these endeavours. However, as states understand their 
limitations, they are extending lucrative security packages towards investors in 
order to attract their investment portfolios. In cases where the state is only 
partially offering a security package, or the existing package is inadequate to 
provide a robust measure of security, investors are seeking alternative measures 
to mitigate existential risks within their targeted investment regime.  
Sovereign guarantee frameworks provide reassurance to investors; however, in 
view of foreign direct investment (hereinafter referred to as “FDI”) becoming 
increasingly important in financing growth, especially in developing countries370, 
and liquidity issues constraining the state’s ability to provide robust measures of 
security, investors are seeking recourse to alternative risk-mitigation 
frameworks. There are three types of measure that a host state can adopt in order 
to promote capital inflow. First, finding and publicising investment opportunities 
abroad, removing obstacles by providing one-window operations, influencing 
potential investors to utilise their funds in specific areas or specific types of loans 
                                                
370 IMF, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries’ (September 18, 2003) Report 
of the Working Group of the Capital Markets Consultative Group (CMCG) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/cmcg/2003/eng/091803.HTM> Accessed 23 March 2016. 
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or investments. Second, providing adequately stable and protective measures to 
safeguard the foreign investor’s capital, and adopt all necessary measures to 
maintain a stable economic climate.371 Third, the state acting directly within the 
sphere of its power can facilitate the international capital market through 
providing state loans, guarantees, or even equity investments.372 
The primary premise of the three contentions outlined by Whitman are 
predicated upon the understanding that in highly leveraged transactions, it is 
important that parties are provided with adequate measures in order to attract 
infrastructure development funds. The provision of a sovereign guarantee is a 
mere indication of a state’s favourable attitude towards investment, and not an 
absolute security undertaking, per se. However, the premise of sovereign 
guarantees may be problematic in instances where blanket guarantees are offered 
by the host state. As Whitman submitted, these may increase the likelihood of 
attracting political interference.373 Moreover, in the event that there are poor 
regulatory measures or inadequate fiscal space to honour them, the issuance of 
such guarantees seems futile, since the host state will be unable to meet any 
obligations outlined therein. 
Countries like Nigeria, India, Pakistan and various other developing and 
developed countries have in the past offered blanket guarantees in their 
                                                
371 Investing in emerging countries involves greater risk than investing in developed countries 
because of political, currency, liquidity, returns, contagion, and even systemic risks. See Serge 
Darolles, Jeremy Dudek and Gaelle Le Fol, ‘Contagion in Emerging Markets’ in Nigel Finch 
(ed), Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (1st Edition, The Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
372 Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press 1965). 
373 Marina Von Neumann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press, 1965) pp 151. 
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infrastructure development industries.374 Pakistan, for example, has been 
adversely affected by an on-going electricity crisis. Pakistan’s textile industry, 
which contributes 9.5% of GDP, and directly employs over 15million people375 
is experiencing 3.5% negative growth, due to ruptured growth directly associated 
with electricity crisis.376 The state’s inability to provide the requisite facilities to 
assist industries like textile has meant that industries are relocating to countries 
such as Bangladesh and India. There is an enormous deficit insofar as the 
demand and supply of electricity in Pakistan. As a consequence, the state is 
seeking to attract private sector participation in a bid to enhance generation and 
distribution facilities. However, in view of the risks posed to such investors, 
Pakistan is content to offer blanket guarantees as a measure to mitigate risk.  
In view of the challenges that are exhibited by these volatile economies, 
especially in Pakistan, it is argued that there is a need to introduce a redundancy 
measure, in order to provide an additional layer of security within the 
infrastructure development regime. The following discussion provides an 
introduction to political risk insurance (hereinafter referred to as “PRI”) as a 
                                                
374 See Kenneth Hansan, Robert C O’Sullivan and W Geoffrey Anderson, ‘The Dabhol Power 
Project Settlement: What Happened? And How?’ Infrastructurejournal.com 
<http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/a5aa1e52-4285-4bb5-87e6-
7201123895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-40fc-a293-
720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol_InfrastructureJournal12_2005.pdf> Accessed 23 March 2016.  The 
Dabhol power project successfully raised US$1.9bn in project debt largely on the Power 
Purchase Agreement and the guaranties issued by the Government of Maharashtra and, subject to 
a roughly US$300 million cap, the Central Government.  
375 Editor, ‘Statistics on Textile Industry in Pakistan’ The Tribune (Islamabad, 18 March 2013) 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/522292/statistics-on-textile-industry-in-pakistan/> Accessed 12 May 
2016; also see Muazam Rashid Dar, Muhammad Azeem, Dr Muhammad Ramzan, ‘Impact of 
Energy Consumption on Pakistan’s Economic Growth’ (2013) International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science Innovation Vol 2 Issue 6 < 
http://www.superior.edu.pk/Images/Research/6.pdf> Accessed 21 May 2016. Wherein, the 
authors have argued that with Pakistan’s current energy crisis, Pakistan will be unable to compete 
against countries like China, India and Bangladesh.  
376 Editor, ‘Energy Crisis Besetting Industries’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 20 July 2014) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1120432> Accessed 03 May 2016. 
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form of either an additional or alternative redundancy measure, in order to 
strengthen Pakistan’s energy sector. 
This chapter is predicated on three strands. First, it considers the notion of 
political risk in a larger context. In view of the discussion concerning liquidity 
issues, especially in a developing country context, this section provides a holistic 
picture of political risk in general. Whilst referring to various developing and 
developed countries, it outlines and compares how risk is outlaid in various 
contexts. In addition to providing a contextual comparison, this section also 
arrives at the conclusion that without limitation to the liquidity issues, there are 
other challenges that an investor may face. Thereafter, this discussion progresses 
to reflect upon political risk in Pakistan’s context, with a view to outlining the 
political risk challenges in a contextual framework.  
The discussion then shifts and progresses to political risk insurance. This section 
argues that in view of a state’s inability to provide any real recompense under a 
sovereign guarantee framework, political risk insurance provides plausible 
additional security. In order to dispel the similarities between guarantee and 
insurance instruments, this section also provides a brief analysis of the different 
nature of the two security instruments. This discussion supports the contention 
that the two instruments can potentially co-exist, and attempts to highlight how 
guarantee instruments can be narrower in comparison to the speculative nature of 
insurance instruments. The discussion then builds the argument, using the 
political risk insurance products of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (hereinafter referred to as “MIGA”) as an illustration. This section aligns 
the issues cognisant with Pakistan’s energy sector with services offered by 
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MIGA. In a broader spectrum, it is argued that MIGA’s political risk insurance is 
not a replacement for Pakistan’s sovereign guarantee structure, but an additional 
measure of security that strengthens the existing security framework. Moreover, 
from an investor’s standpoint, this section argues that MIGA plays a larger role 
in the context of providing robust measure of security. Involving a multilateral 
body, especially in a developing country context, involves an element of 
deterrence due to the larger role played by multilateral institutions in providing 
fiscal and economic stability. As a result, it is unlikely that a developing country 
will default on payments when a multilateral institution is involved.  
The last strand within this discussion sails away from the usual arguments 
presented in support of political risk insurance. This section is predicated on the 
very substance and nature of political risk insurance instruments. It argues that 
risk insurance instruments breed moral hazard. Whilst relying on fieldwork and 
engagement with wider academic community, this section highlights the 
dilemma surrounding political risk insurance. It argues that risk insurance 
instruments are a mere condition-precedent for securing debt finance. Relying on 
evidence made available through various sources, this section demonstrates that 
investors cancel their insurance policies after securing such instruments.  
The discussion undertaken in this chapter is an extension of the discussions 
undertaken in Chapter 4. The primary contention emerging in the following 
discourse refers to the inclusion of risk insurance frameworks as an additional 
form of security to sovereign guarantee measures, and not a replacement model. 
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5.2 Navigating Political Risk 
5.2.1 What is Political Risk? 
Political risk is an elusive concept, not always easy to define to the satisfaction of 
those concerned with its political ramifications.377 In a broad spectrum, political 
risk is the risk of the uncertain.378 A simple definition of the term ‘political risk’ 
is the risk or probability of occurrence of some political event(s) that will change 
the prospects of the profitability for an investment.379 An event might occur due 
to the political-economic climate of a host country, or may be perpetrated due to 
a social change that has erupted within the host country, for example, a 
revolution. A good example of political risk is the liquidity crisis discussed in 
Chapter 1. A country’s economic position and fiscal space might not allow 
provision for timely payments under the agreed PPAs, due to the lack of 
sufficient funds or inept regulatory measures. Good examples of this are India’s 
Dabhol Power Project, and more recently Pakistan’s Riqo Diq.380 Another 
definition of ‘political risk’ may correlate to a material adverse change in the 
                                                
377 Hasan S Zakariya, ‘Insurance against the Political Risk of Petroleum Investment’ (1986) 4 J 
Energy & Natural Resources L 217. 
378 See Sam Wilkin, Country and Political Risk: Practical Insights for Global Finance (Risk 
Books, 2004). The author submits that ‘country risk is, broadly speaking, the risk of business loss 
due to country-specific factors, usually related to political and economic instability. 
379 Paola Morales Torrado, ‘Political Risk Insurance and Breach of Contract Coverage: How the 
Intervention of Domestic Courts May Prevent Investors from Claiming Insurance’ (2005) 17 
PACE Int’l L Rev 301. Paola argues that political risks in developing countries usually arise 
because many of those countries lack a well-tested legal framework to enforce contractual 
obligations and to fully recognise investor’s rights to the proceeds of their investment.  
380 See Kenneth Hansan, Robert C O’Sullivan and W Geoffrey Anderson, ‘The Dabhol Power 
Project Settlement’ Infrastructurejournal.com <http//:www.chadbourne.com/files/Publications> 
Accessed 22 February 2016. The authors have argued that there can be little doubt, however, that 
all else being equal, the experience of Dabhol makes investors wiser and slower in committing 
their resources to India. The attraction is still there, but the calculation today has to compensate 
for risks that, before Dabhol, would not have been given as much weight.  
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commercial viability of the project, which is directly aligned with the political 
landscape of the host state.381  
Risks faced by foreign investors investing in a developing country vary 
significantly, and take diverse forms.382 Figure 5.1, below, provides an outline of 
a country risk profile of selected countries.383  
 
Figure 5.1: Selected Country Risk Profile 
Reflecting on the data presented in the chart above, it is submitted that Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate similar patterns insofar as political risk. These 
countries have been economically unstable due to an on-going war and continued 
volatile fiscal position. As a result, their sovereign risk, expropriation, breach of 
                                                
381 See Thomas E Krayenbuehl, Country Risk: Assessment and Monitoring (2nd Edition, 
Woodhead Faulkner). 
382 See Elizabeth Kessler, ‘Political Risk insurance and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation: What Happened to the Private Sector?’ (1992) 13 N Y L Sch J Int’l & Comp L 203, 
204. 
383 See Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country Risk from Theory to Practice’ (May 2012) 
SACE <www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> Accessed 12 April 
2016. 
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contract and political violence indices are much higher when compared with 
countries like Belgium, United Kingdom and Germany.384 Political risk plays a 
pivotal role in an environment that seeks to attract infrastructure development 
funds. The following sections illustrate upon some of the common forms of risk.  
5.2.1.a Expropriation 
A succinct definition of the term ‘expropriation’ was outlined by the tribunal in 
the Middle East Cement case. The tribunal submitted that:  
[W]hen measures are taken by a State the effect of which is to 
deprive the investor of use and benefit of his investment even 
though he may retain nominal ownership of the respective 
rights being the investment…the effect of which is tantamount 
to expropriation385 
Under international law386 a measure employed by the state need not deprive an 
investor of the title to his property rights in order to amount to an 
                                                
384 Reference to these jurisdictions is for comparative purposes only. It is important to draw 
comparison insofar as risk in relation to developed and developing countries.  
385 See Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No ARB/99/6.12 April 2002, para 107 <www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/me_cement_award.pdf> 
Accessed 12 December 2016. 
386 Customary international law has long afforded states the authority to expropriate foreign 
investments, as long as the expropriation: (i) is for a public purpose (ii) is non-discriminatory (iii) 
complies with due process principles and (iv) provides the investor with prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation. See L Yver Fortier and Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the 
Law of International Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor’ (2005) 13 Asia Pac 
L Rev 79, 81; also see Tamada Dai, ‘Assessing damages in non-expropriation cases before 
international investment arbitration’ (2009) 52 Japanese Y B Int’l L 309. Dai submits ‘…that in 
theory, as the payment of compensation is a condition under international law for that an 
expropriation be lawful, an expropriation without any compensation inevitably engages the state 
responsibility of the host-country, and the result of this involvement is “full reparation”.’  
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expropriation.387 Consequently, an act of expropriation is not limited to 
deprivation of the owner’s title to the project company. It can also be perpetrated 
by measures that gradually adversely affect the project company. A definition 
encompassing this view is outlined by MIGA. MIGA defines expropriation as:  
[A]ny legislative action or administrative action or omission 
attributable to the host government which has the effect of 
depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control 
of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the 
exception of non-discriminatory measures of general 
application which governments normally take for the purposes 
of regulatory economic activity in their territories388 
Every investment is predicated upon risk; however, not every business problem 
experienced by an investor is an indirect389 or creeping form of expropriation. 
Expropriation, in various forms, is one of the primary non-commercial risks 
investors and project companies face in developing countries.390 Whereas direct 
expropriation is no longer a common instance, indirect expropriation through 
delayed payments, increase in costs (related to the project, for example), an 
increase in taxes, and introduction of laws that may be prejudicial towards the 
project company or its business are a common occurrence. Recently, the UK’s 
                                                
387 Zeyad A Al Qurashi, ‘Indirect expropriation in the field of petroleum’, (2004) 5 Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 897. 
388 Article 11 of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
<https://www.miga.org/who-we-are/miga-convention> Accessed 23 April 2016. 
389 The phrase ‘indirect expropriation’ denotes that the investor’s assets were not seized directly. 
See Paul E Comeaux and Stephen Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment under International 
Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1997). 
390 See Patrick J Donovan, ‘Creeping Expropriation and MIGA: The need for tighter regulation in 
the political risk insurance market’ (2003-2004) 7 Gonz J Int’l L 1. 
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Supreme Court overturned a Court of Appeal’s ruling on a matter concerning 
s103 (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. Whereas the court’s rationale in this case is 
not relevant for the purposes of this study, the case has been pending execution 
of the award since the dispute was first instituted in 2004. This case is a stark 
reflection upon the state’s ability to hinder project operation or to create barriers 
for compensation to hinder those operations.391 
It is interesting to note, however, that investors address these acts of 
expropriation by assigning an increased economic value multiplier to reflect the 
risk that their capital bears. This sum represents a premium which reflects the 
increase in the amount of risk that the lenders are undertaking. As a result, cost 
of capital increases proportionally with an increase in risk.392 However, these 
higher returns have not discouraged or deterred states from exercising measures 
that may amount to direct or indirect expropriation, as illustrated in the recent 
case of IPCO.393  
A definition of expropriation acutely relevant to the liquidity crisis is outlined in 
a North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “NAFTA”) 
dispute resolution. The tribunal in S D Myer’s expropriation claim stated that:  
An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the 
ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although 
it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be 
                                                
391 See IPCO (Nigeria) Limited v Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (2017) UKSC 16. 
392 See David Blumental, ‘Sources of funds and risk management for international energy 
projects’ (1998) 16 Berkeley J Int’l L 267, 271-72.  
393 See IPCO (Nigeria) Limited v Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (2017) UKSC 16. 
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apparent to view a deprivation as amounting to an 
expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.394  
Whereas academic literature on expropriation is predominately restricted to 
direct and indirect expropriation, there are instances where states are obligated to 
undertake indirect expropriation in order to facilitate or honour another 
transactional contract under necessity.395 From Pakistan’s standpoint it is 
submitted that the failure of the state to indemnify IPPs for the off-taking bodies’ 
failure to honour contractual commitment is an important facet of this study. 
Delay or non-payment adversely affects the operations of the SPV, and as a 
result can be tantamount to an act of indirect expropriation. Al Qurashi 
illuminates this predicament, submitting that while looking beyond the issue of 
outright takings, one finds that under international law, expropriation need not be 
exercised only through a formal decree of nationalisation or legislation designed 
to adversely impact or separate altogether the owner from its belongings, in this 
instance the project company.396 
Expropriation can also be achieved through other indirect means, which may 
have the same effect as direct expropriation.397 Expropriation is a process, and 
                                                
394 S D Myers, Inc (US) v Canada, First Partial Award, paras 117, 123, 127, 40 I L M 1408 
(2001) (NAFTA Ch11 Arb Inb 2000) <www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_sdmyers.htm> 
Accessed 17 May 2016. 
395See George Chifot, ‘Caveat Emptor: Developing international disciplines for deterring third 
party investment in unlawfully expropriated property’ 33 Law & Policy Int’l Bus 179,183-84. 
Chifor argues ‘…that in the past two decades, indirect expropriation has supplanted direct takings 
as the dominant form of state interference with foreign investment, as host countries have learned 
that more value can be extracted from foreign enterprises through the more subtle instrument of 
regulatory control than outright seizures’. 
396 Zeyad A Al Qurashi, ‘Indirect expropriation in the field of petroleum’, (2004) 5 Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 897. 
397 Zeyad A Al Qurashi, ‘Indirect expropriation in the field of petroleum’ (2004) 5 J World 
Investment & Trade 897. Also see Barry Appleton, ‘Regulatory Takings: The International Law 
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not so much an act, per se. It may be aimed at other legitimate regulatory 
objectives, and does not involve a single instance of an outright taking; 
nonetheless it has the effect, often degree-by-degree, of depriving an owner of 
fundamental rights associated with such property.398 As a result, circular debt or 
liquidity issues discussed in Chapter 1 formed under the auspices of 
expropriation are a predicament loathed by most energy sector investors 
investing in developing countries.399  
5.2.1.b Transfer restrictions  
Transfer restrictions involve local banks or financial institutions not allowed to 
export or remit currency to the place agreed by the investor, or when an investor 
is unable to repatriate currency generated through the project company’s 
revenues. MIGA’s Convention broadly defines transfer restrictions as: 
[A]ny introduction attributable to the host government of 
restrictions on the transfer outside the host country of its 
currency into a freely usable currency or another currency 
acceptable to the holder of the guarantee, including a failure of 
                                                                                                                               
Perspective’ (2002) 11 NYU Env L J 35. Appleton argues that international judicial officers have 
found that there is no longer any distinction between direct, indirect or creeping expropriation.  
398 L Yves Fortier, CC, QC and Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor’ (2005) 13 Asia Pacific L 
Rev 79. 
399 As discussed earlier, the circular debt or liquidity crisis discussed in the chapter below is no 
longer an anomaly, but is considered as a general occurrence due to the capped and constraints on 
fiscal means. Also see Timi Soleye, ‘Guest post: The imminent collapse of Nigeria’s power 
privatisation is a good thing’ Financial Times (Lagos, 21 Oct 2014).   
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the host government to act within a reasonable period of time 
on an application by such holder for such transfer.400   
The imposition of such restrictions has been defined in order to encompass all 
new forms of direct restrictions, as well as any disguised indirect restrictions.401 
Currency transfer restrictions are deeply embedded in developing economies, 
due to their need to maintain foreign currency reserves within their jurisdictions 
and discourage flight of capital.402 For example, in 2016, the Chinese 
government clamped down on capital outflows due to reported depreciation of 
renminbi against the dollar. The renminbi depreciated almost 6% against the 
dollar in weeks leading towards end of 2016. The Financial Times reported that 
investors and corporate industry faced difficulties in remitting dividends to 
stockholders abroad.403  
Figure 5.2, below, illustrates how risk compares in Asia and Latin America. 
Pakistan has a higher risk of regulatory and transfer risk, illustrating the dangers 
faced by potential investors. Whereas currency transfer risk is characterised by a 
weak political and economic structure, and forms part of one of the main risks 
feared by investors, it is submitted that this does not form part of the purview of 
this study.  
                                                
400 See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Art. 11(a)(i).  
401 See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Commentary on the Convention Establishing 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency <www.miga.org> Accessed April 2017. 
402 Ali Salman, ‘Foreign exchange: An emerging black market from within a tight noose’ The 
Express Tribune (Islamabad, 13 April 2015) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/868775/foreign-
exchange-an-emerging-black-market-from-within-a-tight-noose> Accessed 13 April 2015. 
403 See Yuan Yang, ‘China tightens control of personal forex purchases’ Financial Times 
(Beijing, 1 January 2017). 
 
213 
 
Figure 5.2: Transfer and Regulatory Risk in Asia and Latin America404 
The currency transfer restrictions can amount to indirect expropriation. In order 
to address this issue, some projects in developing countries tend to raise money 
for a project in local currency. However, the risk then pertains to an increase in 
conversion rates, which can create a difference in debt service payments to 
foreign investors. Moreover, unlike currency transfer risk, that can be managed 
through robust contractual provisions in the PPA, currency convertibility risk is 
not within the purview of the host state.  
5.2.1.c Contract repudiation405 
Contract repudiation, contract breach or credit risk occurs when a state or a SOE 
does not honour or, fails to meet the commitments outlined within a PPA. This 
type of risk is usually present in project finance in oil, energy and water sectors, 
                                                
404 Transfer and regulatory risk in Latin America and Asia (2012). See Raoul Ascari and Federica 
Pocek, ‘Country Risk from Theory to Practice’ (May 2012) SACE 
<www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> Accessed 24 May 2016. 
405 If a state breaches its contract with a foreign investor, there are consequences. This is 
particularly reflected in the fact that not only does the state have to pay compensation to the 
investor, the award for compensation may also include the payment of lost future profits. See 
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, ‘Permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the sanctity of 
contracts, from the angle of Lucrum Cessans’ (2014-15) 12 Loy U Chi Int’l L Rev153. 
23	   26	  
95	  
24	  
59	  
82	  
32	  
37	  
28	  
33	  
80	  
29	  
55	  
71	  
46	   44	  
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
Transfer	  Risk	  
Regulatory	  Risk	  
 
214 
wherein the private parties sign contracts with the state in order to ensure that the 
product produced by the SPV is off-taken by the state. Contract repudiation can 
be characterised as a form of indirect expropriation, however the entire premise 
of this study is predicated on the risk of SOEs not honouring their contractual 
obligations; as a result, this section has been discussed separately.406 The host 
country’s ability to fulfil its financial obligations depends not only on its 
creditworthiness or economic health, but also on a wide array of domestic and 
international elements that eventually have an effect on its ability to pay.407  Both 
national and international factors play a role in a host state’s ability to honour its 
contractual commitments. As discussed earlier, no state intentionally breaches its 
financial, contractual commitments. The repercussions of such breaches can be 
everlasting, and prove detrimental for the investment regime in emerging and 
developing economies.  
Existential political risk can have far-reaching consequences for the host state. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, below, and briefly outlined in our earlier discussion, 
the higher the risk the higher the cost of capital. Developing countries offer 
higher returns in order to attract investment. Recently, the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (hereinafter referred to as “CPEC”) has been in the news for 
astronomical return figures on an investment of approximately US$50bn. 
Pakistan will pay China approximately US$90bn over a 25-year period under 
                                                
406 See Paola Morales Torrado, ‘Political Risk Insurance and Breach of Contract Coverage: How 
the Intervention of Domestic Courts may prevent Investors from Claiming Insurance’ (2005) 17 
PACE Int’l L Rev 301. 
407 See Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country Risk from Theory to Practice’ (May 2012) 
SACE<www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> Accessed 03 May 
2016.  
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CPEC related contracts.408 There is some academic debate upon this issue, 
arguing that countries with low economic growth deliver lower equity returns. 
Conversely, countries with high economic growth do not necessarily deliver 
superior equity returns.409 
Name of Country Return on Equity 
Investment 
GDP Growth (annual 
%)410 
Brazil 18.6 2.2 
Pakistan 16 3.8 
India 13.4 6.5 
China 12.3 8.1 
United Kingdom 2.3 2.1  
United States 0.5 2.1 
Figure 5.3: Rate of Return on Equity vs. GDP Growth411 
                                                
408 Salman Siddiqui, ‘Pakistan will be paying China USD90bn against CPEC-related projects’ 
The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 12 March 2017). 
409 See R McFall Lamm, Jr, ‘Economic Growth vs Equity Returns in Emerging Markets’ in Nigel 
Finch (ed), Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (1st Edition, The Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
410 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
Data has been obtained from the World Bank’s website and reflects an average growth rate from 
2011 to 2014. Data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>. 
Accessed February 2017.  
411 See R McFall Lamm, Jr, ‘Economic Growth vs Equity Returns in Emerging Markets’ in Nigel 
Finch (ed), Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (1st Edition, The Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
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Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 5.4, developing countries attract more 
infrastructure development funds primarily because they offer higher returns. 
However, this presents another question: is risk a significant driving force for 
investment? Or is risk one of the many variables that are taken into account 
without the forbearance of its actual ramifications within infrastructure 
development? 
 
Figure 5.4: Change in FDI since 2011 (GBP£bn) 412 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the constant variation of FDI in developed countries in 
comparison to FDI in developing countries. Since 2000, investment flows into 
developing countries nearly quadrupled from US$160bn in 2000 to US$580bn in 
2008, with an annual growth of 17.5% annually.413 In 2010, FDI flows to 
developing countries increased by 30% to US$507bn. ADB’s 2017 report 
highlights that Asia alone will require approximately US$1.7 trillion on a yearly 
                                                
412 See George Arnett, ‘Foreign direct investment: which countries get the most?’ The Guardian 
(London, 24 June 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/jun/24/foreign-
direct-investment-which-countries-get-the-most> Accessed 04 April 2016. 
413 MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk (2011) <www.miga.org; 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=393> Accessed March 2016; 
also see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance (2015) UNCTAD 
<www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> Accessed April 2016. 
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basis in order to meet their growing infrastructure demand.414 However, as 
illustrated in Figures 5.5 and Figure 5.6, below, it is argued that these figures are 
merely centred on a few countries, and do not necessarily reflect regional 
development. 
Name of Country FDI Inflow (In US$ billions) Change from Previous 
Year 
Iran 2.1 -31% 
Pakistan 1.7 +31% 
Bangladesh  1.5 -4.5% 
Sri Lanka  0.9 +1.3% 
India 34.4 +22% 
Figure 5.5: FDI by Region415 
                                                
414 See Asian Development Bank, ‘Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion Per Year, 
Double Previous Estimates’ ADB News Release (Manila, 28 February 2017) < 
https://www.adb.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-year-double-previous-
estimates> Accessed February 2017. 
415 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015, 
Reforming International Investment Governance (2015) UNCTAD 
<www.unctad.org.en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> Accessed 04 April 2016. 
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Figure 5.6: FDI Inflow by Region416 
The UNCTAD makes a similar observation: 
Many developing countries, including least developed 
countries, have attracted only small amounts of FDI despite 
their efforts at economic liberalisation in an increasingly 
globalising world. Moreover, FDI inflows are highly 
concentrated in a small number of countries. It is generally well 
known that the modest levels of, and disparity in, the 
distribution of FDI inflows, are due to factors such as a 
deficient regulatory framework, a poor business environment 
and opportunities, weak FDI policies, poor institutional 
                                                
416 United Nations Conference for Trade and Development <www.unctad.org.fdistatistics> 
Accessed 04 April 2016. 
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frameworks, limited market access, unfavourable comparative 
costs and lack of political stability.417    
However, it is argued that infrastructure funds are not necessarily an indicator of 
real development or growth. It is questionable whether investment flows have a 
real social impact through these infrastructure projects for the poor and needy 
segments within the society.418 For example, Nigeria derives almost 80% of its 
revenue from oil, and attracts nearly US$5bn FDI on a yearly basis. Despite 
healthy FDI figures, Nigeria still has 61% of its people living in poverty.419 
The focus of this section was primarily to review and discuss the nature of 
political risk and its impact on infrastructure development. It reviews some of the 
facets of political risk by referring to figures issued by various international 
bodies. Another brief argument reviewed under this section looks at the character 
of FDI, and whether it can indeed generate enough growth to affect the real 
impoverished segments of the society. The next section reviews political risk in 
the context of Pakistan, in order to better understand the nexus between political 
risk and risk insurance.  
5.2.2 Political Risk in Pakistan 
                                                
417 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Division on Investment and 
Enterprise, UNCTAD Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operations of TNEs, Volume 
I (FDI Flows and Stocks). 
<www.unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationsArchieve.aspx?publicationid=393> Accessed 04 April 
2016. 
418 See Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment and 
the Crisis of Development (Island Press, The Centre for Resource Economics, 2013). Rich 
extensively discusses the plight of the poor communities in Brazil, Indonesia, and Thailand, 
where infrastructure has perhaps caused more harm than benefit to the impoverished 
communities.    
419 BBC, ‘Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%’ BBC (London, 13 February 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873> Accessed in 26 April 2016. 
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In 2014, FDI inflow figures to South Asia experienced a 16% increase, compared 
to a downward trend for West Africa for a sixth consecutive year, decreasing by 
4% to US$43bn. FDI flows to South Asia rose to US$41.2bn, primarily owing to 
growth in India, the dominant FDI recipient in South Asia. Whereas there is no 
conclusive evidence to suggest that risk is a major driving force insofar as 
infrastructure development funds, it is argued that it is one of the most important 
factors.  
In addition to the circular debt issues, the prevailing political and economic 
issues in Pakistan make it an outfit satisfying the classic definition of political 
risk.420 The previous section has illuminated the nature of political risk, and 
discussed the elusive concept of political risk, and some of the facets of foreign 
direct investment. Whereas the above-mentioned arguments shed light on the 
dominance of FDI geared towards less volatile, higher return regions, it is 
submitted that the abundance of un-tapped natural resources has led to a drive 
towards investment in more volatile regions subject to the provision of sovereign 
guarantees, a facet discussed in the previous chapter, and the availability of risk 
insurance. Most of the benefits of FDI are intangible in nature, and are 
particularly scarce in developing countries. Whereas infrastructure development 
and the availability of certain processed commodities are more visible, the 
introduction of technology, skilled work force are less obvious.  
                                                
420 See Paola Morales Torrado, ‘Political Risk Insurance and Breach of Contract Coverage: How 
the Intervention of Domestic Courts may prevent Investors from Claiming Insurance’ (2005) 17 
PACE Int’l L Rev 301. Torrado argues that the probability of occurrence of an event will result in 
an adverse effect on the profitability of the project.  
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Pakistan labours under the reputation of being a volatile economy. Events, both 
political and non-political have had a direct impact on the risk exposure of 
potential foreign investors. State and non-state elements have perpetrated 
terrorist activities harming the investment prospects in an already almost non-
existent investment regime. Unlike the Arab Spring, the woes of Pakistan are 
ongoing. The issues discussed in the introductory chapter concerning circular 
debt within the energy cycle have had an adverse impact on Pakistan and 
investment in Pakistan. FDI figures from 2006 to 2010 varied, as the country 
transitioned from a dictatorial regime to an elected government.421 The years 
from 2010 to 2014 failed to attract FDI as originally envisaged by economists 
and political analysts. A continued political turmoil led to a fragile economy, 
which was unable to attract foreign investment. However, after the 2013 
elections, FDI inflows to Pakistan increased by 3% to US$1.7 billion, as a result 
of rising Chinese FDI in the country. Figures Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, below, 
illustrate the change in trend after 2013. It is submitted that these figures are 
likely to increase as a result of the CPEC related work.  
 
                                                
421 Also see Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental 
Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development (The Centre for Resource Economics, Island 
Press, 2013). Rich has criticised the Bretton Woods for supporting illegitimate regimes. The 
World Bank had refused to lend to the democratically elected Goulart government in Brazil in the 
early 1960s, but following the 1964 military coup, lending rose to average US$73 million a year. 
Chile, under the democratically elected regime of Allende, received no bank loans, but following 
the Pinochet coup in 1973, the country suddenly became creditworthy, despite a worsening 
economic situation.   
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Figure 5.7: Pakistan's FDI Inflow 2006-2010422 
 
Figure 5.8: Pakistan's FDI Inflow 2011-2014423 
China’s commitment towards regional domination has led its private sector to 
invest heavily abroad. Whereas China has become the world’s largest recipient 
of FDI, it is witnessed that many developing countries are increasingly becoming 
home countries for FDI flows. In fact, the outward FDI stock of developing 
countries has grown considerably since 1990, with a particular leap since 1995. 
In addition, FDI flows originating from, and going to, developing countries 
appear to be growing faster than those from developed to developing countries 
                                                
422Data 
available<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/countries?page=1> 
Accessed 07 April 2016. 
423Data available 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/countries?page=1> Accessed 07 
April 2016. 
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since the late 1990s.424 China’s investment in Pakistan is part of the South-South 
FDI flow drive.  
CPEC, more commonly known as ‘economic corridor’, is part of the overall 
context of implementing China’s “one belt, one road” strategy.425 The Chinese 
investment comprising approximately US$45.6bn (of which US$33.8bn will be 
invested in the electricity sector, and US$11.8bn in transport), is an effort to 
improve and facilitate the transmission and distribution component of electricity 
generation. Whereas both parties are committed to undertake this project and 
successfully complete it within the time frame, there are several political and 
non-political risks that threaten the completion of the project.426 The project has 
already been delayed, as the original route went through the troubled province of 
Balochistan, a province rife with a separatist movement targeting foreign 
investors. 
Whereas there is no extensive debate surrounding the ‘war and civil disturbance 
risk’ as a category that may affect investment prospects in Pakistan, there is a 
likelihood that they may prove problematic from an investment standpoint. 
Pakistan’s support for the US’s war on terror, and consequently, military 
operations against terrorist factions in the tribal areas, has had economic 
ramifications for the country. Modest estimates suggest that Pakistan has 
                                                
424 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), South-South Cooperation 
in International Investment arrangements, (UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies 
for Development, 2005) 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=424> Accessed 04 April 
2016. 
425 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance (2015) 
<www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> Accessed 03 May 2016. 
426 See Muhammad Amir Rana, ‘The CPEC trick’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 24 April 2016) 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1253998> Accessed 24 April 2016.  
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suffered approximately US$188bn as a result of its war on terror.427 Moreover, as 
outlined by MIGA, it is argued that terrorism risk is difficult to quantify and 
therefore not easy to insure.428 As a result, there is a great potential for vast 
losses from large-scale terrorist attacks, especially in urban centres, which 
reduces the ability of the private sector to offer insurance. It is pertinent to 
mention, however, that from Pakistan’s standpoint there has been no major 
terrorist attack on a project facility, and therefore the study primarily 
concentrates on contractual breach by off-taking bodies, and subsequently the 
government.  
Unlike terrorism risk, other forms of risk discussed above can be quantified. 
Subsequently, this study partakes to draw attention to an ancillary security 
measure that can either strengthen the existing sovereign guarantee framework or 
replace it altogether.  
5.3 Political Risk Insurance 
Since time immemorial, investors have always been looking to mitigate risk. 
British and Portuguese traders during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries travelled across the Indian sub-continent. They would gamble on the 
ships leaving and arriving at the port. In order to mitigate their losses and 
diminish risk, these traders would seek insurance from wealthy traders, in order 
to ensure that they would be indemnified against any losses that they suffered as 
a consequence of an accident during their voyage.  
                                                
427 See Editor, ‘Pakistan suffered loss of $188bn during war on terror’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 4 
June 2016) 
428 See MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk (2012) <www.miga.org> 
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One theme that emerges throughout this study concerns the predicament that 
every business faces: risk. The degree to which an investor is ready to bear that 
risk varies from transaction to transaction, however there will always be an 
element of risk. As illustrated in Figure 5.1 read in conjunction with Figure 5.5, 
stable economies providing investment safety offer lower returns compared to 
more volatile economies. As a result, investors are increasingly drawn towards 
volatile economies, but are looking to mitigate their risk through, inter alia, 
guarantees, insurance instruments and subrogation.  
In order to bring certainty within an investment regime and provide adequate 
recourse for investors, in case the SOEs or the state are unable to provide 
recompense for a breach of payment under PPA, political risk insurance 
(hereinafter referred to as “PRI”) provides a plausible additional security 
measure. PRI is emerging as a pivotal plank for international investment regime. 
Investors’ increasing endeavour to mitigate risk whilst investing in volatile 
economies is illustrated through the rising PRI issuance. In 2012, new PRI 
issuance reached a historic high, increasing by 33% even as global FDI flow 
declined.429 PRI works as a sub-set of a broader arsenal of investment 
guarantees, offering investors security against a wide spectrum of risks in the 
host state. A PRI provision transforms an unpredictable or uncertain event into a 
calculable probability that can be assigned an economic value. If such an event 
occurs, what is insured against is not the loss or injury suffered as a consequence 
                                                
429 See Celine Tan, ‘Risky business: Political risk insurance and the law and governance of 
natural resources’ (2015) Int’l Journal of Law in Context, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp174-194. 
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of the occurrence of the insured event, but ‘a capital against whose loss the 
insurer offers a guarantee’.430 
MIGA’s Economic Intelligence Unit (hereinafter referred to as “EIU”) survey 
found that political risk was the second most significant factor in the decision-
making process by investors in relation to making FDI decisions in developing 
countries, after ‘macro-economic’ instability.431 In order to provide a more 
effective tool to mitigate inter alia, political and macro-economic risks, there are 
national, regional and international investment guarantee agencies. The scope of 
this study does not allow for a detailed discussion of all the insurance bodies 
(both private and multilateral) providing investment protection. However, a brief 
reference to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (hereinafter referred to 
as “OPIC”) has been made. This study then continues to extensively refer to 
MIGA’s operations, in a bid to understand the wider influence exercised by such 
bodies in project finance transactions.  
The PRI market broadly consists of three main risk insurance providers: public, 
multilaterals, and private PRI providers.432 OPIC is a good example of a national 
investment security instrument. OPIC is the US Government’s development 
                                                
430 See Francois Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter 
Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University of Chicago Press) 197-
210.  
431 See MIGA, 2013 World Investment and Political Risk (2013) World Bank 
<www.miga.org/documents/WIPR13.pdf> Accessed 13 February 2016. 
432 See MIGA, Strategic Directions FY15-17 <www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_ FY15-
17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 22 March 2016. The PRI market includes three broad categories of 
providers: public PRI providers, multilaterals, and private PRI providers. Public providers 
include national export credit agencies, investment credit, investment insurance, and insurance 
entities, and are generally focused on border trade and investment for constituents in their own 
countries. Multilaterals include the African Trade Insurance Agency, the Inter-Arab Investment 
Guarantee Corporation, the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investments and Export 
Credit, and MIGA; also see Robert B. Shanks, ‘Insuring investment and loans against currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence’ (1985-86) 9 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 
417. 
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finance institution which mobilises private capital to help solve critical 
development challenges and advance the government’s foreign policy objectives. 
OPIC’s coverage is divided into two classifications: first, “the current insured 
amount”, which is the amount of coverage actually in effect at a given time, and 
secondly, the “standby insured amount”, which is assurance that OPIC will 
provide future coverage, up to the maximum stipulated amount specified in each 
contract.433 
OPIC’s status as a government agency has been beneficial for its operations and 
its investors. Investors have increasingly sought OPIC’s services knowing that 
the U.S government will assist them in dealing with the host state government. 
This aspect has been discussed later in this chapter.434 However, since OPIC’s 
services are only limited to US nationals, OPICs insurance package will not be 
discussed extensively in this study.  
Before providing an outline of MIGA’s services normative to Pakistan’s energy 
sector, this chapter provides a brief outline of the differences between insurance 
and a guarantee instrument. In view of the extensive discussion undertaken in 
Chapter 4, it seems appropriate to provide an insight and highlight the 
differences predicated in both instruments, in order to differentiate their presence 
in an investment regime.  
5.3.1 Are Insurance and Guarantee instruments two sides to a coin? 
                                                
433 S Linn Williams, ‘Political and other risk insurance: OPIC, MIGA, EXIMBank and other 
providers’ (1993) 5 Pace Int’l L Rev 59. 
434 See Robert B Shanks, ‘Insuring investment and loans against currency inconvertibility, 
expropriation, and political violence’ (1985-86) 9 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 417. 
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Insurance and guarantee instruments share an uncanny resemblance. First, both 
instruments are a means to mitigate risk, and perhaps even promote free 
movement of capital. The provision of another party agreeing to pay or hold 
harmless another party against any agreed loss creates an environment where 
there is more trust amongst parties to undertake financial transactions. Second, 
both instruments aim to protect a final beneficiary within a transaction, and 
ensure that a third party holds harmless the creditor. However, after careful 
review one can argue that an insurance instrument is in effect an indemnity 
instrument. A contract of insurance is a direct, positive and independent contract 
wherein the insurer agrees to pay money upon the happening of a specified 
event.435 A contract for insurance, like a contract of indemnity, imposes a 
primary liability upon the party that agrees to indemnify. The creation of a 
primary liability usually ensures payment of money upon the occurrence of a 
specified event. As a result, unlike a contract for guarantee, it is not a collateral 
obligation to answer for the debt or default of another person.436 The legal 
remedy that ensues from the application of both an indemnity and an insurance 
instrument are a form of indemnification.437 This legal conundrum was explained 
in the seminal case of Prudential Insurance Co v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners438, wherein Channell J submitted: 
                                                
435 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W.L.R. 828. Also see James O’Donovan and John 
Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (1st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010).  
436 Zuhal K [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 151; Prudential Insurance Co v IRC (1904) 2 K B 658 at 663 
per Channell J. A contract of insurance secures some benefit to the insured, but a guarantee 
generally involves no payment to the creditor. 
437 As per Richard Posner in Harley Davidson, Inc v Minstar, Inc 41 F 3d 341 (7th Cir 1994); 
similarly see Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millet, The Law of Guarantees (6th Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2012) pp 8. It is noted that contracts of insurance and contracts of guarantee are both 
examples of contracts which protect the creditor from loss.  
438 (1904) S K B 658. 
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…[A]nd it seems to me that we must inquire a little further into 
the nature of a contract of insurance. Where you insure a ship or 
a house you cannot insure that the ship shall not be lost or the 
house burnt, but what you do insure is that a sum of money 
shall be paid upon the happening of a certain event…Then the 
next thing that is necessary is that the event should be one 
which involves some amount of uncertainty. There must be 
either uncertainty whether the event will ever happen or not, or 
if the event is one which must happen at some time there must 
be uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen...A contract 
of insurance, then must be a contract for the payment of a sum 
of money, or for some corresponding benefit such as the 
rebuilding of a house or the repairing of the ship, to become due 
on the happening of an event, which event must have some 
amount of uncertainty about it, and must be of a character more 
or less adverse to the interest of the person affecting the 
insurance. 
The concept of uncertainty explained by Channell J is predicated upon the notion 
of speculation. It is interesting to note that a contract of insurance does not relate 
to the occurrence of default or lack of performance of a third party. Nor is it 
necessary for an insurance contract to relate to the conduct or performance of 
another person.439 Lord Esher M R explained this central point, by reference to 
marine insurance ‘a policy on a ship, for instance, is not an understanding to pay 
                                                
439 James O’Donovan and John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (1st Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2010). 
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the amount insured, if somebody else, for example, the owner of another ship 
that has caused the loss, does not, but to pay such amount on the loss of the 
ship’.440 Unlike a contract of insurance, a contract of guarantee is not based 
around speculation. Nor is the notion of a guarantee predicated upon the 
understanding that a party pays a premium in order to remain insured. At least 
from an investment regime standpoint, it is argued that guarantees involve no 
premium payable from the investor or sponsors to the host state. Moreover, there 
is an element of reliance upon the performance of another party and hence the 
entire structure relates to the imposition of a secondary obligation. In case of 
sovereign guarantees, the state guarantees the performance of the off-taker to 
purchase the electricity from the project company for a fixed period, or as 
stipulated within the provision of the PPA. As a result, under a sovereign 
guarantee framework the state will pay the project company any sums due under 
the PPA in case there is a breach perpetrated by the off-taker under the 
agreement.  
Moreover, Andrews & Millet submit that a contract of guarantee is narrower in 
its scope in comparison to a contract of insurance.441 As mentioned earlier, a 
contract of insurance comes into operation upon the occurrence of a specified 
event.442 Therefore, it can be seen why they have made the aforementioned 
submission.  
                                                
440 See Dane v Mortgage Insurance Corp Ltd [1894] 1 Q B 54 at 60.  
441 Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millet, The Law of Guarantees, (6th Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012) 
442 Prudential Insurance Co v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1904) 2 K B 658; see Seaton v 
Heath (1899) 1 Q B 782, wherein it is expressed that the insurer undertakes to pay the loss 
incurred by the insured in the event of certain specified contingencies occurring. 
 
231 
This section provides a broad outline concerning the two legal instruments. The 
primary argument rests on the understanding that an insurance instrument is, in 
essence, a contract of indemnity. As a result, broadly speaking, it imposes a 
primary liability upon the insurer to protect the creditor in the event that a 
specified event has occurred.  
5.3.2 MIGA’s PRI: A Reassuring model? 
There are several national, regional and international insurance agencies in the 
public and private domains that facilitate international investment and 
infrastructure development. This thesis specifically reviews MIGA’s PRI model, 
as one which mitigates investor risk, and facilitates investment flow to 
impoverished economies. There are two reasons why this study investigates and 
focuses on MIGA. First, it is impossible to discuss and analyse all risk insurance 
providers.443 The underlying contention of this study does not deal with political 
risk insurers per se, but the act of insuring through political risk insurance and 
providing an additional measure of security. Therefore, it seems more 
appropriate to focus on one agency, which demonstrates a stronger connection 
with infrastructure development. The second, and perhaps more compelling 
reason relates to MIGA being part of the operations and an arm of the World 
Bank Group (hereinafter referred to as “Group”). The Group has extensively 
advised Pakistan on several complex issues, and provided funding and technical 
expertise on fiscal and development issues. As a result, MIGA has a very close 
nexus with developing countries, especially Pakistan.  
                                                
443 This limitation is imposed due to the extensive products and the historical context of all the 
insurance providers. Moreover, since the primary focus of this thesis is to determine the adequacy 
of sovereign guarantee instruments, it did not warrant an extensive discussion on all the risk 
insurers.  
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A brief history of Pakistan’s relationship with the Group is as follows: Pakistan 
became a member of the Group on July 11, 1950444, three years after its 
independence. The World Bank’s advice on external financial assistance, large 
resources at their disposal, and their influence exercised through conditionalities 
has contributed towards strengthening the macro-economic framework, efficient 
monetary control and misallocations of resources brought about by high rates of 
inflation.445 Insofar as the influence exercised by the Group over Pakistan, 
Pakistan has been a beneficiary of the funds made available to it by the Group 
over the course of its six decades of membership. In a recent string of efforts to 
support Pakistan, the World Bank approved a loan of US$12bn, payable after 
thirty years. The World Bank highlighted that ‘the Government of Pakistan 
deserves appreciation for stabilising the economy, initiating reforms in the power 
sector as well as revenue mobilisation and drawing in the private sector for 
spurring growth’.446  
Over the last decade, Pakistan has received over US$49bn from various 
multilateral institutions.447 A significant proportion of this constitutes the amount 
                                                
444 Nigeria joined the World Bank on 30 March 1961; Kenya on 3 February 1964. Data available 
on <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members> Accessed on 15 June 2016.  For a 
detailed account of the history of the formation of the Bretton Woods and especially the World 
Bank, see Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, 
and the Crisis of Development (Island Press, Centre for Resource Economics, 2013) See Chapter 
3 specifically; also see Asif H Qureshi and Andreas R Ziegler, International Economic Law (3rd 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011).   
445 See Ariel Buira (ed), Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country 
Perspectives (Published for G24 Research Program, Anthem Press, 2003); also see Heena R 
Bakshi and R B Saxena, ‘IMF Conditionality—A Third World Perspective’ (1988) 22 Journal of 
World Trade, Issue 5, pp 67-79; also see Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, ‘Making sense of the IMF 
Conditionality Debate’ (1983) 17 J World Trade L 115.  
446 Katharine Houreld and Maria Golovnina, ‘World Bank approves $12 billion, five year-loan for 
Pakistan: Finance minister’ The Reuters (2 May 2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
pakistan-worldbank-loan-idUSBREA4108N20140502> Accessed 02 April 2016. 
447 Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the 
Crisis of Development, (Island Press, Centre for Resource Economics, 2013). Rich discusses the 
questions raised by Robert Thaft in the 1990s. Thaft argued ‘the Bank and the Fund are 
seemingly permanent, eternally expanding institutions, and there is little possibility that most 
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received from the IMF and the Group.448 Whereas the majority of the 
contributions made through the Bretton Woods organisations (IMF and World 
Bank) have been primarily as loans or aid, it is submitted that donor aid alone 
cannot build long-term, lasting economic growth.449 It is for this reason that the 
role of political risk insurers in general, and role of MIGA in particular, is 
extremely relevant. MIGA’s PRI helps to assuage any concerns highlighted by 
investors, and encourages them to invest in countries where they would 
otherwise hesitate without such assistance.450  
Moreover, in light of Pakistan’s energy crisis discussed throughout this study, 
MIGA’s extensive expertise on advising various parties in the sector gives it an 
eminent position.451 Amongst a list of recent transactions, MIGA provided AES 
Horizons Ltd with a guarantee for US$20million to cover part of US$223 million 
equity in the Maritza East 1 power project in Bulgaria. Another example of 
MIGA’s contribution towards promoting investment in the energy sector and 
demonstrating its expertise in the area is Vietnam’s Phu My Power Complex, 
which provides 8-10% of the country’s electricity. MIGA provided a guarantee 
of US$43.2million for equity investment, US$75 million for a non-shareholder 
                                                                                                                               
developing countries will ever pay off their burgeoning debts. The “solution” has been to lend 
them more and more, and to postpone the ultimate day of reckoning’.  
448 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Pakistan has received $49 billion in the last 10 years’ The Express Tribune 
(Islamabad, 7 August 2015) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/933617/foreign-loans-pakistan-has-
received-49-billion-in-last-10-years/> Accessed 07 August 2015. 
449 MIGA, Annual Report 2005 (Washington, MIGA) <www.miga.org> Accessed 02 June 2016. 
450 MIGA, Annual Report 2006 (Washington, MIGA) <www.miga.org>  02 June 2016. One of 
the primary goals of MIGA is to encourage the return of traditional infrastructure investors who 
have abandoned developing countries in search for safer investment climates.  
451 See MIGA, Annual Report 2003 (Washington, MIGA) <www.miga.org> Accessed April 
2016. The report submits that ‘as part of the World Bank group, MIGA brings a breadth of 
resources and experience that provides an added level of comfort for investors considering these 
types of water sector projects’. The report further touches upon an example: in the case of 
Guayaquil, MIGA’s guarantees played a crucial role in insuring that the project got off the 
ground. At the time of signing, potential shareholders were concerned about the country’s history 
of political risk. Without this insurance, the project was in danger of not moving forward.   
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loan, and US$15 million to cover a financing swap agreement.452 There are 
numerous examples of how MIGA can prove beneficial in supporting and 
countering the acute energy crisis faced by Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s endemic electricity crisis situation resonates with Bulgaria’s nuclear 
power projects in the 1980s. Seven nuclear power projects were issued LoIs to 
commence construction and development of nuclear energy. Only one of the 
seven projects, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Project, is still active. This is 
primarily because Bulgaria was unable to provide any guarantees insofar as the 
risk undertaken by the investors. Eventually, through a public-private partnership 
structure, the Bulgarian authorities participated and shared the risk taken by the 
investors. In view of increasing budget constraints and fiscal stress, sovereign 
finance is no longer a viable option. As a result, PRI in Pakistan’s energy sector 
can be viewed as an ancillary, additional form of security to promote and direct 
more investment in the energy market.  
Through perusal of various reports, and informal discussions with members of 
the government, it is fair to argue that the strong relationship that exists between 
Pakistan and the Group can be used as a leverage point to further increase 
investor confidence in its energy sector. The next section aims to provide 
extensive information of the range of products offered by MIGA that could 
mutually benefit the parties in their endeavour to address the endemic energy 
crisis.  
                                                
452 See MIGA, Annual Report 2006 (Washington, MIGA) <www.miga.org> Accessed 06 April 
2016. MIGA has been active in participating in transactions to guarantee an investor’s interests 
and to promote investment in the infrastructure development. It is submitted that amongst the 
projects highlighted above, other notable projects MIGA was involved include: 450MW 
Ashyuganj Power Station Company Limited, the expansion of Angola’s Cambambe 
Hydroelectric Power Plant and Pakistan’s 147MW Star Hydro Power Ltd project.  
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5.3.3 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
Insurance schemes are not a legal guarantee against the occurrence of an 
expropriatory measure or breach of contract by the off-taking body in a volatile 
jurisdiction. An insurance instrument simply guarantees the investor adequate 
indemnity when any such event occurs.453  
One of the fundamental planks of an investment insurance instrument is 
predicated on the assumption that by purchasing political risk insurance, 
investors can spare themselves the expense, delay and inconvenience of pursuing 
claims against the host country’s government. Consider the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “NNPC”) case: IPCO instituted 
a claim against NNPC in 2004; at the time of writing, IPCO has received no 
compensation from the NNPC! 
Referring to Lord Esher M R’s remarks in Dane v Mortgage Insurance Corp, it 
is argued that the ‘cause of loss’ will result in the insured party reserving the 
right to payment from the insurance provider if a specified event occurred.454 The 
introduction and rise of investment insurance instruments have become popular 
due to a decline in investment trend towards developing countries.455 The 
perceptible decline in investment in developing countries was highlighted by the 
World Bank’s report in 1985. The World Bank estimated that investment 
                                                
453 See Hasan S Zakariya, ‘Insurance against the political risk of petroleum investment’ (1986) 4 
J Energy & Natural Resources L 217.  
454 Vance R Koven, ‘Expropriation and the Jurisprudence of OPIC’ (1981) 22 Harvard 
International Law Journal 269, 270. 
455 See Marina Von Newmann Whitman, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment 
(Princeton University Press, 1965). Whitman states that economists recognised that fear of the 
unfamiliar will often lead an investor to keep his money at home when he could earn more on it 
abroad. Whitman relies on Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations; David Ricardo, Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation, VII. 
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amounting to about US$17bn in 1981 fell to US$12bn in 1982, and to US$8bn in 
1983.456 Investors were reluctant to invest, primarily due to the risk of either not 
being paid any revenue for the product offered by the project company or due to 
an imminent expropriation measure introduced by the host state.  
During this time period, wherein FDI was faltering, and the existing national or 
regional investment insurance schemes either precluded certain form of 
investment or investors457, there was a need for a multilateral insurance agency. 
Such an agency would address these shortcomings in order to facilitate and 
encourage investment flows to the developing countries.458 Ibrahim Shihata was 
one of the strong advocates of capitalising on a growing opportunity to facilitate 
investment in developing economies.459 This was a period when LDCs were 
cautious about foreign investment. They were suspicious that along with the 
investment, the Western political-economic agenda would also be forced upon 
various institutions within the host state, thus inculcating Western policies into 
the existing political regime’s ideology.460 These countries, often haunted by 
colonial times, viewed FDI as a means of economic imperialism. Perera, who 
                                                
456 See The World Bank, Report on MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(September/October, 1985) p 2; also see Hasan S Zakariya, ‘Insurance against the political risks 
of petroleum investment’ (1986) 4 J Energy & Natural Resources L 217. 
457 See Motomichi Ikawa, ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1999) 31 Stud 
Transnational Legal Policy 21. 
458 See Richard B Alsop, ‘The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency’, (1986-
1987) 25 Colum J Transnational L 101. Also see Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘The settlement of disputes 
regarding foreign investment: the role of the World Bank, with particular reference to ICSID and 
MIGA’(1986) 1 Am U J Int’l L & Policy 97. 
459 Richard B Alsop, ‘The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency’, (1986-1987) 
25 Colum  J Transnational L 101; Paola Morales Torrado, ‘Political Risk Insurance and Breach 
of Contract Coverage: How the Intervention of Domestic Courts may prevent investors from 
claiming insurance’ (2005) 17 PACE Int’l L Rev 301.  
460 See Patrick J Donovan, ‘Creeping Expropriation and MIGA: The need for tighter regulation in 
the political risk insurance market’ (2003-2004) 7 Gonz J Int’l L 1; investment from foreign 
parties was also viewed as an extension of the economic colonialism. Local far-right political 
forces and pressure groups felt that by bringing investment the host country will be influenced 
over their policies.  
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made a valid submission concerning the introduction of a multilateral insurance 
body, noted another interesting submission. Perera461 notes: 
Proposals for multilateral investments came at a time when the 
call for nationalism was at its zenith. Newly independent 
countries sought increasingly to control their own natural 
resources and at a minimum sought to shift the bargaining 
power away from large oil and ore producing corporation that 
were dominating the natural resource areas.  
The increasing demand for a multilateral investment agency dealing with a 
widespread endemic issue concerning investment led to the inception of MIGA 
in 1988.462 At the time only few people believed or anticipated the usefulness of 
a multilateral political risk insurer.463 Since then, MIGA has grown as an 
organisation facilitating investment in developing and developed countries. 
While it can be argued that foreign investment in developing or LDCs is not a 
panacea for surmounting the challenges of poverty reduction, job creation and 
                                                
461 See Srilal Mohan Perera, Techniques in Protecting Foreign Investments Against Political Risk 
(University Microfilms International, 1986). Perera’s primary moot point in his doctoral thesis 
was that the MIGA did not come into play sooner due to the nationalist concerns raised various 
LDCs with the World Bank. Also see Don Wallace, Jr. and David B. Bailey, ‘Exceptions and 
Conditions: The Inevitability of the National Treatment of FDI with Increasingly Few and 
Narrow Exceptions’ (1998) 31 Cornell Int’l L J 615, 616. Wallace and Bailey note that 
historically: ‘[I]n the past World War II era, the initial concern was investment protection against 
expropriation, followed later by the desire of lesser-developed countries (LDCs) to create a “new 
international economic order” to replace the Bretton Woods System. LDCs wanted this new 
international economic order to include codes (the negotiation of which some thought would give 
rise to “soft law”) that would control multinational corporations (MNCs) and their practices and 
have a general redistributive effect.  
462 See Patrick J Donovan, ‘Creeping expropriation and MIGA: The need for tighter regulation in 
the political risk insurance market’ (2003-2004) 7 Gonz J Int’l L 1; also note that even though 
MIGA was created in April 1988, it was only in 1992 that MIGA achieved, “critical mass”—
country membership rose to about one hundred, and the guarantee business began a surge of 
growth. See Motomichi Ikawa, ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1999) 31 Stud 
Transnational Legal Policy 21. 
463 Motomichi Ikawa, ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1999) 31 Stud Transnational 
Legal Policy 21.  
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economic uplift, it is submitted that investment is a pivotal plank in the overall 
strategy towards successful and sustainable development, that ultimately creates 
jobs and economic growth.464 MIGA’s role primarily concerns encouraging the 
flow of investments for productive purposes among member countries, and in 
particular to developing member countries.465 MIGA’s preamble also highlights 
that the flow of foreign investment to developing countries would be facilitated 
and further encouraged by alleviating concerns relating to non-commercial risks, 
and can further strengthen international cooperation for economic development 
to foster private foreign investment.466  
There is a sense of 'security by association' which arises when dealing with an 
organisation that has government backing, as in the OPIC model of providing 
assistance, where OPIC utilised their association with the US Government to 
facilitate investment and resolve investment disputes. During the Dabhol Power 
Project, MIGA too provided an ancillary service to its principal business (acting 
as a risk insurer), by bringing an aura of security arising from association with 
the Group. MIGA’s interaction with political administrations in various parts of 
the world gives it an advantage in carrying out research, providing technical 
                                                
464 See Adam L Masser, ‘The Nexus of Public and Private in Foreign Direct Investment: An 
analysis of IFC, MIGA, and OPIC’ (2008-2009) 32 Fordham Int’l L J 1698. Masser also argues 
that FDI is, quite simply, the activities of private investors who are investing in the private sector 
of a foreign state. It is a key element of development; increasing the capacity of the private sector 
in the developing world will allow more the benefits of trade to reach the world’s poorest people.  
465 See Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
<www.miga.org>  
466 See Preamble of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
<www.miga.org> 
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assistance and policy advice to developing countries, in order to restructure or 
improve their investment regime.467 
These ancillary benefits ensuing from involving MIGA may not be considered a 
secondary activity of MIGA, but a vital part of its mandate. Some criticism may 
be made as a result of these services: some argue that these services are an 
encroachment on a state’s sovereignty. However, there is a widespread view that 
MIGA’s role as an institution providing technical assistance, policy advice, and 
carrying out research is, in essence, their method of understanding the risks 
involved in a particular transaction and mitigating them.468 Romer L J made a 
similar observation in Seaton v Heath, wherein he submitted that: 
[T]he person desiring to be insured has means of knowledge as 
to the risk, and the insurer has not the means or not the same 
means. The insured generally puts the risk before the insurer as 
a business transaction, and the insurer on the risk stated fixes a 
proper price to remunerate him for the risk undertaken…469  
As discussed earlier, the principal purpose of MIGA is to remove barriers for 
FDI surrounding developing, volatile economies, insofar as the element of risk 
                                                
467 See A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘The pursuit of stability in international energy investment 
contracts: A critical appraisal of the emerging trends’ (2008) Journal of Energy Law & Business, 
Vol 1, No 2 121; also see Celine Tan, ‘Risky business: political risk insurance and the law and 
governance of natural resources’ (2015) Int’l Journal of Law in Context, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp174-
194. 
468 In an insurance rationality, risk transforms an unpredictable or uncertain event into a 
calculable probability that can be assigned an economic value if and when it occurs, so that what 
is insured against is not the loss or injury suffered as a consequence of the occurrence of the 
insured event but ‘a capital against whose loss the insurer offers a guarantee’. See Francois 
Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Garden and Peter Miller (ed), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press) 197-210. 
469 See (1899) 1 Q B 782, 792-793; also see Michael C Blair, ‘The Conversion of Guarantee 
Contracts’, (1966) 29 Mod L Rev 522.  
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bars investment from developed or other developing/transition economies.470 
Article 11 of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (hereinafter referred to as “Convention”) outlines risks covered by 
MIGA. 
Article 11. Covered Risk471  
(a) subject to the provisions of Sections (b) and (c) below, the 
Agency may guarantee eligible investments against a loss 
resulting from one or more of the following types of risk: 
(i) Currency Transfer 
Any introduction attributable to the host government of 
restrictions on the transfer outside the host country of its 
currency into a freely usable currency or another currency 
acceptable to the holder of the guarantee, including a failure of 
the host government to act within a reasonable period of time 
on an application by such holder of such transfer; 
(ii) Expropriation and Similar Measures 
any legislative action or administrative action or omission 
attributable to the host government which has the effect of 
depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control 
                                                
470 See Valentina Okaru-Bisant, ‘Overcoming Challenges in the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency’s Risk Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: Corruption and 
Consumer Risks’, (2012) 57 S D L Rev 277. Bisant submits that ‘MIGA has the ability to deter 
some harmful action to private investors. MIGA also has the ability to help investors access and 
obtain project financing and its guaranteed loans may help reduce risk-capital ratings of projects.  
471 See the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
<www.miga.org> Accessed 06 June 2017. 
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of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the 
exception of non-discriminatory measures of general 
application which governments normally take for the purpose of 
regulating economic activity in their territories; 
(iii) Breach of Contract 
any repudiation or breach by the host government of a contract 
with the holder of a guarantee, when (a) the holder of a 
guarantee does not have recourse to a judicial or arbitral forum 
to determine the claim of repudiation or breach, or (b) a 
decision by such forum is not rendered within such reasonable 
period of time as shall be prescribed in the contracts of 
guarantee pursuant to the Agency’s regulations, or (c) such a 
decision cannot be enforced; and  
(iv) War and Civil Disturbance 
 any military action or civil disturbance in any territory of the 
host country to which this Convention shall be applicable as 
provided in Article 66. 
MIGA provides an extensive cover to potential investors in order to promote 
investment. As highlighted in the political risk section (section 5.2, Navigating 
Political Risk) risk cannot always be quantified.472 However, it can be calculated 
by attaching a proximate numerical value based on the probability of its 
                                                
472 Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country Risk from Theory to Practice’ (May 2012) SACE 
<www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?>.  Accessed 03 May 2016. 
The concept of risk is not easily quantifiable, and the numerous steps compound the difficulty to 
its measurement involved.  
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occurrence: a premium. Consequently, if the anticipated risk occurs, the insured 
is indemnified against such occurrence. Article 11 discusses the forms of risks 
covered under the Convention. For the purposes of our study, it is submitted that 
‘breach of contract’, and ‘non-honouring of financial obligations by SOEs forms 
a fundamental part of this thesis.  
In light of the discussion on liquidity crisis within the energy cycle in Pakistan, it 
is argued that breach of contract by off-taking bodies poses a significant risk. 
Moreover, MIGA’s global survey in 2009 indicates that investors are more 
concerned about breach of contract, non-honouring of government guarantees 
and adverse regulatory changes, which can result in investment loss, than 
outright expropriation,473 thus illustrating the trend that promotes use of more 
robust security measures. Research undertaken as part of this study illustrates 
that the topmost priority for Pakistan is to address the liquidity crisis. However, 
the notion of liquidity issues is not predicated on one strand. In order to address 
investor concerns, Pakistan’s best hope is to encourage use of MIGA’s PRI 
model to uplift the investment regime before a regulatory overhaul can be 
undertaken.  
From an in-depth analysis of the reports published by MIGA from 2009 to 2016, 
it can be concluded that risk insurance has grown in popularity. However, despite 
an array of risks experienced by investors, the majority of investors are still 
either agonising over how political risk can be mitigated most effectively, or 
prefer the informal methods of risk mitigation.474 Amongst a wide variety of risk-
                                                
473 MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2009 <www.miga.org> Accessed 03 May 2017. 
474 MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2011 < www.miga.org> Accessed 03 May 2017. 
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mitigation methods present, investors feel that joint ventures (hereinafter referred 
to as “JVs”) with local businesses in the host state, building relationships with 
key political leaders, or engagement with local community can informally 
support risk mitigation. Whether there is any credibility to such measures is 
questionable. It is argued that these measures might provide short-term remedies, 
however cases like IPCO, HUBCO, and Riqo Diq provide strong indications to 
dispel any suggestion contrary to an actual third party insurance scheme, separate 
from the state’s formal risk mitigation.475 
MIGA’s published reports have one theme in common. All the reports maintain 
that governmental interference through breach of contract or SOE not honouring 
their financial commitments is the key risk that concerns an investor.476 In view 
of the uncertainty surrounding SOEs and especially off-taking bodies in 
Pakistan’s energy sector, it is suggested that the notion of independence of these 
entities is qualified. Despite increasing concerns regarding breach of contractual 
agreements or PPAs by host state or its agencies, investors are still looking at 
other alternative measures to mitigate such risks. One of the reasons why this 
may be the case is primarily because developing countries over-sell the idea of 
security to these investors.  
For example, at a workshop hosted in London’s Centre for Commercial Legal 
Studies, the Managing Director of Private Power Infrastructure Board 
                                                
475 MIGA’s report argues that PRI can be a very effective tool to hedge against cataclysmic and 
unexpected risk events such as the Arab Spring. See MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk, 
2011. The risk insurance model offered by MIGA ensures that any uncertain event is minimised 
due to the influence exercised through these multilateral bodies. 
476 MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk, 2011; MIGA, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-
17, MIGA (2015) <www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 01 
January 2016; MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk, 2009 <www.miga.org> Accessed 24 
January 2016. 
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(hereinafter referred to as “PPIB”) emphasised on the robust nature of the 
contractual security offered by Pakistan.477 He further highlighted that the 
security features are exemplary. In light of the discussion undertaken in Chapter 
1 concerning the circular debt nemesis, there is a discrepancy as to what is being 
offered (and sold) and what an investor actually receives once a project company 
commences operations. In fact, it is the lack of understanding amongst some 
investors concerning these government security packages that eventually lead to 
unfulfilled expectations.   
 
Figure 5.9: Interest in PRI 478 
As outlined in MIGA’s PRI survey illustrated above in Figure 5.9, 40% of the 
respondents felt that PRI would be considered when investing abroad, 57% felt 
that they were either not sure or would not consider PRI. The results of this pie 
chart were gathered in 2009, and it is argued that the situation has changed since 
                                                
477 The workshop was hosted in London through funding from the Economic Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and in collaboration with Professor. Raphael Heffron (Queen Mary, University 
of London) on 26th January 2017. 
478 Interest in Political Risk Insurance. MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2009. Question—do you 
expect your company to consider political risk insurance for its investment abroad? MIGA, 
World Investment and Political Risk 2009 <www.miga.org> Accessed 13 January 2016.  
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then.479 Whereas it is hard to judge the growing popularity of the risk insurance 
industry as a whole, figures drawn from the MIGA report indicate that there has 
been a rise in the number of PRI issued over the years, as the gross exposure of 
the agency grows amid signs of increasing political risk.  
PRI is a redundancy measure to provide an additional recourse for the project 
company sponsors, or in cases where a party has breached their debt service 
repayment, the lenders, to be able to recoup their losses. However, seeking 
recompense is one of the reasons to draw a PRI.  
Another prevalent view that demonstrates similarity between a sovereign 
guarantee and PRI instrument is predicated on the understanding that such 
security instruments are drawn to raise debt finance. As part of the research 
undertaken for this project, there is an implicit contention that shows PRI drawn 
in order to satisfy the lender’s requirements to raise finance. After FC has been 
achieved, the insurance policy is generally cancelled. An extensive study of the 
reports published by MIGA vindicates this concern. In two instances, the reports 
have illuminated the aspect of MIGA’s role wherein investors, EPC contractors, 
or the project company have used MIGA’s services to illustrate to the lenders, 
mainly foreign financial institutions, that in case there is a breach on any of the 
contracted provisions, MIGA will indemnify the contracting party. However, 
                                                
479 See MIGA, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17, (2015) 
<www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 29 January 2016. The 
report discusses that ‘the PRI market as a whole has grown at an average rate of 12% per year for 
the last seven years. The bulk of activity in the private sector PRI market is in countries rated 
investment grade (BBB-) or better, while MIGA has been most active in the higher risk countries 
rated BB, B, CCC, and below CC…MIGA’s business has been growing at an average rate of 8% 
per year over the past 12 years, and that growth accelerated over the last few years, in part, as a 
result of the convention changes’.  
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once the project’s FC has been achieved, the contract is cancelled. MIGA 
highlights this as follows:  
In fiscal year 2008, 50 contracts were cancelled. In addition, 
four contracts were replaced. The majority of cancellations took 
place when the investment was successful from a financial 
standpoint, and in most cases, the investor’s perception of 
political risk had improved. Such cancellations illustrates that 
MIGA is achieving its mandate of encouraging foreign 
investors and lenders into markets they perceive as risky and 
supporting them until they feel comfortable enough to bear the 
risks on their own.480  
MIGA’s report outlines that cancellations only occur once an investor is instilled 
with confidence to proceed with an investment. The cancellation of the policy 
generally takes place when the investment is considered successful from a 
financial standpoint, or when perceptions of political risk have improved.481 
Banks, private equity firms and hedge funds are, primarily, in the majority of the 
cases, major contributors towards the finance raised. It can therefore be argued 
that PRI promotes moral hazard482.  
                                                
480 MIGA, Annual Report 2008 <www.miga.org> Accessed 12 January 2016. 
481 MIGA, Annual Report 2010 <www.miga.org> Accessed 12 January 2016. The report argues 
that MIGA’s 2010 report submits ‘that a total of 31 contracts were cancelled this fiscal year 
compared to 11 in 2009, and 54 in 2007. Cancellations generally take place when the investment 
is considered successful from a financial standpoint or when perceptions of political risk have 
improved. 
482 See Tom Baker, ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’ (1996-1997) 75. Tex L Rev 237, 
wherein Baker argues that Hazard has been imported from an old French word ‘Hasart’ in the 
mid-sixteenth century. Baker also argues that ‘moral hazard has never been a straight forward, 
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This contention supporting PRI as a moral hazard can be explained using the 
example of a lifesaving vest. A lifesaving vest performs a dual purpose: first, it 
can be used to save an individual who is drowning, and therefore save a life. 
Second, it can be used to allow individuals who are learning to swim to enjoy 
deep-water swimming without fear of drowning. PRI instruments may be 
correlated to this concept. With an insurance instrument promising to indemnify 
an investor in case there is a breach, investors and lenders will be encouraged to 
invest in jurisdictions wherein they would not otherwise invest. 
A classic example of moral hazard is reflected through the 2007 financial crisis. 
With central banks acting as ‘lenders of last resort’, the provision that there was 
an ‘insurance’ scheme effectively waiting to indemnify the losses incurred by the 
banks led to irrational, pervasive risk-taking behaviour, resulting in the financial 
institutions lending to individuals who were unable to pay and whom could least 
afford these services. These poor investments were then packaged together: 
multiple sub-prime mortgages rolled into one product, to sell onto other rich 
investors, even creating credit default swaps (“CDS”) to bet against the market 
practices.483 Consequently, banks and other financial institutions took more risk 
due to the presence of safety nets.484 
                                                                                                                               
purely logical or scientific concept. It had a non-rational, performative dimension for the 
nineteenth century insurers who coined the term, just as it does today. 
483 See Nazanin Baseri, ‘Credit Default Swaps and Clearing’ (2011) American University 
Legislation and Policy Brief, 7-38; Angus Duncan, ‘Loan-only Credit Default Swaps: The March 
to Liquidity’ (Sept-Oct 2006) 21 Com Lending Rev 15, pp 15-18; Steven A Sibo, ‘Credit Default 
Swaps: How should they be regulated’ (2013) Dartmouth Law Journal, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp 54-81.  
484 See Henry Kolbus, ‘The Moral Hazard and the Increased Risk’ (1948) Ins L J 731; also see 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D Logue, ‘Outsourcing regulation: How insurance reduces moral 
hazard’ (2012-2013) 111 Mich L Rev 197 wherein it is submitted that ‘Insurance arrangements—
by using such tools as deductibles, exclusions, and experience rating—give private parties the 
incentive to reduce risks. Insurance is a business that specialises in risk management. Insurers 
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However, MIGA’s report illustrates policy cancellation as a positive instruction. 
MIGA argues that their involvement and support leads investors to become more 
confident about investing in a volatile jurisdiction. This contention may be true 
to an extent; however, as there is an increasing chance of dispute arising as a 
result of scarcity of resources, it is unlikely that the investors, or their highly-
leveraged enterprises, will be able to seek recourse without waiting in the host 
state courts. As agriculture and land investment in Africa is increasing, it is 
argued that most sellers or investors are taking account of the scarcity of water 
sources. This, in light of the cancellation of policies, can be problematic for 
investors in the long run.  
Government of Host State
Project Company 
(Special Purpose 
Vehicle)
Private 
Investors
Commercial Bank 
or lender
Equity
Project Agreement
Government 
Undertaking or 
Guarantee
Project Loan
Indemnity Agreement
 
Figure 5.10: Illustration of how MIGA operates 
The role of an insurance instrument in a project finance transaction is not to 
replace the sovereign guarantee framework altogether, but to provide an 
additional layer of security to further strengthen the sovereign guarantee. As 
outlined in Figure 5.10, above, both measures operate on a level-playing field, 
alongside each other. They are not competing against each other, but 
                                                                                                                               
assemble large actuarial databases and use them both ex ante in underwriting the risk they insure 
and ex-post in verifying claims by separating valid from frivolous ones.  
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complement each other. In a typical project finance transaction involving the 
provision of a sovereign guarantee and a PRI, there are three facets involved. 
First, the host state will sign a LoS, also known as a sovereign guarantee, with 
the project company. Second, the project company approaches the multilateral 
insurance agency, MIGA. This project agreement is an insurance document. The 
third contractual arrangement is between the host state and MIGA, wherein the 
host state agrees to indemnify the risk insurer in case there is breach of sovereign 
guarantee by the state or breach of the PPA. Consequently, there is a complex 
web of contractual arrangements, each dependent on the other. This arrangement 
illustrates that a sovereign guarantee framework is critical for the insurer too. 
However, it can be argued that the enforcement of PPAs and timely payments for 
a private investor will be different under the structure involving a multilateral 
institution like the Group, in comparison to a sovereign guarantee model acting 
in a vacuum. Moreover, historically, it is noted that sovereign states are reluctant 
to breach their contractual measures against multilateral institutions, due to the 
systemic effect such breaches may have with other contingent agreements.  
5.3.4 Are Risk Insurance and Sovereign Guarantee Instruments different? 
Unlike section 5.3.1, this section is not an illustration of the differences between 
the two instruments. This section highlights their characteristic value insofar as 
their incorporation within an investment regime to uplift investor confidence. 
The term ‘instrument’ refers to an apparatus. In an international investment 
context, these security arrangements, risk insurance, and sovereign guarantees 
are an apparatus to mitigate risk. 
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In a PRI model, the insurance is a guarantee, in its abstract sense, that reassures 
the sponsors (or the lenders) that they will be fully or partially indemnified by a 
third party. It is important to highlight the presence of a third party—unlike a 
sovereign guarantee arrangement, wherein the third party, along with the off-
taker, is ostensibly part of the state’s organic structure. From a project finance 
standpoint, it is submitted that in reference to the notion of certainty and security, 
an insurance model under a PRI is likely to provide a more robust form of 
security than a sovereign guarantee instrument under its current framework.  
From the outset, the larger question presented in light of the above submission 
relates to the proposition: whether the presence of one instrument can replace the 
other? As illustrated in Figure 5.10, above, despite an insurance instrument 
signed with MIGA, the state still needs to provide a sovereign guarantee, along 
with an indemnity agreement to be signed with MIGA. This logical explanation 
subdues the suggestion that one framework can replace the other. A PRI model is 
an optional mode of operation. A sovereign guarantee, especially under 
Pakistan’s existing framework, is offered as a blanket guarantee regardless of the 
size of the project being commissioned.     
Moreover, in light of the liquidity crisis, it is questionable whether in the absence 
of effective regulation, either model will prove effective for the host state or 
provide any robust selection of security to the investors. For example, in 
Pakistan, the state pays as soon as the off-taking body defaults. However, a 
proposition to add a ‘third wheel’ to this arrangement, in the absence of clearly 
defined legal frameworks, is not addressing the real problem. As a result, in light 
of the proposition made in Chapter 3—renaming a sovereign guarantee 
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framework as a sovereign indemnity—one issue is being replaced with another. 
Similarly, replacement models such as PRI, especially when established by 
multilateral organisations like MIGA, will have significant ramifications in the 
event of default for the host state. As illustrated throughout this study, the state’s 
inability to effectively manage SOEs and lack of regulation will cause defaults 
regardless.485 However, any defaults under a multilateral arrangement will 
adversely affect other funding tranches. These may affect other development 
projects.   
Without prejudice to the discussion undertaken above, it is argued that the 
primary machinery within PRI is contingent upon a sovereign guarantee, 
regardless of whether such is offered to a sponsor. However, it is pertinent to 
mention the secondary, implicit role of MIGA’s PRI. As briefly mentioned 
earlier, the role of PRI is to enhance confidence and instill trust within lenders, in 
order to facilitate development projects.   
Furthermore, the PRI instrument is inclined towards deterrence rather than an 
outright, complete protection.486 Reviewing the reports published by MIGA, it is 
submitted that remarks made by MIGA’s then Executive Vice President 
                                                
485 MIGA, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17 (2015) 
<www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 14 February 2016. The 
report submits that MIGA employs a risk-based pricing, based on country risk assessments for 
individual PRI covers (transfer restriction, expropriation, breach of contract, war and civil 
disturbance). Ratings for SOEs are prepared on a case-by-case basis, the approach for which is 
currently being refined.   
486 One can argue that the driving force behind the rapid growth of the political risk insurance 
market, which is estimated to be growing at 30-40% annually, is increasing the capability of 
private insurers to meet the insurance needs of international investors and lenders. It is also 
interesting to read another perspective wherein it is highlighted that PRI seems to remain 
discretionary purchase as margins became thinner and many established investors feel that their 
balance sheets are strong enough to warrant the risk of not insuring the investment. See MIGA, 
MIGA Annual Report 2000 <www.miga.org>  
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(hereinafter referred to as “EVP”) illustrate the binary character played by MIGA 
as an institution promoting investment. The EVP highlighted: 
[T]his past year, we registered one claim, which is under 
review, for a project that we have guaranteed in Argentina, 
linked to the larger financial crisis in the country. We are 
working closely with the investor and the Argentinian 
government to resolve the matter. This claim is only the second 
to have been registered with MIGA, which demonstrates the 
effectiveness of MIGA’s umbrella of deterrence and ability to 
resolve investor disputes.487 
MIGA’s binary role: actively seeking to promote investment in LDCs and 
volatile jurisdictions, and to resolve disputes that may have an adverse impact on 
the investment regime overall or those guaranteed by MIGA. The latter function 
assumed by MIGA has worked to the benefit of both the parties; the host state 
and the investor. As a tool of deterrence, it is argued that MIGA’s auspices under 
the umbrella of the Group gives it this unique, privileged position.488 By actively 
seeking to resolve disputes, MIGA not only allows guaranteed investments to 
remain in the host country and operate as planned, but also avoids harming the 
investment reputation of the host country.489 As of 2015, MIGA has paid five 
                                                
487 MIGA, Annual Report 2003 <www.miga.org> 
488 Also see MIGA, Investment Guarantee Guide (July 2015) <www.miga.org> Accessed 21 
April 2016. The report submits ‘…unique strength from the World Bank Group and members 
including most countries of the world. This enables MIGA to provide an umbrella of deterrence 
against government action that could disrupt projects, and assist in the resolution of disputes 
between investors and governments. MIGA also adds value through its ability to offer clients 
extensive knowledge of emerging markets and of international best practice in environmental and 
social management’. 
489 MIGA, Annual Report 2005 <www.miga.org> Accessed 21 June 2017. 
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claims in various investment disputes to investors. This figure does not reflect 
the number of disputes resolved by MIGA. However, as an agency with a 
US$64.2bn490 in loans, grants, equity investments, and guarantees to partner 
countries and private businesses, and US$4.3bn in guarantees in the year 2016 
alone, these figures are an illustration of a larger role played by MIGA as a 
deterrence instrument.491 A similar submission was outlined in MIGA’s Strategic 
Directions document. The report highlights that MIGA instils confidence among 
investors seeking to secure private investment flows against political and 
sovereign risks. MIGA has been able to do this by leveraging its strength as a 
member of the Group, with access to knowledge, experience, and key decision-
makers that other providers cannot match.492 
It is therefore argued that Pakistan faces immense challenges in addressing its 
existing energy crisis. Whereas the enhancement of sovereign guarantee 
framework is a long term, and even implicitly challenging exercise, the PRI 
                                                
490 See MIGA, Annual Report 2016 <www.miga.org> Accessed 21 June 2017. The report 
outlines the agencies exposure according to various regions. Latin America & the Caribbean: 
US$11.4bn, Europe & Central Asia: US$10.3bn, East Asia & the Pacific US$11.4bn, South Asia 
US$11.3bn, Middle East & North Africa: US$6.3bn and Sub Saharan Africa US$13.3bn.  
491 See MIGA, Annual Report 2015 <www.miga.org> Accessed  21 June 2017. MIGA paid two 
claims during the fiscal year 2005. One was US$144,600 for a small war and civil disturbance 
claim filed in relation to a hydroelectric plant in Nepal that was the target of an attack by Maoist 
guerrillas in 2002. MIGA also paid a claim to Mitsubishi International Cooperation with respect 
to its loan guaranty to Bank of Tokyo-Buenos Aires Branch. While a decision to pay the claim in 
the amount of $1.396 million was made, only $55,311 has been paid to date; the remainder will 
be paid subject to the guarantee holder’s compliance with certain requirements; no claims were 
paid in fiscal year 2006; no claims were paid in fiscal year 2007; no claims were paid in fiscal 
year 2008; two claims were paid during fiscal year 2009; no claims paid in fiscal year 2013. 
492 See MIGA, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17, <www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-
17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 22 March 2016. Another interesting observation made by the report 
highlights that MIGA has developed its role as a leader in the political risk insurance industry 
over the past several years, notably with the publication of its reports on political and FDI. 
Another interesting submission is made by Valentina Okaru-Bisant, ‘Overcoming challenges in 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s Risk Insurance Coverage to Private Water 
Investors: Corruption and Consumer Risks’ (2012) 57 S D L Rev 277. Bisant argues that MIGA’s 
risk insurance program has several advantages to private investors. One of these advantages is the 
access to finance, primarily due to the involvement of MIGA as a risk mitigator under the 
auspices of the World Bank Group, seems ideal to lenders. 
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model can uplift the country’s investment outlook in the short term. Baird, 
Gertner & Picker493 and Miranda make a similar observation concerning deposit 
insurance schemes. Miranda emphasised: 
…[T]hat the lender of last resort should not be a permanent 
practice of central banks, rather a temporary emergency 
measure applicable only when the whole economy is at stake. 
Hence, it should not aim at preventing key banks from failing as 
a consequence of its poor management, but to avoid a resultant 
wave of failures disseminating through the system. If banks are 
bad, they will probably become worse if the government 
sustains and encourages them.494 
Similarly, the use of PRI in Pakistan’s energy sector can provide a boost to 
capital inflow, and even strengthen the existing sovereign guarantee framework 
to the extent that investors understand the presence of an ancillary framework 
supporting the primary framework. It will not only provide a great stepping-stone 
for Pakistan’s energy sector, it will also circumvent hurdles to attract investment. 
 
 
                                                
493 It is interesting to read the analysis undertaken in Douglas G Baird, Robert H Gertner, and 
Randal C Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard University Press, 1994) 62. An interesting 
analysis follows course. It is argued that where banks knowingly enter into risky transactions, 
they do so on the basis that there is an insurance regime protecting their behaviour. It is submitted 
that whereas the risk of default is high (and so is the probability of a bank run) it is argued that 
banks in hindsight will not be promiscuous in their approach. They would exercise due care and 
due diligence in order to understand risk better, and make thorough decisions.   
494 Andres Curia Miranda, ‘Moral hazard and how it was invoked in the Northern Rock crisis of 
2007’ (2010) 2 King’s Student L Rev 27. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aligns well with the discussion concerning the inadequacy of 
sovereign guarantee instruments. The primary rationale for incorporating a third-
party guarantor is predicated on the assumption that in the event the primary 
debtor is in breach of their contractual obligation; the surety will step into the 
principal debtor’s shoes. As a result, the creditor is secure. Whilst providing a 
continuation of the discussion undertaken in Chapter 4, this chapter attempts to 
carry out a discursive analysis that highlights any additional security measures 
that can be incorporated in Pakistan’s energy market to attract, sustain, and build 
a long-term investment regime.  
The above discussion introduces the concept of political risk in a broader 
context, and then moves to address the critical issues from Pakistan’s standpoint. 
In a bid to explain all the prevailing political risk issues, this chapter attempts to 
align the concepts of expropriation and contractual repudiation in view of the 
liquidity issues in Pakistan’s energy cycle. Moreover, the proposition whether 
sovereign guarantees should be replaced with PRI has been discussed. It 
contends that PRI cannot replace the existing framework completely. As a result, 
the PRI framework ought to be viewed as an additional security framework. As 
discussed extensively, the PRI structure involves a sovereign guarantee 
framework in order to indemnify the risk insurer. Therefore, this chapter 
advances the thesis that host states generally, and Pakistan in particular, need to 
revamp their approach towards investment protection. In any case, the concept 
underlying PRI and the dual security approach is adopted herein.  
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The argument that investors may employ a wide array of informal risk-mitigation 
measures to counter breach of sovereign guarantees is rebutted. Involving local 
pressure groups, forging local partnerships, and seeking favourable terms within 
the project agreements are beneficial, however without any real recourse. Cases 
like IPCO, HUBCO and Riqo Diq provide evidence to negate such contentions. 
In view of short-term commitments, such measures provide some comfort to the 
sponsors. However, the PRI model is a long-term instrument of robust 
protection.  
However, as discussed and highlighted in Figure 5.10, above, it is unclear 
whether PRI is an effective measure against contractual breaches by SOEs. It is 
understood that the SOEs play a pivotal role in ensuring compliance with PPAs. 
In view of the discussion undertaken above, it is illustrated that the PRI 
framework works on a parallel scale, in addition to a sovereign guarantee 
structure. The beneficiaries of sovereign undertakings are two parties: the project 
company and the risk insurer. However, in the absence of ‘doing-away’ with 
sovereign guarantees completely, the arguments presented in the previous 
chapter are defeated. In view of the PRI model discussed above, there is 
likelihood that debt sustainability still renders such measures problematic. The 
IMF’s report highlights that guarantees are a ‘legitimate form of government 
support’ for infrastructure when the government is best placed to anticipate risk, 
control risk exposure, and thereby minimise risk.495 Whereas PRI will provide 
certainty for investors and sponsors in a project company, it will not diminish 
risk altogether.  
                                                
495 See IMF, Public-Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington, 
IMF, 2006). 
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It can be concluded that the PRI model will further constrain a host state. The 
pressures of meeting contractual commitments may be directly contingent for 
tranche payments, or other extensive reforms. However, from an investor’s 
standpoint, incorporation of the PRI model would prove beneficial. Bodies like 
MIGA and OPIC are not just risk insurers. Their role as an advisory body, and 
their principal objectives associated with their parent bodies are an attractive 
prospect for investors to secure payment and deter default through the exercise of 
those powers. An interesting example is India’s Dabhol Power Project. As a 
consequence of non-payment by the State of Maharashtra’s Electricity Board, 
OPIC compensated sponsors for alleged expropriatory acts. As a result, OPIC 
sought to recover from the Indian Government the compensation it had paid to 
the insurance holders. On 10 October 2003, the United States Embassy in Delhi 
delivered a request to the Indian Ministry of Finance to commence negotiations 
for the reimbursement of OPIC for its losses with respect to the investment 
insurance. Later, an official request from OPIC’s president demanded a 
settlement under the India-United States bilateral treaty, and in 2005, almost two 
years after the initial request by OPIC to reimburse for the payment made to the 
investors on account of default by the State Electricity Board, a settlement was 
reached.496 It can thus be argued that the ancillary support for investors under a 
PRI instrument is favourable for the investors. 
It is interesting to conclude that even though the PRI model is not short term, 
neither is it a long-term solution. Its incorporation in Pakistan’s investment 
regime is fraught with both economic and policy implications in the longer run, 
                                                
496 Preeti Kundra, ‘Looking Beyond the Dabhol Debacle: Examining its Causes and 
Understanding its Lessons’ (2008) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 41(3) 907-936.  
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especially for the state. However, from an investor’s standpoint there is no better 
additional measure of security. The expertise that is associated with seeking PRI 
from multilateral bodies like MIGA will help not only to address short-term 
issues, but will assist in addressing the vacuum that exists in formulating long-
term policy, to avert an electricity crisis of a larger magnitude. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: Investment Security Reappraisal 
The premise of this thesis rests on the proposition that the issuance of security 
measures, albeit favourable for investors, are inadequate under the guise of 
sovereign guarantee. This thesis has undertaken an extensive review of the 
underlying features of the sovereign guarantee issued by the host state in the 
context of Pakistan’s energy sector. A detailed analysis outlines that investors are 
increasingly seeking measures in order to diminish or mitigate risk in highly-
leveraged debt-financed energy projects.  
In the context of rapid expansion, and in a bid to keep pace with the growing 
demand for infrastructure, host states have resorted to the private sector as a 
means of facilitating such projects. However, in view of the increasing 
challenges faced by host states, both politically and economically, it is hard to 
envisage how developing countries taking the shape of host state can provide 
robust measure of security to investors. This study approaches the question of 
adequacy of sovereign guarantees by introducing the highly-leveraged nature of 
infrastructure projects. An extensive discussion on project finance provides and 
facilitates a rudimentary understanding of this area: high debt to equity ratios 
within finance secured for the purpose of an infrastructure project. Furthermore, 
the highly-leveraged nature of project finance promotes sponsors and lenders to 
incorporate robust measures to not only deter default, but also provide a 
contractual assurance that is operative, in the event of a default perpetrated by 
the host state. Albeit such assurances are reflected in the cost of capital, and act 
as an aid to promote investment to developing countries, this environment of 
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security creates a multiplier effect, wherein one investment project creates 
opportunity for other projects to be initiated.  
In view of the highly-leveraged nature of the project finance transaction, one of 
the most commonly used measures of security offered by host countries is a 
sovereign guarantee. A succinct introduction to the concept underlying 
suretyship is provided. In order to understand the intrinsic nature of guarantee 
and indemnity instruments, a seamless transition from the underlying procedural 
and legal requirements in a guarantee transaction normative to the sovereign 
guarantee instrument is provided. This thesis has introduced and adopted a 
‘pendulum of responsibility’ model, to assist in understanding the dynamics of a 
guarantee and an indemnity instrument. The key feature of the two instruments is 
predicated on the understanding of secondary and primary liability. The 
imposition of such liability is contingent upon the default perpetrated by the 
principal debtor. The period of default has been categorised in pre-default and 
post-default scenarios. The repercussions of the two are different in view of the 
name accorded to each instrument being used.  
In addition to providing a reliable, more robust measure of security in an 
inhibited investment regime, the premise of a sovereign guarantee is also 
predicated upon the understanding that the host state is a superior risk bearer. 
Richard Posner submits that the superior risk bearer is ‘the party that is the more 
efficient bearer of the particular risk in question, in the particular circumstances 
of the transaction’.497 As a consequence, a party that can diversify and spread 
                                                
497 See Eric D Beal, ‘Posner and Moral Hazard’, (2000-2001) 7 Conn Ins L J 81. 
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risk498 is far more efficient than another party, and therefore such risk should be 
borne by the party that is best capable of spreading risk. In a sovereign guarantee 
spectrum, the state is the superior risk bearer. The state has the ability to avert 
any crisis, or manage a certain crisis in a manner that will avert the risk of 
default. In light of the discussion concerning the liquidity issues within the 
energy cycle in Pakistan, this study mainly focuses on the breach of contract by 
SOEs. There are two categories or dimensions of country risk. First, the political 
willingness to honour financial obligations is a concrete part of the risk at the 
time of investing. Second, the economic capability and capacity to honour 
financial obligations determines risk in a wider spectrum. Together, they are an 
integral part of the country risk dimension.499 Whereas it can be argued that 
political willingness will always be present to honour financial commitments in 
order to further political and economic agendas, fiscal constraints will be beyond 
a government’s capacity. 
One of the arguments that emerges in favour of a provision for a sovereign 
guarantee is predicated on the understanding that a host state, the state’s 
instruments, and functionaries are in a better position to manage and mitigate risk 
than a private investor. However, in view of restructured and decentralised role 
of the state, and the discussion concerning sovereignty, there is a presumption 
that the state is no longer wielding absolute power over the instruments within 
the state. There are external factors that are larger and perhaps not within the 
domain of the host state to manage. An extensive discussion in Chapter 1 
highlights the lack of regulation and inconsistency in policy as a critical factor 
                                                
498 See Eric D Beal, ‘Posner and Moral Hazard’, (2000-2001) 7 Conn Ins L J 81. 
499 See David Chaikin, ‘The political risk of offshore financial centres: The Cyprus bailout’, in 
Nigel Finch (ed), Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (1st Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
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affecting the energy sector and inhibiting development. Moreover, superior risk 
bearer phenomenon will not always lead to sensible results. For example, in 
Pakistan’s case there is an increasing concern demonstrated amongst investors 
that the SOEs will default on payments. As a result, it can be submitted that 
perhaps the risk of payment is better suited to be left at the behest of a third 
party, rather than being dependent upon the host state. 
In the event that the host state fails to provide adequate security measures to 
promote and sustain a consistent flow of investment funds, investors are 
increasingly seeking third parties to mitigate their risk. This model of security is 
predicated upon idea of redundancy inspired from the field of Engineering. The 
provision of two engines in a Boeing 747 provides a ‘safety net’, in the event that 
one of the engines fail.500 Similarly, a political risk insurance model is a 
redundancy method. If a state or SOE defaults on its payment tariff, then there is 
recourse that can be sought from the multilateral guaranty agency to indemnify 
the SPV.    
At a workshop hosted by the author in London, there was consensus amongst 
practitioners and academics that informal methods of risk mitigation, inter alia 
the use of joint ventures with local firms and engaging local leadership, are 
equally effective methods of mitigating risk. Some participants argued that they 
might be more efficient than more formal methods of risk.501 This study does not 
approve the informal approach, primarily because no concrete measures are 
                                                
500 For a brief introduction into the concept of redundancy in engineering please see the following 
article: John Downer, ‘When failure is an option: Redundancy, reliability and regulation in 
complex technical systems’, May 2009. Discussion Paper No 53 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/disspaper53.pdf> Accessed 3 May 2016. 
501 Workshop hosted in London on 26th January 2017 at London’s Centre for Commercial Legal 
Studies.  
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being agreed. Local leadership and their interests are like shifting sand; they 
change with the wind and waves. In the event that there is a change of political 
leadership, there may be adverse repercussions for the project company. Cases 
like HUBCO and Riqo Diq are a grim demonstration of how national courts are 
favourable towards their own governments.502 Despite forging local partnerships 
and engaging the political leadership, the principal sponsors in these cases 
suffered heavy losses, and in the case of Riqo Diq are still seeking compensation 
from the competent authorities.   
Despite project companies being issued a sovereign guarantee in both cases, it is 
clear that on grounds of public policy, the courts in HUBCO and Riqo Diq 
restrained the project companies from invoking arbitration proceedings. The 
court forged an argument for not referring matter to arbitration because, they 
contended, there was prima facie no legally enforceable/binding contract. The 
general belief is that a state will honour its transactions, because it owes this as a 
moral obligation to the investor, and by issuing a sovereign guarantee, their 
unfettered, unconditional and irrevocable support is with the project. However, in 
view of procedural impediments, and uncertainty pertaining to the corporate 
structure of the SOEs involved in the sovereign guarantee structure, it can be 
argued that the utility of such guarantees is tainted.   
This study then progresses further to discuss the primary contentions surrounding 
the sovereign guarantee structure normative to Pakistan’s energy sector. This 
discussion provides a seamless transition from the arguments presented in 
Chapter 3, in order to determine whether the current sovereign guarantee 
                                                
502 HUB Power Company Ltd v Pakistan WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841). 
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framework is adequate for the purposes of a guarantee structure under common 
law. Sovereign guarantee is a contract of obligation. Irrespective of the title 
accorded to the document, the primary purpose of such an obligation is to answer 
for some existing or future liability of another party, the principal, to a third 
party, the creditor.503 In an event where there is a default by a SOE, it is the state 
that resumes responsibility for the fulfillment of any obligation arising under a 
PPA or LoS. As a result, this section attempts to discuss the possibility that the 
current sovereign guarantee structure is problematic, because there is only a 
primary obligor, and consequently the state is guaranteeing its own performance. 
An attempt has been made to discuss the underlying adequacy of sovereign 
guarantees. This discussion attempts to evaluate whether for the purposes of a 
sovereign guarantee structure, there is a primary debtor and a guarantor; and 
secondly, whether the primary debtor’s obligations can be attributed to the 
guarantor.  
A discursive analysis of the nature of entities involved within a sovereign 
guarantee framework is presented. It is contended that the state is viewed as a 
group comprising individual units. If the responsibility of discharging the debt of 
the SOE rests with the state, there is no meaningful protection being offered. The 
prognosis of this thesis is threaded upon a thin line, wherein the corporate 
personality of the SOEs is being challenged. However, this thesis is not 
suggesting a displacement of company law’s cardinal rule of separate legal 
personality. Instead it refers to the Draft Articles as a measure of gauging 
whether the ultimate responsibility of discharging the debt of the project 
company does in fact rest with the state. Therefore, in view of the discussion 
                                                
503 Vossloh AG v Alpha Train (UK) Ltd (2010) EWHC 2443 (Ch). 
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undertaken surrounding suretyship structures, there is a likelihood that the 
guarantee framework is not being satisfied. This thesis undertakes an extensive 
review of the bodies involved in the sovereign guarantee framework and 
determines their position in light of Articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Articles. 
Whereas there are grey areas insofar as the functions that are carried out by 
PPIB, NTDC and CPPAG, it is submitted that there is no unequivocal evidence 
to suggest that these entities are in fact working within the organic structure of 
the state. However, neither is there a strong presumption that suggests that these 
entities are working at an arm’s length from the state. The current SOEs within 
Pakistan’s energy cycle currently have an ambiguous structure. They have been 
corporatised to the extent that they have separate boards, and in the case of 
NTDC and CPPAG, a corporate personality. However, the state still exercises 
some vital functions on behalf of these SOEs. In view of the discussion 
concerning sovereignty, it can be suggested that whereas these entities have been 
restructured, it is unlikely that the state’s involvement can be diminished 
altogether. It is therefore argued that even though this discussion is not 
conclusively suggesting that the sovereign guarantee framework is obsolete, 
there are some procedural inadequacies that taint the very foundations of such 
frameworks.  
In addition to reviewing the sovereign guarantee structure from a common law 
perspective, an extensive discussion on the expectation gap and the lack of 
conformity with legislative requirements is undertaken. The expectation gap 
argument extends the debate concerning the SOEs being part of the state’s 
organic structure. This section contends that the primary association of a 
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sovereign guarantee with the state is the real essence of its robust security 
measure. Whilst this argument is an abstract augmentation of the discussion, 
concerning the position of the law under guarantee provisions, there is an 
increasing association of such assurances with the state. Consequently, sponsors 
are led to believe that the entities providing such guarantees are, in reality, state 
organs. In the absence of such contention, the provisions of such guarantees 
resonate with an empty promise.  
The third strand of discussion refers to the legislative restrictions within 
Pakistan’s energy sector that may affect the issuance of such guarantees. This 
section provides an outline of the Debt Limitation Act 2005, which provides 
whether the provision of sovereign guarantee under the current rising debt 
figures expressly prohibits issuing such guarantees. The underlying rationale for 
employing such prohibitions is predicated on the economic scholarship that gross 
domestic debt accumulated to or exceeding 60% will cause an annual growth 
decline by 2%. The provision of sovereign guarantee is affected by such laws in 
place, which cater to wider economic stability within the country.  
In view of the three strands that have been discussed, this thesis submits that 
there is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that sovereign guarantees are an 
obsolete security measure; however, in view of the inadequacies that have been 
discussed, there is an increasing concern that there may be more efficient ways to 
mitigate risk than outright guarantees from states that are financially unable to 
satisfy debt.  
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In view of the ambiguities surrounding sovereign guarantees issued by host 
states, especially in Pakistan’s context, this thesis refers to the political risk 
insurance model as a measure of robust security. Without prejudice to the 
discussion on sovereign guarantees, this thesis refers to the risk insurance model 
not as a complete replacement for sovereign guarantees, but an additional form 
of safety net. It refers to the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, popularly known as MIGA. One of the primary themes that emerges 
throughout this study is predicated on the understanding that a ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ sounds more reassuring simply by virtue of containing the word 
‘sovereign’. However, the real application of a sovereign guarantee is contingent 
upon a state’s ability to pay. A weak fiscal regime or unstable economic 
conditions—rife in a developing country—will not facilitate a request made by 
the investor or the investment vehicle for payment of outstanding dues. On the 
contrary, prima facie risk insurance may seem beneficial for the investor or the 
lenders; they too are predicated on the state’s ability to pay. However, if a 
cognitive, normative analysis of the two is undertaken, it can be argued that risk 
insurance provides a far more robust protection package than the sovereign 
guarantee regime from a sponsor’s perspective. 
The PRI market as a whole has grown at an average rate of 12% per year for the 
last seven years, and MIGA’s business has been growing at an average rate of 
8% over the past 12 years.504 This growth is anticipated to expand even further, 
with the wide variety of products being introduced by MIGA and those already 
                                                
504 See MIGA, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17 <www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-
17_Strategy.pdf> Accessed 06 May 2017; See Oliver Ralph, ‘Future Risks’. Financial Times 
(London, 26 May 2016) 9. It is interesting to note that while MIGA observes that risk insurance 
is growing, this article notes a decline in the risk insurance market. The article notes that profits 
across the markets as a whole in 2015 were the lowest since 2011.  
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being offered by the Agency.505 MIGA’s Operational Regulations and 
Convention changes since 2009 have introduced new risk-mitigating measures. 
These measures will expand the agency’s coverage for risk, and prove beneficial 
for lenders and other capital market investors, especially in light of defaults due 
to state entities’ inability to meet their financial obligations. MIGA’s new credit 
enhancement products include: i) non-honouring of sovereign financial 
obligations506 and ii) non-honouring of financial obligations of SOEs.507 Unlike 
MIGA’s ‘breach of contract’ coverage, the recent introductions do not require a 
final arbitral award or court decision as a condition of payment of a claim. 
Breach of contract coverage has been subjected to criticism over the years, due to 
the judicial process which the investor has to undergo in the host countries.508 To 
an extent, developing or emerging economies like Pakistan, Nigeria, and India 
lack the technical knowledge or legal expertise within their judicial system to 
administer these complex cases. Even if they did, the time line for resolving such 
disputes is several years before any real outcome. The Nigerian National 
Petroleum case, discussed in Chapter 4, is stark reminder of this endemic issue. 
The international dispute resolution arena is full of examples of host states 
                                                
505 Also see Valentina Okaru-Bisant, ‘Overcoming challenges in the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency’s Risk Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: Corruption and 
Consumer Risks’, (2012) 57 S D L Rev 277. Bisant argues that ‘MIGA’s decision to expand its 
risk insurance guarantee to cover terrorism risk is commendable because it shows the agency’s 
willingness in some instances, to be flexible in responding to global political and economic 
changes and needs.’  
506 Introduced in 2010. Non-honouring of a sovereign financial obligation covers the risk that a 
sovereign fails to honour an unconditional financial payment obligation or guarantee, where the 
underlying project meets all of MIGA’s normal eligibility requirements.  
507 Introduced in 2013. See above. 
508 Breach of Contract is interpreted in slightly different ways across providers. For MIGA, 
breach of contract cover protects against loss arising from a government (including, in certain 
cases, SOEs) breach or repudiation of a contract with an investor, but requires that the investor 
invoke the dispute-resolution mechanism. In a study conducted in 2013, breach of contract and 
regulatory issues remained the most important political risk concerns for investors into 
developing economies, according to the annual MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey. 45% of 
respondents named breach of contract and 58% named adverse regulatory changes as the most 
important political risk they face in the next three years.  
 
269 
adjudicating disputes in their own judicial system and receiving favourable 
decisions. A brief outline of the recent cases concerning investment disputes 
highlights the poor measures and non-investor friendly approach by the Pakistani 
courts. This also provides a vindication of how poor is the quality of the ‘breach 
of contract’ provision within Article 11 in the Convention. It is primarily for this 
reason that MIGA has introduced new and innovative products in its scheme to 
promote investment.509 Insofar as the utility of MIGA’s risk insurance is 
concerned, it is argued that with the limitation of US$720million510 per country 
in a given year limits MIGA’s scope to promote investment.511 However, in view 
of the extensive projects undertaken by MIGA in the domain of the energy 
sector, it is an illustration of MIGA’s commitment to address the prevailing 
energy crisis in various developing countries. Whether MIGA will be effective 
on the scale required in order to tackle the energy crisis is questionable. 
However, the Gulpur Power Project512 provides evidence to suggest that MIGA’s 
                                                
509 Also see Valentina Okaru-Bisant, ‘Over-coming Challenges in the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency’s Risk Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: Corruption and 
Consumer Risks’, (2012) 57 S D L Rev 277. 
510 MIGA currently has a limit of US$720 million per country on a net basis. There is no 
minimum size limit for a project. At present, MIGA can cover up to $US220 million on a net 
basis per project. As outlined below, this can be supplemented through MIGA’s coinsurance and 
reinsurance programs. <https://www.miga.org/Pages/Who%20We%20Are/Frequently-Asked-
Questions.aspx#con4> Accessed 23 May 2017. 
511 Since 1997, MIGA has successfully used reinsurance to leverage its investment guarantee 
capacity. The methods used by MIGA are as follows: i) Syndication/ceding risk—whenever a 
project exceeds MIGA’s own capacity, the agency reinsures itself, through a syndication process, 
with private and public sector (re)insurance companies in order to meet its clients’ needs. 
MIGA’s main programs are facultative reinsurance and the cooperative underwriting program 
(CUP). ii) Assuming risk—in addition to attracting capacity from private and public insurers in 
order to support projects in its member countries, MIGA also provides such capacity to primary 
insurers. Currently MIGA providers this kind of assistance mainly to public insurers, but also 
welcomes inquiries from private insurers. MIGA’s ability to provide reinsurance is conditioned 
on, among other factors, whether the agency’s environmental and social policy clauses can be 
included in the contract of the primary insurer. 
<https://www.miga.org/Pages/Investment%20Guarantees/Reinsurance.aspx> Accessed 14 
August 2017.  
512 Gulpur Hydro Power Project is a project being undertaken by Mira Power Limited, a special 
purpose vehicle. The company is to design, construct, own, operate and maintain (in other words 
a BOOT project). The project’s total output is 100MW and is being adopted under the 
Government’s Pakistan Policy for Power Generation Projects 2002; see Report, ‘IFC offers 
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involvement can provide the safety net investors so eagerly desire. It can also be 
considered as a tool fit to encourage investors to direct their investment to 
economies like Pakistan.  
The debt-financing element or off-balance sheet finance aspect of project finance 
is ideal, primarily because debt is being raised on a newly incorporated entity’s 
future revenue stream. Project finance is used primarily to mitigate and manage 
risk. Its popularity is predicated upon the self-regulatory method, wherein risk is 
dealt with within the project company. However, project finance is often viewed 
as a short-term method of mitigating such risk. The negative implications of 
employing project finance are its debt-servicing aspect, which can be 
problematic in the medium and long run.513 Issuing ancillary instruments, inter 
alia sovereign guarantees, not only shifts risk from the SPV to the state, they are 
also supposedly more robust and certain. An interesting contention insofar as 
debt servicing from an emerging economies’ perspective, it is argued that 
countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, and other economically fragile countries have to 
borrow more to service their existing debt.514 This means that in order to make 
payments for a previously borrowed debt, they have to borrow more. This 
                                                                                                                               
$1.2bn to power, banking sectors in FY15’ Dawn Newspaper (Islamabad, 15 August 2015); 
MIGA has issued guarantees totalling US$82.7 million for the sponsor’s equity investments into 
the SPV. MIGA is providing coverage for up to 15 years against the risk of breach of contract. 
<https://www.miga.org/Lists/Press%20Releases/CustomDisp.aspx?ID=496> Accessed 08 May 
2017. 
513 Stanley Fischer, ‘The Economics of the Government Budget Constraint’ (1989) Policy 
Planning and Research Working Paper 224, The World Bank Office of the President, Washington 
DC.  
514 An interesting account on this is in Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, 
environmental impoverishment, and the crisis of development (Earthscan, 1994).  
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borrowing is affixed with a relatively higher rate of interest, further increasing 
the debt levels.515  
The importance of security measures in an investment regime can be gauged 
from the fact that Asia alone will require approximately US$24 trillion by 2030 
in order to meet its infrastructure demands. Consequently, it can be argued that 
capital flow will be determined not only by return, but risk will play a pivotal 
role to ensure that sufficient capital needs are met. As outlined earlier, risk 
cannot always be quantified. However, with the relevant risks mapped out, there 
is likelihood that they can be mitigated. There are significant measures that need 
to be enforced in order to meet and re-develop Pakistan’s energy sector. These 
measures include a complete overhaul within the regulatory framework, an 
extensive review of the policies, and, at least for the time being, a risk insurance 
model as a basis for large infrastructure projects. It is understood through 
research that blanket guarantees are not a measure of a successful investment 
regime. In fact, they prove to be unhealthy for such initiatives. Sovereign 
guarantees may be an indicator of a healthy investment forum, but in view of the 
default on payments it seems that such provisions have no real value. Instead an 
alternative approach to sovereign guarantees ought to be adopted. Conditional 
financial guarantees or indemnities, issued through contracting with the Treasury 
or Finance Ministry, and subject to a yearly premium, will not only provide a 
real measure of security, but may also diminish the risk of default under the 
current blanket guarantees, thus significantly improving the security regime in 
countries like Pakistan.  
                                                
515 Nadia Tahir, and Pervez Tahir, ‘Public Debt and Fiscal Responsibility in a Federal Structure: 
The case of Pakistan’ (2012) Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 27-47.  
 
272 
Bibliography 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Books 
Bhattacharyay N B Kawai, M, and M Nag R, Infrastructure for Asian 
Community (Joint publication of the Asian Development Bank Institute and 
Asian Development Bank with Edward Elgar, 2012) 
Kugelman M, Pakistan’s Interminable Energy Crisis: Is there any way out? 
(Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2015) 
McFarlane B, Hopkins N, Nield S, Land Law: Text cases, and materials (3rd 
edition, Oxford, 2015) 
Subedi S, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2nd 
Edition, Hart Publishing, 2012) 
Yescombe R E, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002) 
Wood P, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees and Legal Opinions (2nd 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 
Fatouros A, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University 
Press, 1962) 
Whitman M, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press,1965) 
Dolzer R and Schreuer C, Principles of International Investment (2nd Edition, 
Oxford, 2012) 
O’Caminal R, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) 
 
Articles 
William M Stelwagon, ‘Financing Private Energy Projects in the Third World’ 
(1996-1997) 37 Cath Law 45 
 
273 
Ibrahim F Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticisation of Investment Disputes: 
The roles of ICSID and MIGA’, 1 ICSID Rev: Foreign Investment L J 1 
Jonathan Eaton, ‘Public debt guarantees and private capital flight’, The World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol 1, No 3 (May, 1987), pp 377-395 
Alejandro D, ‘Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash’, Journal of 
Development Economics 19 (1985), 1-24 
M Breheny and J Beaven, ‘Australian federal and state government guarantees-a 
legal overview’ (1986) 4 J I B L 231 
Syed Sajid Ali and Sadia Babar, ‘Dynamics of circular debt in Pakistan and its 
resolution’, (2010) The Lahore Journal of Economics 15:SE, pp 61-74 
 
Working Papers 
Ryan Hogarth and Llmi Granoff, ‘Speaking truth to power: Why energy 
distribution, more than generation, is Africa’s poverty reduction challenge’ (May 
2015) OPM/Oxfam, Working Paper 418 < https://policy-
practice.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/FINAL_speakingpowertotruth_SH.
pdf>  
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, ‘The Role of Institutions in Growth and 
Development’ (2008) World Bank, Working Paper. 10 < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_10_Role_Institutions_G
rowth_Development.pdf>  
Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country risk from theory to practice’ (May 
2012) SACE 
<www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Public 
Sector Modernisation: Changing Organisational Structures (OECD Policy Brief, 
2004). 
 
Law Commission Reports 
Law Commission, Land Registration of the Twenty-First Century: A 
conveyancing Revolution (Law Com No 271, 2001) 
 
274 
 
Cases 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Chandra and another [2011] EWCA Civ 192 
Northshore Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc and others [2011] EWCA Civ 
230 
Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara Attenborough Associated Ltd [1997] AC 70 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 A C 773 
Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1993] Q B 109 
CiBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 
R v Rederiaktiebolaget Amphirite [1921] 3 K.B.500 
Commissioner of Crown Lands v Page [1960] 2 Q B 274 
Robertson v Minister of Pension [1949] 1 K B 227 
Vossloh Aktiengesellschaft v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2443 
Twycross v Dreyfus, 5 Ch D 605, 616 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529 
 
Newspaper Articles and Online Databases 
Sham Oirere, ‘Dismay at proposal to scrap Kenyan guarantee’ WindPower 
Monthly (Kenya, 01 May 2011) 
Keith D Larson, ‘New Incentives for Independent power projects in Nigeria’ 
Lexology (05.01.2011) <www.lexology.com/library>  
Mehtab Haider, ‘Budget deficit swells to 2.4pc of GDP in first half of 2016-17’ 
The News (Islamabad, 27 January 2017) 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/182083-Budget-deficit-swells-to-24pc-of-
GDP-in-first-half-of-2016-17> 
 
275 
Wajeeha Riaz, ‘Circular Debt: From where is all started’ Prime Institute (21 May 
2014) <http://www.primeinstitute.org/blog/circular-debt-from-where-it-all-
started> 
AFP, ‘For Pakistan, every day is a blackout with no end in sight’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 08 August 2012) <https://www.dawn.com/news/740705> 
David Pilling and Emily Feng, ‘Kenya’s $4bn railway gains traction from 
Chinese policy ambition’ The Financial Times (London, 4 April 2017) < 
https://www.ft.com/content/d0fd50ee-1549-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c> 
Michael Peel and Tom Mitchell, ‘Asia’s $26tn infrastructure gap threatens 
growth, ADB warns’ The Financial Times (Beijing, 28th February 2017) < 
https://www.ft.com/content/79d9e36e-fd0b-11e6-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4> 
 
Multilateral Institutions’ Reports 
Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector Investment 
(Supplementary Document 13, 2014) 
<www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-001-sd-04.pdf> 
Planning Commission of Pakistan and USAID, The Causes and Impacts of 
Power Sector Circular Debt in Pakistan (March 2013) 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KPHC.pdf 
International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: First review under the extended 
arrangement under the extended fund facility, request for waiver of 
nonobservance of a performance criterion and modification of performance 
criteria (IMF Country Report No. 14/1, January 2014) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1401.pdf> 
Asian Development Bank, Circular Debt Impact on Power Sector Investment 
(Supplementary Document 13, 2014) 
<www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked_documents/47015-001-sd-04.pdf> 
Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program 
(Performance Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-
energy-restructuring-program-0> 
World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises: A toolkit 
(Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World 
Bank, 2014) 
 
276 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Public-Private Partnerships, Government 
Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington, IMF. 2006) 
 
Chapter 2: Project Finance: A Primer for an Instrument for Risk Mitigation 
Books 
Ferran E and Chan Ho L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd Edition, 
Oxford, 2013) 
Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Masahiro Kawai and Rajat M Nag (ed), 
Infrastructure for Asian Connectivity, (ADBI/ADB and Edward Elgar, 2012) pp 
19-79 
Rich B, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, environment impoverishment, 
and the crisis of development (Island Press, 2013) 
Rossi E and Stepic R, Infrastructure Project Finance and Project Bonds in 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015) 
Yescombe, R E, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002) 
Nevitt P and Fabozzi F, Project Financing (7th Edition, EuroMoney, 2004) 
 
Articles 
Hugh G McCrory Jr, ‘Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries’, (April 
1995) American Society of International Law Vol 89, pp 19-36 
Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti, Alessandro Steffanoni, ‘Risk Shifting through 
non-financial contracts: Effects on Loans spreads and capital structure of project 
finance deals’, (October, 2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, 
No 7, pp 1295-1320 
Richard A Brealey, Ian A Cooper, and Michel Habib, ‘Using Project Finance to 
Fund Infrastructure Investments’, (1996) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
9, 25-38 
Benjamin C Esty, ‘Returns on Project Financed Investment: Evolution and 
Managerial Implications’ (2002) 15 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
 
277 
Rian Matthews, ‘Are courts undermining the flexibility of MAC clauses in 
finance documents?’ (2015) JIBFL 485 
Jamie Logie, ‘Restructuring natural resources projects in the emerging markets: 
features and challenges Part 2’, (2016) 2 CRI 73 
Williams A C, ‘Regulating the Impacts of International Project Financing: The 
Equator Principles’, (April 2013) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law), Vol 107, pp 303-308 
Kleimeier S and Megginson W, ‘An empirical analysis of limited recourse 
project finance’, (July 2001) University of Oklahoma, Michel F Price College of 
Business Working Paper Series. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=283969> 
Rajeev J Sawant, ‘The economics of large-scale infrastructure FDI: The case of 
project finance’, (August 2010), Journal of International Business Studies, Vol 
41, No 6, pp 1036-1055 
Cally Jordan, ‘How International finance really works’ (2013) 7(5) LFMR, 256-
264 
Frank Julien and Jean-Marc Lamontagne-Defriez, ‘Material Adverse Change and 
Syndicated Bank Financing: Part 1’ (2004) Journal of International Banking Law 
and Regulation 172 
Frank Julien and Jean-Marc Lamontagne-Defriez, ‘Material Adverse Change and 
Syndicated Bank Financing: Part 2’ (2004) Journal of International Banking Law 
and Regulation 193 
 
Working Papers 
Georg Inderst, ‘Infrastructure Investment, Private Finance and Institutional 
Investors: Asia from a Global Perspective’ (January 2016) ADBI Working Paper 
555 <http.ssrn.com/abstract=2721577> Accessed March 2016 
Christa Hainz and Stefanie Kleimeier, ‘Project Finance as a Risk management 
tool in International Syndicated Lending’, (December 2006) Governance and the 
Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), SFB/TR 15, Discussion Paper No. 183 
< https://ssrn.com/abstract=567112>  
Antonio Estache and John Strong, ‘The Rise the Fall, and…the Emerging 
Recovery of Project Finance in Transport’, (July 2000) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No 2385 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=630757> 
 
278 
Law Commission Reports 
N/A 
 
Cases 
Barclays Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306 (Comm) 
Pan Am Corp. v Delta Air Lines Inc, 175 B.R. 438, 514 (S D N Y 1994) 
BNP Paribas SA and others v Yukos Oil Co [2005] EWHC 1321 (Ch) 
 
Newspaper Articles and Online Articles 
Richard Martin, ‘India’s Energy Crisis’ MIT Technology Review (7 October 
2015) <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542091/indias-energy-crisis> 
Accessed 
GRATA, ‘Financing Renewable Energy Projects in Kazakhstan: Key Legal 
Challenges’ Gratanet (March, 2016) <www.gratanet.com> 
Dawn, ‘PM Nawaz inaugurates 102MW Gulpur hydropower project in AJK’ The 
Dawn (Islamabad, 15 October 2015) <https://www.dawn.com/news/1213248> 
 
Multilateral Institutions’ Report and International Reports 
World Bank, Making Politics Work for Development: Harnessing Transparency 
and Citizen Engagement (Policy Research Report, 2016) 
Antonio Estache and John Strong, ‘The Rise the Fall, and…the Emerging 
Recovery of Project Finance in Transport’, (July 2000) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No 2385 
Navroz K Dubash and Sudhir Chella Rajan, The Politics of Power Sector Reform 
in India (The World Resources Institute, 2 April 2001) 
<http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/powerpolitics_india.pdf>  
Asian Development Bank, ‘Pakistan: Gulpur Hydropower Project Non sovereign 
project, 47929-001’ <https://www.adb.org/projects/47929-001/main#project-
overview> 
 
279 
 
Chapter 3: Guarantee or Indemnity: An Old Chestnut Revisited 
Books 
O’Donovan J and Phillips J, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd Edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 
Hewitson T, Suretyship: Its Origin and History in Outline (1st Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1927) 
Kaser M, Roman Private Law (2nd Edition, Rolf Dannenbring Trans, 1968) 
Pennock R J and Chapman W J, Political and Legal Obligation (Nomos XII, 
Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 1970) 
Marks D and Moss G, Rowlatt on Principal and Surety (6th Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011) 
Andrews G and Millet R, The Law of Guarantees (6th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012) 
Whitman N V M, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press, 1965) 
Beale H, Chitty on Contracts: General Principles Volume I (31st Edition, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2012) 
Wood P, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions (The Law and 
Practice of International Finance Series, Vol 3, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell) 
 
Articles 
Willis D Morgan, ‘The History and Economics of Suretyship’ (1926-1927) 12 
Cornell L Q 153 
Philip K Jones, ‘Roman law Basis of Suretyship in some modern civil codes’ 
(1977-1978) 52 Tul L Rev 129 
William H Loyd, ‘The Surety’ (1917) 66 Uni of Penn L Rev 40, 42 
 
280 
Alan Berg, ‘Rethinking Indemnities, Part 1’ (2002) 9 Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 360 
Paul McGrath, ‘The nature of modern guarantees: IIG v Van Der Merwes’ 
(2009) 1 CRI 10 
David Hahn, ‘The Role of Acceleration’ (2009-2010) 8 DePaul Bus & Comm L 
J 229 
Alexander Van de Putte, David F Gates and Ann K Holder, ‘Political Risk 
Insurance as an Investment to reduce oil and gas investment risk and manage 
investment returns’ (2012) Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Vol 5, 
No 4 284 
 
Cases 
Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v The King [1921] 3 K B 500 
Spar Shipping AS v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd [2015] 
EWHC 718 
Harburg India Rubber Comb Company v Martin [1902] 1 K B 778 
Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 
Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 17 
Vossloh Aktiengesellschaft v Alpha Trains (UK) Limited [2010] EWHC 2443 
(Ch) 
Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd and others [1972] 2 W L R 1175 
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos [1980] 2 All ER 29 
General Produce Co v United Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255, 258. 
Pitts and Others v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 
HUBCO Power Company Ltd v Pakistan WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841) 
Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch & Others v Government of Balochistan & Others 
(PLD 2013 Supreme Court 641) 
Harbour Assurance v Kansa (1993) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455 
 
281 
Kleinwart Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Bhd [1989] 1 WLR 379, 
CA 
Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV, MSC Belgium NV [2008] EWHC 1265 
(Comm) 
Argo Caribbean Group Ltd v Lewis [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289 
Goulston Discount Co Ltd v Clark [1967] 2 Q B 493 
Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Unex Corp Ltd [1994] 38 Con L R 63 
IIG Capital v Van Der Merwe [2008] EWCA Civ 542 
Trafalgar House Construction (Regions) Ltd v General Surety & Guarantee Co 
Ltd [1996] A C 199 
Marubeni Hong Kong v Government of Mongolia [2005] EWCA Civ 395 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo v Gold Coast Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1806 
Sofaer v Anglo Irish Asset Finance Plc (2011) EWHC 1480 (Ch) 
Polak v Everett [1876] 1 QBD 669 
IPCO v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) [2016] UKSC 16 
 
Newspaper Articles 
The Economist, ‘The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course’ The 
Economist (London, 07 September 2013) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-
crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article> 
Barry Ritholtz, ‘Lehman didn’t cause the financial crisis, no matter what the 
partisans say’ The Washington Post (21 September 2013) 
 
Working Papers 
N/A 
 
 
282 
Online Articles 
RPC, ‘Sub-prime and related Northern Rock credit crisis force tighter lending 
criteria but put mortgage lenders and brokers at greater risk of mis-selling claims 
by existing customers’ Lexology (Dec 13, 2007) <www.lexology.com/library> 
 
Chapter 4: Sovereign Guarantees: Post Gunboat Diplomacy to Trade 
Diplomacy  
Books 
Andrews G and Millet R, Law of Guarantees (Sixth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011) 
Whitman V N M, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press, 1962) 
Colin Turpin, Government Contracts (1st Edition, Penguin) 
Donnelly J, Realism and International Relations (1st Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 
Finnemore M, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the use of 
force (1st Edition, Cornell University Press, 2003) 
Tomz M, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across 
Three Centuries (Princeton University Press 2007) 
Subedi P S, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle 
(Second Edition, Hart Publishing, 2012) 
Sauvant P K (eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy (Oxford, 
2010-2011) 
O’Caminal R, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) 
Seddon N, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (Fourth Edition, The 
Federation Press, 2009) 
Scott S H and Gelpern A, International Finance Law and Regulation (3rd 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 
 
283 
Federico S, Zettelmeyer J, Debt Defaults and lesson from a Decade of Crises 
(Cambridge MA. MIT Press, 2006) 
Rosenfield M and Sajo A (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional law (OUP, 2012) 
Loughlin M, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
Rousseau J J, Social Contract, in Rousseau, Social Contract and Discourses 
(London: Everyman, 1993) 
Popper K, The Open Society and its Enemies [1945] (Routledge, 2002) 
MacCormick N, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth (Law, State, and Practical Reason, Oxford, 1999) 
Barry A, Osborne T, and Rose N (eds), Foucault and Political Reason: 
Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government (1st Edition, 
University College London Press Limited, 1996) 
Wood P, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1995) 
Yescombe R E, Principles of Project Finance (Academic Press, 2002) 
Bamford C, Principles of International Financial Law (Second Edition, OUP, 
2015) 
Nevitt K P and Fabozzi F, Project Financing (7th Edition, Euromoney Books 
London, 2000) 
Hudson A, The Law of Finance (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 
Fatouros A A, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia 
University Press, 1962) 
Smith A, Wealth of Nations (Fourth Edition, Penguin Classics, 1999) 
Baird D, Gertner H.R, and Picker C. R, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1994) 
Bishop D R, Crawford J and Reisman M W, Foreign Investment Disputes: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, 
2014) 
 
284 
Ferran E and Chan Ho L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (Second Edition, 
OUP, 2014). 
Beale H, Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 
Wade W H, Administrative Law (11th Edition, OUP, 2014) 
 
Articles 
Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor and Vikrant Vig, ‘How Law Affects 
Lending’ (2010) 23(2) Review of Financial Studies 549  
George Affaki, ‘Increasing Access to Credit: Reforming Secured Transactions 
Laws’ (2010) International Trade Centre 
Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability under 
International Law’ (1995-1996) 18 Loyola L A Int’l & Comp 
Nick Seddon, ‘The Interaction of Contract and Executive Power’, 
<flr.law.an.edu.au/sites/flr.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Seddon.pdf> Accessed November 
2015 
Michael Feit, ‘Responsibility of the State Under International Law for the Breach 
of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity’ (2010) 28 Berkeley J Int’l L 
142 
Stephen Tierney, ‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-state national societies and 
contemporary challenges to the nation state’ (2005) 54 Int’l & Comp L Q 161 
Ellen C. Collier, ‘Congressional Research Service, Instances of use of United 
States forces abroad, 1798-1993’ (Oct 1993) <http//www.history.navy.mil/wars>  
Hali Edison, Ross Levine, Luca Ricci, and Torsten Slok, ‘International Financial 
Integration and Economic Growth’ (2002) 21 Journal of International Money and 
Finance 749 
Paul L Lee, ‘Central banks and sovereign immunity’ (2003) 41 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 327 
Arteta Carlos and Galina Hale, ‘Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private 
Sector’ (2008) Journal of International Economics, 74, pp 53-69 
 
285 
Tahir N and Tahir P, ‘Public Debt and Fiscal Responsibility in a Federal 
Structure: The case of Pakistan’ (2012) Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy, 
Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 27-47 
Ashis Nandy, ‘History’s Forgotten Doubles’ (1995) History and Theory 34, No 2 
Guido Sandleris, ‘Sovereign Defaults, Credit to the Private Sector, and Domestic 
Credit Market Institutions’ (March-April 2014) Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Volume 46, No 2-3 
Bauman Z, ‘Utopia with a Topos’ (2003) History of Human Sciences 16, no 
1:11-25 
Jayan Nayar, ‘On the Elusive Subject of Sovereignty’ (Nov 2014) Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 2014/17, Warwick Law School 
Dora T Kostakopoulou, ‘Floating Sovereignty: A Pathology or a Necessary 
Means of State Evolution? (2002) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 22(1) 
Janet McLean, ‘Government to State: Globalisation, Regulation, and 
Governments as Legal Persons’ (2003) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
Volume 10, Issue 1 
Peter Payoyo, ‘Economic Sovereignty in International Law: The state of the art’ 
(1990-1991) 65 Phil L J 129 
Richard N Haas, former ambassador and director of Policy Planning Staff, US 
Department of State, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, 
Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Centre for 
International Studies, Georgetown University, at 2 (Jan 14, 2003), transcript 
available at 
<http://www/georgetown.edu/sfs/documents/haas_sovereingty_20030114.pdf>  
John H Jackson, ‘Sovereignty—Modern: A new approach to an outdated 
concept’ (2003) American Journal of International Law, Vol 97 (4), 782-802 
Louis Henkin, ‘That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 Fordham L Rev 1 (1999) 
<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/1>  
Sol Picciotto, ‘The retreat of the state: Challenges to law and lawyers’ (2006) 
Regulatory Networks and Global Governance, Paper presented at the WG Hart 
Legal Workshop, Institute for Advanced Legal Study, University of London, 
London, 27-29, June 2009 
 
286 
Shoyele O, ‘State succession and governmental contracts in African states’ 
(1997) 9 Srilanka J International 125 
Seema Bono, Mark Hilgard, Sarah Reynolds and others, ‘Sovereign immunity 
and enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Navigating International Boundaries’ 
(2012) Working paper published by Mayer Brown 
<www.mayorbrown.com/publications/sovereign-immunity-and-enforcement-of-
arbitral-awards- navigating-international-boundaries-02-21-2012> 
Alexander Van de Putte, David F Gates and Ann K Holder, ‘Political risk 
insurance as an instrument to reduce oil and gas investment risk and manage 
investment returns’ (2012) Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Volume 
5, No 4, 284 
Vicki C Jackson, ‘Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and 
Judicial Independence’, (2003) George Washington International Law Review 
35, 521 
Kenneth Hansen, Robert C O’Sullivan, W Geoffrey Anderson, ‘The Dabhol 
Power Project Settlement—What happened? And How?’, The Infrastructure 
Journal <http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/a5aa1e52-4285-4bb5-
87e6-7201123895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-40fc-
a293-720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol_InfrastructureJournal12_2005.pdf> 
Jonathan Eaton, ‘Public debt guarantees and private capital flight’ (May 1987) 
The World Bank Economic Review, Vol 1, No 3 
Gautam Bhattacharyya, Victoria Reynolds and Antony White, ‘Differentiating 
and Identifying Primary and Secondary Liability Instruments in the Law of 
Guarantees’ (2005) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 488 
James Crawford, ‘Investment Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility’ (Spring 2010) ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal 
Vol 25 Number 1 
Larry C Backer, ‘Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-owned enterprises, and the Chinese Experience’ 
(2010-2011) 19 Transnt’l L & Contemp Probs 3 
Eilis Ferran, ‘Company law reform in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 5 Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 516 
White & Case, ‘White & Case Wins Award for Indian Investor Against Poland’, 
White & Case <https://www.whitecase.com/news/white-case-wins-award-indian-
investor-against-poland> 
 
287 
John Dewey, ‘The historic background of corporate legal personality’ (1925-
1926) 35 Yale L J 655 
Nick Seddon, ‘The interaction of contract and executive power’ (2003) Federal 
Law Review, Vol 31 
 
Working Papers 
Charles Calomiris, Mauricio Larrian, Jose Liberti and Jason Sturgess, ‘How 
Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity’ (2014) Working Paper 
Draft < http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/hit-refined/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/wp.020.pdf>  
Ayhan M Kose, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and Eswar Prasad, ‘Financial 
Globalisation: A Reappraisal’ (August 2006) International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper 06/189 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=934448> 
David Kennedy, ‘Power sector regulatory reform in transition economies: 
program and lessons learned’ (Feb 2003) EBRD Working Paper No. 78 < 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0078.pdf
> 
 
Cases 
Rederiaktiebolaget Amphirite v The King (1921) 3 K B 500 
NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina (2011) 2 AC 495 
Birkdale District Electric Supply Co Ltd v Southport Corporation (1926) AC 
355. 
Knighthead Master Fund LP and others v Bank of New York Mellon and another 
[2014] EWHC 3662 (Ch) 
Benkharbouche and another v Embassy of Republic of Sudan (2015) EWCA Civ 
33 
Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad (1958) AC 397 
Jones v IRC (1895) 1 QB 484 
 
288 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 
1970 
Bristol Airport Plc v Poudrill and others [1990] 2 WLR 1362 
Vossloh AG v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd (2010) EWHC 2442 (Ch) 
IIG Capital LLC v Van Der Merwe (2008) EWCA Civ 542 
Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV & Anor (2009) EWCA Civ 189 
Thomas Lakeman v J P Mountstephen (1874-75) L R 7 H L 
Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd (1897) A C 22 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) UKSC 34 
VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp (2013) UKSC 5 
Barclay Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Waypharm LP (2012) EWHC 306 (Comm) 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q B 529 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v Government of Pakistan, Directorate of 
Agricultural Supplies [1975] 1 W L R 1485, 1491 
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Sheedy [1927] A C 899 
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7 
Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11. 
Jan de Nul N V Dredging International N V v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No ARB/04/13 
Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No ARB/09/02 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegonia v Serbia and Montenegro) Judgement ICJ 
Reports 2007 
Dahanayaka v De Silva and others [1978] 1 SLR 41, 10 September 1979 
Flamingo Duty Free Shop Private Limited v The Republic of Poland, 
UNCITRAL, 12 August 2016 
 
289 
Bayindir Insaat Turzim Ticaret Ve Sanayi A S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ARB/03/29 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia, Award dated 3 March 2010, ICSID Case 
Nos. ARB/05.18 and ARB/07/15 
Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine, ARB No 080/2005 
Shehla Zia v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 Supreme Court 694) 
Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Ltd v Chalk (1975) AC 520, 533 
Commercial Cable Co v Newfoundland (1916) 2 A C 610 
Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 C L 
R 41 
Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 454 
Twycross v Dreyfus (1877) 5 Ch D 605 
 
Newspaper Articles 
Kashif Kiani, ‘Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to be completed by 2017’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 29 Jan 2015) <http://www.dawn.com/news/1160072> 
Nexif, ‘Financial close of 50 MW Metro Wind and signing of debt agreements 
for 50MW Gul Ahmed Wind—two power projects developed by Nexif in 
Pakistan’ Nexif Singapore (23 February, 2015) 
<http://www.nexif.com/news/pakistan-wind/>  
Timi Soleye, ‘Guest post: The imminent collapse of Nigeria’s power 
privatization is a good thing’ Financial Times (Lagos, 14 Oct 2014) 
<www.ft.com> 
Kiran Stacey, ‘Debt Burden slows India’s rollout of reliable electricity supply’ 
Financial Times (New Delhi, 20 February 2017). 
Victor Mallet and James Crabtree, ‘India restructures $35bn of power debt’ 
Financial Times (New Delhi, 24 September 2012) 
Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, ‘Top NTDC, NPCC officials suspended over power 
breakdown’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 30 January 2016) < 
http://www.dawn.com/news/1160445> 
 
290 
Iftikhar Alam, ‘Power Ministry all set to remove NTDC chief’ The Nation 
(Islamabad, 23 January 2016) < http://nation.com.pk/national/23-Jan-
2016/power-ministry-all-set-to-remove-ntdc-chief> 
Khaleeq Kiani, ‘IPPs suspend notices calling sovereign guarantees’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 12 Dec 2014) <http://www.dawn.com/news/1150322> 
Sabir Shah, ‘Pakistan external debt, debt-to-GDP ratio alarming’ The News 
(Islamabad, 01 February 2016) < http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/95260-Pak-
external-debt-debt-to-GDP-ratio-alarming> 
 
Online Material and Multilateral Institution/Government Documents 
International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, General Commentary’ [2001] 2(2) Y B Int’l L 
Comm’n 30, 31-32 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> 
Ayhan M Kose, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and Eswar Prasad, ‘Financial 
Globalisation: A Reappraisal’ International Monetary Fund Working Paper 
06/189 (August 2006)    
George Kopits, and Steven A Symansky, ‘Fiscal Policy Rules’ (1998) 
International Monetary Fund’s Occasional Paper 162 
World Bank Group, Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A 
toolkit’ (Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/World Bank, 2014) 
National Audit Office’s Report on UK Guarantees Scheme for Infrastructure, 
HM Treasury (Jan 2015) 
Gardner D and Wright J (HSBC) ‘Project Finance’ <www.hsbcnet.com-
gbm_attachments_products -services_financing-project- finance> 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 
Trillion Per Year, Double Previous Estimates’ ABD News Release (28 February 
2017) < https://www.adb.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-
year-double-previous-estimates> 
Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program 
(Performance Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-
energy-sector-restructuring-program-0> 
 
291 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Public-Private Partnerships, Government 
Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington, IMF, 2006) 
Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program 
(Performance Evaluation Report, Feb 2014) <www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-
energy-sector-restructuring-program-0> 
Private Power Infrastructure Board <http://www.ppib.gov.pk/N_legislation.htm 
 
Chapter 5: Political Risk Insurance: A Lasting Solution?  
Books 
Finch N, Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (1st Edition, The Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) 
Whitman V N M, Government Risk Sharing in Foreign Investment (Princeton 
University Press 1965) 
Wilkin S, Country and Political Risk: Practical Insights for Global Finance 
(Risk Books, 2004) 
James O’Donovan and John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (1st 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 
Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millet, The Law of Guarantees (6th Edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 
Krayenbuehl E T, Country Risk: Assessment and Monitoring (2nd Edition, 
Woodhead Faulkner) 
Comeaux E P and Kinsella S, Protecting Foreign Investment under International 
Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New 
York, 1997) 
Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental 
Impoverishment and the Crisis of Development (Island Press, The Centre for 
Resource Economics, 2013) 
Burchell G, Gordon C and Miller P, The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality (University of Chicago Press) 197-210 
 
292 
Asif H Qureshi and Andreas R Ziegler, International Economic Law (3rd Edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 
Ariel Buira (ed), Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country 
Perspectives (Published for G24 Research Program, Anthem Press, 2003) 
Baird G B, Gertner H R, and Picker C R, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1994) 62 
 
Articles 
Kenneth Hansan, Robert C O’Sullivan and W Geoffrey Anderson, ‘The Dabhol 
Power Project Settlement: What Happened? And How?’ 
Infrastructurejournal.com 
<http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/a5aa1e52-4285-4bb5-87e6-
7201123895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-40fc-a293-
720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol_InfrastructureJournal12_2005.pdf>  
Celine Tan, ‘Risky business: Political risk insurance and the law and governance 
of natural resources’ (2015) Int’l Journal of Law in Context, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp 
174-194 
Don Wallace, Jr and David B Bailey, ‘Exceptions and Conditions: The 
Inevitability of the National treatment of FDI with increasingly few and narrow 
exceptions’ (1998) 31 Cornell Int’l L J 615, 616 
Perera M S, Techniques in Protecting Foreign Investments against political risk 
(University Microfilms International, 1986) 
Motomichi Ikawa, ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1999) 31 Stud 
Transnational Legal Policy 21 
Adam L Masser, ‘The Nexus of Public and Private in foreign direct investment: 
An analysis of IFC, MIGA, and OPIC’ (2008-2009) 32 Fordham Int’l L J 1698 
A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘The pursuit of stability in international energy 
investment contracts: A critical appraisal of the emerging trends’ (2008) Journal 
of Energy Law & Business, Vol 1, No 2 121 
Michael C Blair, ‘The Conversion of Guarantee Contracts’, (1966) 29 Mod L 
Rev 522 
 
293 
Patrick J Donovan, ‘Creeping Expropriation and MIGA: The need for tighter 
regulation in the political risk insurance market’ (2003-2004) 7 Gonz J Int’l L 1 
Rashid Dar R M, Azeem M, Ramzan M, ‘Impact of Energy Consumption on 
Pakistan’s Economic Growth’ (2013) International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Science Innovation Vol 2 Issue 6 < 
http://www.superior.edu.pk/Images/Research/6.pdf> 
Valentina Okaru-Bisant, ‘Overcoming Challenges in the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency’s Risk Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: 
Corruption and Consumer Risks’, (2012) 57 S D L Rev 277 
Hasan S Zakariya, ‘Insurance against the political risk of petroleum investment’ 
(1986) 4 J Energy & Nat Resources L 217 
Paola Morales Torrado, ‘Political Risk Insurance and Breach of Contract 
Coverage: How the Intervention of Domestic Courts may Prevent Investors from 
Claiming Insurance’ (2005) 17 PACE Int’l L Rev 301 
Kessler E, ‘Political Risk Insurance and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation: What happened to the Private Sector?’ (1992) 13 N Y L Sch J Int’l 
& Comp L 203, 204 
Heena R Bakshi and R B Saxena, ‘IMF Conditionality—A Third World 
Perspective’ (1988) 22 Journal of World Trade, Issue 5, pp 67-79 
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, ‘Making sense of the IMF Conditionality Debate’ (1983) 
17 J World Trade L 115 
Robert B Shanks, ‘Insuring investment and loans against currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence’ (1985-86) 9 Hastings Int’l 
& Comp L Rev 417 
S Linn Williams, ‘Political and other risk insurance: OPIC, MIGA, EXIMBank 
and other providers’ (1993) 5 Pace Int’l L Rev 59 
Robert B Shanks, ‘Insuring investment and loans against currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence’ (1985-86) 9 Hastings Int’l 
& Comp L Rev 417 
Fortier Y L and Drymer L S, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International 
Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor’ (2005) 13 Asia Pac L 
Rev 79, 81 
 
294 
Tamada Dai, ‘Assessing Damages in Non-Expropriation Cases Before 
International Investment Arbitration’ (2009) 52 Japanese Y B Int’l L 309 
Zeyad A Al Qurashi, ‘Indirect expropriation in the field of petroleum’, (2004) 5 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 897 
David Blumental, ‘Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International 
Energy Projects’ (1998) 16 Berkeley J Int’l L 267, 271-72 
George Chifot, ‘Caveat Emptor: Developing international disciplines for 
deterring third party investment in unlawfully expropriated property’ 33 Law & 
Policy Int’l Bus 179, 183-84 
Barry Appleton, ‘Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective’ (2002) 
11 N Y U Envt’l L J 35 
L Yves Fortier, CC, QC and Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the 
Law of International Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor’ 
(2005) 13 Asia Pacific L Rev 79 
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, ‘Permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
the sanctity of contracts, from the angle of Lucrum Cessans’ (2014-15) 12 Loy U 
Chi Int’l L Rev 153 
Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘The settlement of disputes regarding foreign investment: 
the role of the World Bank, with particular reference to ICSID and MIGA’ 
(1986) 1 Am U J Int’l L & Policy 97 
Motomichi Ikawa, ‘Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1999) 31 Stud 
Transnational Legal Policy 21 
Richard B Alsop, ‘The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency’, 
(1986-1987) 25 Colum J Transnational L 101 
Patrick J Donovan, ‘Creeping Expropriation and MIGA: The need for tighter 
regulation in the political risk insurance market’ (2003-2004) 7 Gonz J Int’l L 1 
Nazanin Baseri, ‘Credit Default Swaps and Clearing’ (2011) American 
University Legislation and Policy Brief, 7-38 
Angus Duncan, ‘Loan-only Credit Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity’ 
(Sept-Oct 2006) 21 Com Lending Rev 15, pp15-18 
Steven A Sibo, ‘Credit Default Swaps: How should they be regulated’ (2013) 
Dartmouth Law Journal, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp 54-81 
 
295 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D Logue, ‘Outsourcing regulation: How insurance 
reduces moral hazard’ (2012-2013) 111 Mich L Rev 197 
Henry Kolbus, ‘The Moral Hazard and the Increased Risk’ (1948) Ins L J 731 
Andres Curia Miranda, ‘Moral Hazard and how it was invoked in the Northern 
Rock crisis of 2007’ (2010) 2 King’s Student L Rev 27 
Tom Baker, ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’ (1996-1997) 75 Tex L Rev 
237  
Kevin Dowd, ‘Moral Hazard and the financial crisis’ (2009) 29 Cato J 141 
Eric D Beal, ‘Posner and Moral Hazard’, (2000-2001) 7 Conn Ins L J 81 
Vance R Koven, ‘Expropriation and the Jurisprudence of OPIC’ (1981) 22 
Harvard International Law Journal 269, 270 
Preeti Kundra, ‘Looking Beyond the Dabhol Debacle: Examining its Causes and 
Understanding its Lessons’ (2008) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
41(3): 907-936 
 
Cases 
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No ARB/99/6 12 April 2002, para107 
<www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/me_cement_award.pdf> 
S D Myers, Inc (US) v Canada, First Partial Award, paras 117, 123, 127, 40 
I.L.M. 1408 (2001) (NAFTA Ch 11 Arb Inb 2000) 
<www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_sdmyers.htm> 
IPCO (Nigeria) Limited v Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (2017) 
UKSC 16 
Prudential Insurance Co v IRC (1904) 2 K B 658 
Zuhal K [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 151 
Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 W L R 828 
Harley Davidson, Inc v Minstar, Inc 41 F 3d 341 (7th Cir 1994) 
Dane v Mortgage Insurance Corp Ltd [1894] 1 Q B 54 
 
296 
Seaton v Heath (1899) 1 Q B 782 
 
Newspaper Articles 
Shahbaz Rana, ‘Pakistan has received $49 billion in the last 10 years’ The 
Express Tribune (Islamabad, 7 August 2015) 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/933617/foreign-loans-pakistan-has-received-49-
billion-in-last-10-years/> 
Editor, ‘Energy Crisis besetting industries’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 20 July 2014) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1120432> 
Editor, ‘Statistics on Textile Industry in Pakistan’ The Tribune (Islamabad, 18 
March 2013) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/522292/statistics-on-textile-industry-
in-pakistan/>  
Timi Soleye, ‘Guest post: The imminent collapse of Nigeria’s power 
privatisation is a good thing’ Financial Times (Lagos, 21 Oct 2014).   
BBC, ‘Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%’ BBC (London, 13 
February 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873>   
Salman Siddiqui, ‘Pakistan will be paying China USD90bn against CPEC-related 
projects’ The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 12 March 2017) 
George Arnett, ‘Foreign direct investment: which countries get the most?’ The 
Guardian (London, 24 June 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/jun/24/foreign-direct-
investment-which-countries-get-the-most> 
Ali Salman, ‘Foreign exchange: An emerging black market from within a tight 
noose’ The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 13 April 2015) 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/868775/foreign-exchange-an-emerging-black-
market-from-within-a-tight-noose>  
Houreld K and Golovnina M, ‘World Bank approves $12 billion, five year-loan 
for Pakistan: Finance minister’ The Reuters (2 May 2014) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-worldbank-loan-
idUSBREA4108N20140502> 
Muhammad Amir Rana, ‘The CPEC trick’ The Dawn (Islamabad, 24 April 2016) 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1253998>  
 
297 
Editor, ‘Pakistan suffered loss of $188bn during war on terror’ The Dawn 
(Islamabad, 4 June 2016) 
Yuan Yang, ‘China tightens control of personal forex purchases’ Financial 
Times (Beijing, 1 January 2017) 
 
Working Papers 
Raoul Ascari and Federica Pocek, ‘Country Risk from theory to practice’ (May 
2012) SACE 
<www.sace.it/docs/default/wp_sace_n15_countryrisk_en_pdf.pdf?> 
 
Online Material and Multilateral Institution Documents 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market 
Countries’ (September 18, 2003) Report of the Working Group of the Capital 
Markets Consultative Group (CMCG) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/cmcg/2003/eng/091803.HTM> 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Public-Private Partnerships, Government 
Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington, IMF, 2006) 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
<https://www.miga.org/who-we-are/miga-convention> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk 
(2011) <www.miga.org; 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=393> 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment 
Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance (2015) UNCTAD 
<www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> 
Asian Development Bank, ‘Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion Per 
Year, Double Previous Estimates’ ADB News Release (Manila, 28 February 
2017) < https://www.adb.org/news/asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-
year-double-previous-estimates> 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
<www.unctad.org.fdistatistics> 
 
298 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Division on Investment 
and Enterprise, UNCTAD Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the 
Operations of TNEs, Volume I (FDI Flows and Stocks) 
<www.unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationsArchieve.aspx?publicationid=393> 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), South-South 
Cooperation in International Investment arrangements, (UNCTAD Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development, 2005) 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=424> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA Annual Report 2000 
<www.miga.org>  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2003 
<www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk 
(2012) 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 2013 World Investment and 
Political Risk (2013) World Bank <www.miga.org/documents/WIPR13.pdf> 
Also see Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Investment Guarantee 
Guide (July 2015) <www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2016 
<www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2005 (Washington, 
MIGA) <www.miga.org>  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Repot 2006 (Washington, 
MIGA) <www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17 
<www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_ FY15-17_Strategy.pdf> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2003 (Washington, 
MIGA) <www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Repot 2006 (Washington, 
MIGA) <www.miga.org> 
The World Bank, Report on MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(September/October, 1985) 
 
299 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk 
2009 <www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk 
2011 < www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA Strategic Directions FY15-17, 
MIGA (2015) www.miga.org/documents/MIGA_FY15-17_Strategy.pdf 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2008 
<www.miga.org> 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annual Report 2010 
<www.miga.org> 
